POPULISM AND COLLECTIVE MEMORY
COMPARING FASCIST LEGACIES IN WESTERN EUROPE

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You wish to know where my true loyalties lie?
Not with any king or queen, but with the people.
The people *who suffer under the despots and prosper under the just rule.*
The people *whose hearts you aim to win.*[1]

– We need a system where the politicians sit down and discuss the problem, agree what's the interest of all the *people*, and then do it.
– That's exactly what we do. The trouble is that *people* don't always agree.
- Well, then they should be made to.[2]

I am tired of the people *with power running this country.*
This is a fight between the people *with power and poor* people*, weak* people.
If I am elected […] those who never had a voice will have a voice.[3]

There's *people* in this country who are sick and tired.
Tired of hearing all the rhetoric, tired of Washington
failing us while they pat their own backs.
Finally someone comes along who says what he feels.
That's why *people* like him: because say what you want,
at least he doesn't sound like another politician.[4]

[1] Varys in *Game of Thrones*, Season 7, Episode 2.
[2] Anakin Skywalker and Padmé Amidala in *Attack of the Clones*, 2002.
[3] Pablo Escobar in *Narcos*, Season 1, Episode 3.
[4] Man in a bar in *South Park*, Season 20, Episode 3 (on Donald Trump).

Abstract

This work points to the importance of different political cultures when studying the social acceptability of populist discourses. Following the literature on political and economic factors behind the electoral success of populist actors, it remains unexplained why populism thrives in certain countries but not in others. This is the case because beyond socio-economic and political-institutional factors that trigger populism on the short term, one must not forget long-term, cultural elements that might close down or open up the window of opportunity for populist discourses. In Western Europe the social acceptability of the populist idea of power is linked to the collective memory that a certain country developed about the fascist past. In turn, different collective memories produce different levels of stigmatization of that past. Where the fascist idea of power is *taboo*, a no-go area, populist discourses are also stigmatized and relegated to the margins of public debates. Conversely, populist discourses enjoy a widespread social acceptability in countries where the fascist past is not stigmatized. The fascist past resonates with the populist present because populism and fascism share several illiberal elements. As soon as a strong stigma is attached to the fascist past, also the populist idea of power is considered as a threat to several pillars of liberal democracy such as pluralism, minority rights, and division of powers. This study stresses the relevance of long lasting cultural elements in the study of populism's social acceptability, and develops a new typology of collective memory that can explain the degree of stigma of the fascist past in eight West European countries, and therefore the social acceptability of populist discourses.

Each country's type of collective memory is analyzed through the study of the relevant literature, and finally a level of stigmatization of the fascist past is attributed to each country. Moreover, a content analysis of 173 party manifestos is performed in order to obtain a measure for the social acceptability of populist discourses over four decades combining the percentage of populist statements in manifestos with the vote share and degree of radicalism of each party. Four conditions usually associated with the electoral success of populist actors are tested, but the results of a QCA analysis show that these four elements fail to explain why populism is socially acceptable in certain countries while it remains taboo in others. Economic performance, levels of corruption, ideological convergence of the political spectrum, accountability and responsiveness of the democratic system: all this factors cannot explain the social acceptability of populist discourses across countries. It means that some unobserved, latent factors have been left out of the picture. For this reason, the analysis is repeated one more time with the inclusion of a new, crucial factor: the levels of stigma of the fascist past. The findings clearly point to the fact that *right-wing* populism is more or less acceptable in different countries according to the degree of stigma associated to the fascist past. This confirms the importance of national political cultures in defining which ideas of power are socially acceptable and which ones are, conversely, taboo and stigmatized. The social acceptability of populism, and in particular of right-wing populism, is therefore linked to a combination of short-term contingent factors and long-term cultural elements.

Preface and Acknowledgments

During the last four years populism has been constantly at the centre of academic debates and a recurrent topic in mainstream media all over the world. I am grateful to the Swiss National Science Foundation for giving me the opportunity to work on such a thrilling topic by funding my research through the NCCR program *Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century*. I am grateful in particular to all the colleagues at the University of Zurich, both at the institutes of Political Science and Media Studies, with whom I had long and insightful discussions. Without them, this work would have not been possible. Thanks to Michele Strebel, Michi Amsler, Edward Weber, Saskia Ruth, Martin Wettstein, Laurent Bernhard, Simon Bornshcier, Anne Schulz, Nicole Ernst, and Dominique Wirz. A special mention goes to Doreen Spörer-Wagner, for her guidance through the perils of a PhD.

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Introduction – Populism and the Fascist Legacy

It is difficult to fully grasp the current wave of populism in Western Europe because short-term economic and political factors often fail to explain the social acceptability of populist discourses across countries. While the vast majority of studies point to contingent demand and supply side factors that are supposed to explain the electoral success of populist discourses, this study shows the importance of considering populism from a *long-term perspective* in order to understand its social acceptability. The populist idea of power is circulating in every public debate across Europe, but its social acceptability is strongly determined by *cultural* elements.

Without this historical approach, it would be impossible to explain why populism is socially acceptable in certain countries while it is *taboo* in others. The presence of high levels of corruption combined with a poor economic performance and growing inequalities, for example, might not lead to the success of populist discourses. Similarly, in a country with a growing economy and a responsive political system there might be the presence of several and successful populist actors. This can only be explained by adopting a long-term perspective that focuses on the stigma generated by different collective memories of the fascist past. Only in this way it is possible to make sense of the different levels of populism's social acceptability across West European countries.

Naturally, long-term legacies that determine the *Salonfähigkeit* of populism always interact with short-term socio-economic and political-institutional factors. It is impossible to ignore that in Western Europe populist movements, parties, and leaders often settle the political debate and obtain remarkable electoral results. Populist discourses have become *mainstream* in liberal democracies to the point that the political climate characterizing the last two decades has been described as populist *Zeitgeist*.[5] When the political system is perceived as 'out of touch' and isolated in its ivory tower, and those in power do not deliver on their promises, citizens want to be heard and to hold their representatives accountable. If the media add fuel to the fire of supranational integration and refugee crisis, the perfect cocktail is served, and populism becomes a very effective way to mobilize resentment by offering redemption from the *old politics* and by exploiting the fears of constituencies disoriented by modernization.

This means that when trying to understand the mechanisms determining the social acceptability of populist discourses across countries, one must constantly bear in mind that populism is increasingly successful in elections and often accepted in the political debate. Indeed, the data examined in this work confirm a growing presence of populist discourses in West European party manifestos. This indicates that short-term supply and demand side conditions are favourable for populism to thrive.

In times of protracted economic crisis and deterioration of the credibility of political parties and institutions, the growing political weight of populist actors should not come as a

[5] Mudde (2004).

surprise. Indeed, populism gains traction when the gap between representatives and represented grows to a critical point, which is why it can be considered as a potential "*barometer*" of the health of representative politics (Taggart 2002, 71): high levels of populism might indicate the malfunctioning of liberal and constitutional democratic mechanisms. Moreover, by observing previous waves of populism one can notice that socio-economic turbulence and political transformations have always been key factors for the success of populism. If one considers that the last three decades in Western Europe have been marked by the Great Recession, the process of supranational integration, and the flow of migrants from the Middle East and Northern Africa, the boisterous success of populism becomes the obvious ending of a well-known story rather than a flash in the pan.

Socio-economic and political-institutional factors, however, are only a part of the explanation and they must be considered in *interaction* with the national political culture of each country, which can either prevent or foster the social acceptability of populism. Indeed, it is remarkable to observe that the social acceptability of populist discourses greatly varies across countries which are experiencing the same transformations and turbulences with a similar timing. This suggests that in certain countries populism does not thrive despite the presence of favourable conditions, and vice versa. While certain countries can be considered as 'populist paradises' (e.g. Italy, Switzerland, Austria), in other countries populist discourses do not have enough legitimacy to leave the periphery of the public debate and become a credible alternative (e.g. Sweden, Germany). Why is that the case?

To better understand the cross-country variation of populism's social acceptability one must observe how short-term social, economic, and political factors interact with *cultural* elements. In particular, different collective memories of the fascist past can open up or, conversely, close down windows of opportunity for the social acceptability of populist discourses. By observing different re-elaborations of that past it is possible to determine the degree of stigma attached to it, and therefore the *Salonfähigkeit* of populist discourses in a given society. This explains why populist discourses are widespread and electorally successful in countries where short-term factors seem unfavourable, and vice versa.

The degree of stigmatization of the fascist past is determined by four different types of re-elaboration: culpabilizaiton, heroizaition, cancellation, and victimization. In countries characterized by *victimization* – producing a very low degree of stigma of the fascist past – populism is particularly acceptable. By contrast, in countries characterized by *culpabilization* – producing a very high degree of stigma – populism is taboo and therefore socially unacceptable, at the margins of the public debate.

It is not surprising to observe that, in particular, it is the social acceptability of *right-wing* populism that proves to be highly linked to the levels of *stigma of the fascist past*. Indeed, the authoritarian past in Western Europe is represented by the *fascist* regimes in power in Italy in Germany between 1922 and 1945.[6] Countries which did not deal with the fascist

[6] In Portugal António Salazar remained in power until 1974 and Francisco Franco in Spain until 1975. However, the memories of these two regimes after 1945 follow a different trajectory compared to the one relevant for the present study.

legacy in a profound and responsible manner are therefore supposed to constitute a fertile ground for right-wing populism to thrive, and vice versa.

For example, while Germany took responsibility for its past and admitted its guilt (a process called *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*), Austria shifted the blame and refused to critically deal with its past. These two opposite types of collective memory produce respectively a very high and very low degree of stigmatization of illiberal elements. Given the fact that the two countries have similar levels of, say, economic development or accountability and responsiveness of the political system, one can hypothesize that their different types of collective memories about the fascist past respectively trigger and block the social acceptability of populism.

A key element of this argument is represented by the *elective affinities* between populism and fascism. On the one hand, the two are extremely different phenomena and the aim is not to collapse the two concepts on each other to the point of making them undistinguishable.[7] What matters here is the fact that the populist idea of power is often portrayed as a dangerous political ideology vis-à-vis liberal and constitutional ideas of power precisely because of its *illiberal elements*, which strongly resonate with certain traits of the fascist idea of power in contrast to liberal and constitutional democracy.

[7] For example, contrary to populism, fascism also includes para-militarism, corporatism and imperialism. Similarities and differences between populism and fascism are thoroughly discussed by Eatwell (2017). Among other things, the author argues that, unlike fascism, populism is a form of democracy, albeit not liberal democracy.

This negative characterization of populism is very much present in the European collective imagination. Politicians accused of being populist are often implicitly linked to the cumbersome legacy of the twentieth century, hence to the absence of democracy.[8] Indeed, the term *populist* is often evoked in European politics in order to label someone as an anti-democratic demagogue, and populism is ultimately seen as a proto-totalitarian and illiberal ideology, because the populist idea of power is at odds with the liberal and constitutional types of democracies which became dominant in Western Europe in the aftermath of World War II.[9]

The tension between liberal and populist ideas of power is the expression of opposite types of democratic qualities: rule of law versus majoritarianism; checks and balances versus unmediated exercise of power; constitutionalism versus unconstrained will of the people; division versus concentration of powers.[10] The fascist past resonates as soon as politicians articulate one of these points and criticize representative politics.

This study does not constitute the first attempt to explain cross-country and longitudinal variations in the presence of populism. Nonetheless, it displays three innovative elements concerning, respectively, the measurement of populist messages, the amplitude of the

[8] In 2012, then EU President Herman van Rompuy and then European Commission President Barroso, warned against the danger for democracy represented by populism, followed by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, and Prime Minister of Norway Erna Solberg.

[9] As it will become evident in Chapter 1, whether or not populism is a threat depends on the normative idea of democracy used as a yardstick for comparison.

[10] Slater speaks of a "tension between democratic inclusivity and democratic constraints", and of a "friction between vertical and horizontal accountability" to describe the relationship between different ideas of democracy based on different levels of liberalism (2013, 732).

data used for the analysis, and the introduction of a novel condition linked to the presence of populism. First, the discursive dimension of populism is taken into consideration. This means that the phenomenon to be explained is the *Salonfähigkeit* or social acceptability of populist discourses, measured as the combination of levels of *populism in party manifestos*, the parties' degree of *radicalism* and their *electoral performance*. Second, the presence of populist discourses is measured in eight West European countries since the 1970s through an extensive content analysis of 173 party manifestos.[11] Third, this study introduces the idea that collective memories are connected to the social acceptability of populism and starts from the assumption that *socio-economic and political-institutional factors are complementary to cultural opportunity structures in explaining different levels of populist discourses*.

Structure of the dissertation

The structure of this work follows several steps in order to test whether the levels of stigma of the fascist past – in interaction with traditional demand and supply side factors – can explain the social acceptability of populism. The first task consists in illustrating the theoretical framework used in order to operationalize and measure populism, as well as the link between the populist idea of power, fascism and liberal democracy (Chapter 1). Once clarified how populism is understood and conceptualized, Chapter 2 presents the existing literature about the conditions that are supposed to explain the electoral success

[11] Such an extensive content analysis has been possible thanks to the NCCR Democracy program: *Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century* (Module 2: *Populism in the Context of Globalization and Mediatization*).

of radical right-wing parties. This literature, however, focuses on a mono-dimensional idea of populism as a right-wing and often extremist political ideology. Moreover, short-term supply and demand side factors appear to leave unexplained part of the cross-country variation in terms of populism's social acceptability. Hence it is introduced the idea that different collective memories determine different degrees of stigmatization or acceptation of populism and therefore play a role in triggering or blocking the social acceptability of populist discourses (Chapter 3).

The research design is presented in Chapter 4. It provides all the details concerning the operationalization and measurement of populist discourses in party manifestos, a discussion of the case selection, and a brief description of the methodology implemented. Chapter 5 presents the results of the content analysis and offers an overview of the presence of populism. The percentage of populist statements in party manifestos is weighted by the vote share and degree of radicalism of each party, thus providing a measure for the social acceptability of populism across countries and over time. Chapter 6 presents the relevant literature about each country's type of re-elaboration in order to establish, for each case, the overall level of stigmatization of the fascist past.

Chapter 7 tests the role of several conditions usually associated to the electoral success of populism. Derived from the literature review presented in Chapter 2, these supply and demand side factors are supposed to trigger the social acceptability of populism. The analysis assesses the presence of sufficient and necessary conditions for the social acceptability of populist messages in eight West European countries over the last three

decades. Chapter 8 finally tests the impact of the degree of stigma associated to the fascist past. It shows to what extent long-term cultural factors are essential in explaining the social acceptability of populist discourses. The Conclusions aim at proposing directions for future research as well as to assess the generalizability of the findings outside Western Europe.

Chapter 1 – Taxonomy of a Chameleon: the Populist Idea of Power

This chapter aims at clarifying the object of this study. It is essential to situate the chosen approach to populism among the burgeoning literature on the topic, which originates from different disciplines and relies on different concepts. What is populism, and how can its presence be measured in party manifestos? How is it possible to understand the relationship between populism and democracy, and how does this impact the possible explanatory models for its social acceptability?

Christoph Blocher in Switzerland and Beppe Grillo in Italy, Nigel Farage in the United Kingdom as well as Jean-Luc Mélenchon in France – despite being erratically positioned along the right-left and authoritarian-libertarian (or GAL-TAN) axes – share a common element: they articulate populist discourses. They express an ideology, a vision of the world, which on the one hand celebrates the common people as the only legitimate source of power, and on the other hand represents the economic, cultural, and political elites as the enemy, the cancer of society, a clique of intrigues and corruption which must leave the stage to the *vox populi*. This logic entails that only the truly populist leaders and parties may redeem the common people and implement radical, direct, or simply legitimate forms of democracy.

Given the gargantuan variety of approaches to populism, however, the popular use of the term is often inaccurate or misleading: the misuse and abuse of the term have contributed

to increase its aura of elusive concept.[12] Even inside academia there has been much tug-of-war around definitions and applications, and the impression is that since the seminal work of Ionescu and Gellner (1969) the fuzziness has done nothing but increasing. Populism seemed to be the *Teumessian Fox* of the Greek mythology, destined never to be caught. Since the 1960s, scholars have been baffled by the "chameleonic" nature and "conceptual slipperiness" of populism (Taggart 2000). Isaiah Berlin argued that studies about populism suffer of the "Cinderella complex":

There exists a shoe – the word "populism" – for which somewhere exists a foot. There are all kinds of feet which it nearly fits, but we must not be trapped by these nearly fitting feet. The prince is always wandering about with the shoe; and somewhere, we feel sure, there awaits a limb called pure populism.[13]

The concept of populism has become increasingly present in the public debate also because of its slipperiness and adaptability to several contexts. It is erroneously used as a synonym for nationalism, anti-elitism and chauvinism, but also to denote simplistic or even vulgar political positions. Duncan McDonnell and Ben Stanley have dubbed the term "*schmopulism*" to describe the fact that "populism" has become a popular buzzword in media and academia alike.

[12] For an interesting study concerning the use of the term in the British media: Bale, van Kessel, and Taggart (2011). A telling statement form Moffitt and Tormey (2014, 382) reads as follows: "It is an axiomatic feature of literature on the topic to acknowledge the contested nature of populism […], and more recently the literature has reached a whole new level of meta-reflexivity, where it is posited that it has become common to *acknowledge the acknowledgment* of this fact."
[13] Quoted by Margaret Canovan (Canovan 1981, 7).

Figure 1: Populism in Newspaper Articles and Academic Journals

Figure 1 shows how scholars and journalists have started talking about populism more than ever before.[14] In newspaper articles (plot on the left), the term started gaining popularity since the 1990s, then it grew steadily, and in just one year (between 2015 and 2016) the term became literally ubiquitous, with a jump from around 34,000 articles mentioning the term to more than 65,000 articles. The development in academic peer-

[14] Both plots show the number of articles mentioning populism or relate terms (populis* or populist* or populism*) in six languages (English, German, French, Italian, Swedish, and Dutch) between 1969 and 2016. On the left, through *Factiva*, the major newspapers are included (the pre-1985 levels are particularly low also because only a few newspaper articles are available, but what matters most is the increase after 2010). On the right, through *Web of Science*, the major academic peer-reviewed journals are considered.

reviewed journals is similar, although the term populism already appears in a significant number of articles since the 1970s. From the 2000s, the growth has become phenomenal: 57 articles in 1999 became 446 in 2016. This is just a rough measure that anyway contributes to understand to what extent populism has become one of the most discussed topics both inside and outside academia in Western Europe.

Top avoid any conceptual slipperiness and in order to adopt a clear theoretical framework, this study situates itself in a precise strand of literature, which considers populism as an ideology – or a worldview – articulated discursively. This conceptualization has provided a theoretical and analytical toolbox which finally allows studying populism in a consistent and comparative way. The next sections expose the extreme variability of populist discourses in order to grasp its ideological essence and eventually propose a minimal definition, which will constitute the base for the operationalization and measurement of populism in Chapter 4. Next, it is clarified the relationship between populism and liberal democracy, and which elements of the populist idea of power resonate with the fascist past.

Populism in historical perspective

From a populist perspective true democracy, the rule (*krátos*) of the people (*demos*) exists only when the will of the common people is respected as sovereign.[15] It follows that

[15] Themistocles, Athenian politician and general, is sometimes described as a paleo-populist since he decided to move to Keramikos, a down-market part of Athens, in order to be perceived

populism becomes successful especially because it promises to introduce (or restore) accountability and responsiveness by involving the people in the decision-making process, thus reviving the idea of direct democracy introduced in Ancient Athens 25 centuries ago.[16] However, political structures such as the Greek *poleis* do not exist anymore, and direct democracy in the context of nation-states is not at stake (R. Dahl 1989).

Several historical manifestations of modern populism across the world show that the centrality of the people is constantly evoked in times of rapid socio-economic and political developments which leave large portions of the population without a credible representation of their interests. Globalization and modernization constitute the two main triggers for the formation of a breeding ground for populism not only in the 21st century, but throughout history.

For example, both agrarian populism and anti-Catholic nativism in 19th century United States developed in times of socioeconomic turmoil as a response to the profound socioeconomic and cultural challenges of the time (Swank and Betz 2003). The Russian Narodniki[17], around 1860s and 1870s, originated from similar socio-economic conditions:

as a man of the people. According to Plutarch, his role of attorney and arbitrator gained him further popularity among the *hoi polloi* (the many, the majority).

[16] The negative connotation of the word '*Idios*' (the Greek term for 'private person'), speaks volumes about the political role of the citizens in Ancient Athens. However, 'direct' does not mean 'inclusive'. In fact, it was a very restrictive idea of democracy. It excluded women, slaves and those who did not have the Athenian citizenship.

[17] Narodniki comes from the Russian word "*narod*", translatable as "people", "folk".

a group of intellectuals tried to convince the peasantry to fight an egalitarian struggle aiming at land redistribution, believing in the peasants' inherent socialism (Pedler 1927).[18]

Völkish movements[19],which developed in 19th century Germany as a mix of populism, Romantic Nationalism and German folklore (Trägårdh 2002; Olsen 1999) were the expression of an anti-modernity reaction to the Industrial revolution. Kurlander (2002, 36) argues that, in order to survive, liberalism in Germany had to become *völkish*, and eventually created the space for the emergence of National Socialism.[20] Similarly, in Austria and France, at the end of the 19th century, right-wing populist actors such as Karl Lueger and Georges Ernest Boulanger became very popular.

Since the 1970s populism resurfaced in Europe in its right-wing, nativist form as a reaction to the New Left and to the de-industrialization process, insisting on issues positioned on the cultural axis of competition such as immigration, crime, and nationalism. Parties such as the Front National in France, the Danish People's Party, and the Vlaams Belang in Belgium mobilized disillusioned constituencies in opposition to the mainstream parties and the political, economic and cultural elites while proposing an ethnocentric vision of the people. In the following years, many other populist parties with a similar agenda emerged all over Europe, such as the Sweden Democrats, the United Kingdom

[18] This makes of the 'Narodniki' one of the rare examples of exclusively top-down populist movements.
[19] From the German word '*Volk*', again translatable as 'people'.
[20] "[…] in so far as German liberalism was universalist and inclusive, it was ultimately rejected by a völkish constituency. Conversely, in so far as the liberals assimilated and promoted certain tenets of the völkish *Weltanschauung,* German liberalism clearly helped to pave the way for Hitler and National Socialism."

Independence Party, and the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands. This is the most studied and best documented wave of populism, and it generated such a tremendous attention that it often overshadowed every other historical populist manifestation.[21] As a result, extreme and radical right-wing populism became a (wrong and misleading) synonym for populism *tout court*.

More recently, growing attention has been devoted also to left-wing populist movements and parties such as Podemos in Spain and SYRIZA in Greece (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014), or the Occupy movements (Pickerill 2015). These political experiences gained traction in the context of a protracted and generalized economic crisis by proposing to fight inequalities and corruption and to restore the sovereignty of the people vis-à-vis supranational economic institutions.

This far from exhaustive historical overview – which focuses mainly on Europe while ignoring many other populist manifestations in Asia, Latin America and Africa – clarifies how heterogeneous populism can be and in how many different organizational and ideological ways it can be declined. The purpose was to illustrate the extreme variability of parties and movements articulating populist discourses in order to understand which is the lowest common denominator and therefore propose a minimal definition of populism which allows to study the phenomenon in a comparative and longitudinal way (Rooduijn 2014b).

[21] To mention a few among others: Betz (1994); Kitschelt (1995); Kazin (1995); Taggart (1995); Rydgren (2005); Mudde (2007).

Populism: its ideological dimension and a minimal definition

This study, in order to analyse the presence of populism in several countries over time, adopts the ideational approach proposed by Mudde (2004). This represents to best way to grasp the essence a political phenomenon which varies so heavily over time and across countries. If the last section illustrated the populist phenomenon by exposing some of its manifold empirical manifestations, this sections aims at re-composing the idea of populism by following the *fil rouge* which allows identifying its ideological core.

Every populist manifestation in first place shares the same *idea of power*. Only on a second stage, it matters whether a particular manifestation of populism follows a right-wing or left-wing agenda, if it is a bottom-up movement or a top-down project, if it relies on a charismatic leader or not, if it opposes or proposes certain policies, whether it stands in government or in opposition. The aim of this study consists in understanding the conditions triggering the social acceptability of populist discourses across eight West European countries, and for this purpose it is essential to identify a set of common elements that characterize every empirical, and in particular discursive, manifestation of populism.[22]

[22] The framework of analysis must be at the same time precise and flexible enough to include every instance of populism while excluding other types of discourses, this avoiding both type I and type II errors.

For this purpose, the ideational approach appears to be the most suitable and convincing.[23] It defines populism as a particular ideology or worldview based on a Manichean distinction between the pure people and the corrupt elite. Since it entails a very narrow set of ideas, populism is often described as a *thin-centred ideology*. In order to gain political depth, thin-centred ideologies such as populism are most commonly combined with more developed political ideologies such as socialism, nativism, or liberalism, depending upon the specific socio-political context and the type of actor articulating them.[24] Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2012, 12) claim that "in practice, populism is almost always combined with one or more other ideological features". This study adopts the ideational approach and therefore identifies populism as a combination of *people-centrism* and *anti-elitism*. This leads to the following definition (Wirth et al. 2016, 15)[25]:

Populism is a thin-centered ideology, which considers – in a Manichean outlook – society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite' and postulates unrestricted sovereignty of the people.

[23] On this point there seems to be quite a large consensus among scholars: Jagers and Walgrave (2007); Stanley (2008); Hawkins (2009; 2010); Pauwles (2011); Rooduijn et al. (2012) to mention just a few.

[24] The combination of a thin (populist) ideology with a thick (or full) one, describes the vast majority of populist manifestations. Indeed, it is very rare to find populism in its purely thin form. The case of the *Five Star Movement* could go in this direction, since the party refuses to be labeled as right or left-wing and indeed seems to rely on a vague post-ideological approach. On this topic: Manucci and Amsler (forthcoming).

[25] The is definition of populism, used by the whole module on *Populism in the Context of Globalization and Mediatization* of the *NCCR Democracy* program, is mainly derived from Albertazzi and McDonnell (2008) and Mudde (2004).

The ideational approach, compared to the other existing ones, presents a main advantage: since it conceives populism as a set of ideas, it become possible to clearly assess whether an actor is articulating a *populist discourse*.[26] Indeed, the populist ideology becomes measurable as soon as an actor articulates it discursively.[27] Moreover, it overcomes the typical dichotomous classification of political actors and journalists as either populist or not. In fact, it reflects the spectrum of different levels and varieties of populist discourses (Deegan Krause and Haughton 2009; Rooduijn, de Lange, and van der Brug 2014).

Populism is therefore understood as a type of discourse available to every political actor, who can employ "populism as a flexible mode of persuasion to redefine the people and their adversaries" (Panizza 2005, 8). This does not imply that every actor should be labelled as populist: at the empirical level, researchers can draw a distinction between populist or non-populist actors by establishing how often a certain actor has to articulate anti-elitist and people-centric messages in ordered to be labelled as a populist. On the other hand, it becomes possible to establish that an actor is more populist than another and that their discourses are populist in different ways because they use different rhetoric strategies and are attached to different full ideologies. In this study, the aim is to establish

[26] Other approaches, for example, define populism in stylistic terms (Kazin 1995), according to its organizational features (Weyland 2001) or as a type of mobilization (Jansen 2011).
[27] This can happen among other ways through speeches (Hawkins 2009), party manifestos (Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011), newspaper articles (Rooduijn 2014), but also interviews and parliamentary discussions. Moreover, different types of actors can articulate populist discourses: while politicians and journalists play a crucial role in circulating populism in the public debate, also common people as well as celebrities, representatives of NGOs and famous brands or other organizations can articulate populist discourses.

when a certain country – at a certain time in point – displays a high social acceptability of populism.[28]

After having defined populism as a thin-centred ideology that can be articulated discursively, a definition that encompasses all the historical manifestations of populism, it is essential to describe the populist idea of power and how this is in conflict with liberal and constitutional ideas of power. Hence, the next sections present the relationship between the elite and the people as antagonistic elements of society in the populist ideology, as well as the substantial differences between the populist idea of power and liberal democracy. These aspects must be discussed for two reasons. First, they are central for the development of the argument presented in Chapter 3 because they clarify the link between populism and illiberal ideas of power and therefore the link between the fascist past and the present social acceptability of populism. Second, they clarify the operationalization of populism presented in Chapter 4.

The people and the elite

By following the ideational approach and therefore defining populism as a thin-centred ideology, it follows that the categories of 'people' and 'elite' can assume different connotations over time and across cases or, to say that *à la* Laclau, the elite and the people remain "floating signifiers" (2005). In other words, the full ideology attached to

[28] The methodological aspects concerning calibration are discussed in detail in Chapter 4 and in the section *Operationalization and calibration* of Chapter 7.

populism defines how the social cleavage between the pure people and the corrupt elite is declined. While the cleavage is a constant element of the populist ideology, it can be interpreted in many different ways by different actors by excluding different portions of the demos and targeting different kinds of elites. The Manichean opposition between *good* and *evil* remains, but the boundaries of inclusion and exclusions vary.

At the center of the populist worldview there is the idea of *demos*, and consequently *demoticism* (closeness to the ordinary people). The people is characterized as a homogeneous entity expressing a common will, or *volonté générale*. Moreover, the people is often portrayed as a virtuous and inherently good group, and its will constitutes the only source of legitimacy and authentic democracy (March 2011; Stanley 2008; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008; Kriesi 2014; Taggart 2000). The duty of populist politicians is to embody and implement the *vox populi* in the most direct and faithful way. Indeed, only populist politicians are supposed to instinctively know what the people want and can voice their needs. As Pasquino noticed, "populist leaders do not represent the people, rather they consider themselves – and succeed in being considered – an integral part of the people. They are of the people" (2007, 21–22).

When the thin populist ideology is associated to a full ideology, usually it becomes explicit who belongs to the demos and who does not: a more or less net division line is established between '*us*' and '*them*'. In general, it is possible to identify three different conceptions of the people which refer to three different social dimensions: political,

cultural, and economic.[29] In empirical terms, the three conceptions of the people are not necessarily distinguished. In fact, they might be combined in a single populist discourse and potentially they can even be present all at the same time.

Politically, populism identifies the people as sovereign. Therefore there is a perfect overlapping between the people and the *demos*: all the people are included.[30] This is generally the most inclusive articulation of populism, although its conceptualization greatly varies across countries and over time. The *cultural* conception considers the people in an ethnic sense: in fact, the people is not understood as *demos* but rather as *ethnos*, and the dividing line excludes part of the national community such as migrants and other minorities, considered as aliens or outsiders. This is normally the most exclusionary articulation of the boundary of the *demos*, and it is typically interpreted by extreme right-wing populist parties. The *economic* conception describes the people as a class and distinguishes between 'ordinary people' and the rich ones (or the 'one percent'), in other words it draws the line between the privileged and the common ones. Similar to the political conception it is rather inclusive, but the dividing line here is articulated on the economic axis, and it is particularly common among – but not exclusive of – left-wing populist parties. As illustrated by the historical excursus presented sopra, different conceptions of the people are articulated by different actors according to different social-political contexts, but the opposition 'people vs elite' remains constant.

[29] In the historical manifestations of populism presented in the section *Populism in historical perspective* it is possible to identify each of the main conceptions of *demos* presented here.
[30] With a caveat: all the people belonging to a certain territory (generally a country, but also existing and even imaginary regions – like *Padania* in Italy) are included. Theoretically, there might be forms of transnational populism, but empirical examples lack in this sense.

As in every ‘good and evil’ dichotomy, while the people are the collective hero there must be a (collective) villain of the story: in this case, the elites. Indeed, they are often portrayed as corrupt or conspiring, while their members are generally considered as unaccountable and incompetent (Jansen 2011; Hawkins 2009; Rooduijn 2013). Mudde (2004, 544) incisively defined the populist interpretation of the elites as the people’s *nemesis*.

Similarly to the concept of people, also the concept of elite can be declined in different ways. It can refer to a political dimension, and in this case it might include the government as well as mainstream parties and other national and international actors. It can refer to a cultural dimension, thus including the mass media system, as well as writers and more generally the *intelligentsia*. Moreover, the elite can be defined in economic terms and refer to bankers, managers, and generally speaking to national and international economic institutions. As illustrated by the historical excursus presented sopra, different elites are targeted according to different social-political contexts. Once again, however, they are always portrayed as having interests and values opposed to those of the common people.

Populism and democracy

Based on the definition of populism provided sopra, it is now possible to highlight the differences between the populist idea of democracy compared to the liberal (or constitutional) one. First of all, the two counterparts of populism must be identified: *elitism*

and *pluralism* (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013; Caramani 2017). Like populism, elitism splits society in two homogenous parts, but operates a symmetric division: it praises the elites and considers the people as incapable of making informed decisions. Pluralism, on the other hand, opposes the Manichean perspective present in populism, and considers diversity of opinions and compromises as a value.

The lack of pluralism in the populist idea of power made several authors conclude that populism can threaten (or be disadvantageous for) democracy, thus constituting a 'syndrome' or a 'pathology' (Taggart 2002; Pasquino 2005; Rosanvallon 2008). Others, on the contrary, argued that the presence of anti-elitism entails a watchdog-type of relationship between those in power and the opposition, and for this reason populism should be rather considered as a corrective or at least an intrinsic part of democracy, thus being its 'shadow' or 'mirror' (Tännsjö 1992; Canovan 1999; Arditi 2004; Laclau 2005; Panizza 2005).

This long-lasting academic controversy is particularly slippery, mainly because the debate is framed in a wrong way. The point is not whether populism constitutes a threat or a corrective for democracy, but rather *to what extent different types of populism can have a positive or negative impact on different forms of democracy*. For this reason it is advisable to follow Rovira Kaltwasser's argument about the necessity of a minimal approach: populism represents a threat from a liberal perspective on democracy and a corrective from a radical perspective (2012). Consequently, different ideas about the

relationship between democracy and populism are too strongly based on normative assumptions about democracy itself.

This study however is not purely theoretical. Since it focuses on the presence of populism in Western Europe since the 1970s, the debate focuses mainly on the potential threat that extreme right-wing populism can represent for liberal democracy. As Dahl pointed out, a populist democracy differs from a liberal "Madisonian" democracy in its disregard of constitutionalist elements such as the rule of law, the division of power, and the respect for the rights of minorities (1956). In a similar vein, Abts and Rummens (2007) observed that the populist demand for unrestricted power of the people distinguishes the populist idea of democracy from constitutional and liberal logics of democracy. Also Mény and Surel (2002, 10) highlighted the fact that populism is against counterweights to the unbalanced supremacy of the people including "enforceable human rights, constitutional courts, the territorial and functional division of powers, and the autonomy of the central banks". These positions are effectively summarized by Pappas (2014) who defined populism as "democratic illiberalism" (although populism is not necessarily combined with democratic features).

Figure 2 summarizes the traits of the populist idea of power that are inherently illiberal and that therefore are in contrast with a liberal and constitutional idea of power. The link between the populist and the fascist idea of power rests upon the illiberal elements they have in common, and for this reason it is possible to hypothesize that the present social acceptability of populism is linked to the collective re-elaboration of the fascist past.

Figure 2: Populist Democracy and its Illiberal Elements



This does not imply that populism is a threat for democracy per se, but since it is inherently based on illiberal elements it strongly challenges the only form of democracy present in Western Europe since 1945: liberal and constitutional democracy.

It is interesting to observe the relationship between populism and liberal democracy because they are deeply in tension: for example, populism constitutes an effective critique of liberal democracy because it highlights some of it shortcomings, pitfalls, and paradoxes such as lack of direct democracy, the process of cartelization of political parties and their corruption. This is possible because populism opposes to two pillars of liberal democracy:

the rule of law, as well as the protection of individual and minorities rights (Plattner 2010). The implementation of the populist idea of power on the one hand would solve the tension[31] inherent to liberal democracy, but on the other hand it would also foster a model where the protection of minority rights is replaced by the indisputable decision of the majority and potential conflicts are thus solved through a purely majoritarian approach targeting the '*common good*' as final goal.

If there is any lesson that European politicians should have assimilated form the tragic events that led to World War II, the respect of minority rights and the importance of the rule of law are two of the most important ones. For this reason the populist idea of power is often rejected by institutions and political actors and it is perceived as a dangerous ideology that might threaten some of the key Western values developed as a reaction to the barbarism of World War II and the Holocaust. Müller (2016) argues that European political systems were built on a *distrust* of popular sovereignty fueled by the experience of fascism. Importantly, however, he maintains that politicians and the media should address the issues raised by populists not by ignoring or excluding them but by *challenging* their framing. In other words, by taking the liberal and democratic principles more seriously.

[31] The paradox is based on the coexistence of a democratic pillar and a liberal pillar. This implies that even if every person belonging to the demos has equal rights (liberal pillar), on the other hand it must be established who belongs to the demos and who does not (democratic pillar), and this inevitably triggers inequality. "What cannot be contestable in a liberal democracy is based on the idea that it is legitimate to establish limits to popular sovereignty in the name of liberty. Hence its paradoxical nature" (Mouffe 2000, 4). Moreover, as Abts and Rummens argued, "populist resentments arise when constitutional democracy is perceived to be out of balance in favour of the constitutional pillar" (2007, 410).

Chapter 2 – The Natural Habitat of Populism: Favourable Conditions and Triggers

This chapter presents a detailed literature review of both supply side and demand side factors usually identified as triggering populism. The first section illustrates the theoretical framework linking the presence of populism to large-scale processes such as modernization and globalization. The second one illustrates and discusses the results produced by the empirical research testing the factors linked to the above mentioned processes. The third one presents the conditions that are relevant for the present study and therefore selected for the analytical section. The aim is to produce an explanatory model able to keep together socio-economic and political-institutional factors that might explain the social acceptability of populism. Finally, a formal hypothesis is formulated.

Contrary to the majority of the literature on the topic, the outcome to be explained in this study is not (only) the electoral performance of allegedly populist parties. As it will be explained more in detail in Chapter 4, the outcome to be explained (the *social acceptability of populism*) is in fact a combination of three factors: the percentage of populist statements in a manifesto (discursive dimension); the degree of radicalism of the party author of the manifesto (political and ideological dimension); the vote share of the party at the elections for which the manifesto was written (electoral dimension).

In this chapter the findings of the relevant literature are hence adapted to the purposes of the present study. Two further caveats have to be considered in this regard. First: while most research on Europe focuses on right-wing populism, this study aims at identifying

the factors that can explain the presence of populism as a thin ideology independently from the full ideology attached to it. Several variables analyzed in the literature refer to the success of far-right or extreme right-wing parties, but unless they are supposedly linked to the thin ideology of populism (a Manichean worldview opposing the good people and the corrupt elite) they will not be considered. Second: while most studies focus on the international dimension of populism understood as a global phenomenon manifesting itself in virtually every democracy, this study aims at explaining *why populism thrives in certain countries but not in others*, therefore the cross-country dimension is essential and variables which do not display any cross-countries variance are not included (e.g. socio-economic variables are very similar in all the cases included, as well as the process of mediatization of politics and the process of supranational integration).

Populism as a by-product of modernization and globalization

The growing presence of populism in Europe is often considered as the result of two interconnected transformations. First: the shift from materialist to post-materialist values occurred during the 1960s and 1970s and symbolized by the protests of 1968. Second: the transition from industrial to post-industrial societies that took place during the 1980s and 1990s. In the first case the 'New Left' mobilized a young electorate which shared post-materialist and cosmopolitan values revolving around civil rights, gay rights, abortion, environmentalism, and gender roles; while in the second case radical right-wing populist parties were able to counter-mobilize the so-called *losers of globalization* along the new cultural cleavage. The two phases are connected to each other, and they are

supposed to constitute the transmission chain that made right-wing populism so widespread since the 1990s.

The process of electorate de-alignment and re-alignment along new dividing lines has been labelled as ‘silent revolution’ in its first – mainly left-wing – phase (Inglehart 1977), and ‘silent counter-revolution’ in its subsequent – mainly right-wing – articulation (Ignazi 1992). This shows that populism becomes a successful political resource as soon as the traditional class and religious cleavages fail to structure the political struggle within society.

More in detail, during the 1960s and 1970s European societies witnessed the end of the stability of the traditional cleavage structure, and a generational and educational revolution brought to the fore values such as pacifism, feminism, civil rights, and environmentalism. New generations without major concerns for material subsistence started attributing more importance to post-materialist values based on autonomy and self-expression, and this produced the fading of established partisan loyalties of the electorate. The re-alignment occurred around along new lines of conflict (cosmopolitan vs communitarian, or libertarian vs authoritarian) together with the old redistributive axis of conflict (Kitschelt 1994). The new cleavage structure favoured left-wing movements and political experiences able to mobilize a new constituency which could not find any

representation in the previous cleavage structure, while norms and values opposed to the libertarian movements emerged only later on.[32]

Indeed, the political mobilization of traditional and authoritarian values became widespread only after a second transformation occurred. During the 1980s and 1990s the decline of the secondary sector, the privatization of public sector enterprises, the cross-border mobility of workers, and the delocalization of the production processes marked the transition from industrial to post-industrial societies. These transformations, rooted in processes such as modernization, globalization, and de-industrialization, produced a dividing line between the so-called *winners and losers of globalization* (Kriesi et al. 2006; Kupchan 2012).

In particular, the latter felt that higher unemployment, growing inequalities, and decreased social services threatened their style of life and social status (Cox and Sinclair 1999; Zimmerling 2005). Moreover, the perceived threat was originated also by the weakening protection of the traditional national boundaries, thus originating a reaction invoking protectionist measures and national independence (Cerny 1999). By fighting the universalistic values mobilized by the 'New Left' and by articulating new discourses and issues related to nativism on the cultural axis (Betz and Johnson 2004), right-wing populist parties became increasingly successful since the 1980s.

[32] Hooghe et al. (2004) define the new cleavage as the opposition between GAL-TAN values: *green, alternative and libertarian* positions versus *traditional, authoritarian and nationalist* positions.

Concerning the mechanisms behind this transformation, while for Kitschelt (1995) the impact of post-industrial societies triggered *preferences* for ethnocentrism and authoritarianism, a complementary approach based on *emotions* (such as resentment, anxiety, and hostility) has been proposed by Betz. He identified the success of right-wing populist parties in their "ability to mobilize resentment and protest and their capability to offer a future-oriented program that confronts the challenge posed by the economic, social, and cultural transformation of advanced West European democracies."

The point of convergence is the strong link between socioeconomic and cultural transformations and the loss of credibility and accountability of the elites. As Kitschelt observed, "the rise of radical right-wing populist parties has coincided with a marked increase in public disaffection and disenchantment with the established political parties, the political class, and the political system in general" (1995, 169). In particular, the transformations of the traditional cleavage structure created the political opportunity structures for populist parties who mobilized electoral constituencies traditionally linked to social-democratic parties (Kitschelt 1994).

Bornschier (2010a) found that while the traditional cleavage based on class conflict gradually lost its salience, the cultural divide increasingly structures the political competition. In particular, the salience of the opposition between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values is a central element for the success of the populist right, linking it to the transformation that took place starting from the 1960s.

Although there is consensus in the literature about the salience of the cultural cleavage in explaining the success of right-wing populist parties, this does not imply that economic issues are not relevant anymore. In fact, following the Great Recession that characterized the period 2008-2012, the constituency identifiable as 'losers of globalization' has considerably expanded. It started including increasingly wider portion of the middle-class, and this allowed also left-wing populist parties to obtain remarkable electoral performances. The effects of the economic crisis could explain the success of left-wing populist parties such as SYRIZA in Greece and Podemos in Spain, although this link has not been yet confirmed empirically (Kriesi and Pappas 2015).

Besides the profound socio-economic and cultural transformation that brought to the de-alignment and re-alignment of the European electorates along a new interpretation of the cultural cleavage, two additional factors have been recently associated with the breakthrough of populist parties: supranational integration and mediatization of politics. These factors characterized virtually every European country and they are supposed to trigger the electoral success and persistence of populist parties. They do not offer an alternative explanation compared to the traditional cleavage model, but rather reinforce the effects produced by the mass values change and the de-industrialization process.

European elites and institutions have been described as too distant from the people, and this, in turn, has reinforced the lack of a fully developed European identity. Given the fact that it has not been possible to identify a unified European demos, some authors have proposed the concept of European *demoi*cracy (Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2013),

while the democratic deficit of the European institutions has become a widespread refrain among politicians and commentators.[33]

Unsurprisingly, the critique of supranational institutions has been a distinctive mark of both right and left populist parties (Gifford 2006; Benedetto and Quaglia 2007). Indeed, they consider multilevel governance as an element further fraying the accountability chain and creating a dimension of contestation between supra-national integration and national independence (Marks and Wilson 2000). Hence, the process of supranational integration – combined with the effects of the Great Recession – is supposed to have long-term effects on the tension between responsibility and responsiveness of the political parties (Mair 2013; Bardi, Bartolini, and Trechsel 2014).

On the one hand the elites must act responsively towards international markets and supranational institutions; on the other hand this diminishes their responsiveness towards the voting public (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). In other words, since the process of European integration entails the creation of supranational institutions and the implementation of models of multilevel governance, this can pose problems of democratic inclusion, accountability, responsiveness, and transparency (Papadopoulos 2010; Lavenex 2013).

Last but not least, the so-called process of '*mediatization of politics*' has been identified as a relevant factor linked to the growing alienation of the voters from the traditional

[33] For an overview about the debate: Follesdal and Hix (2006).

political process, and therefore as a trigger for populism.[34] Commercial media are supposed to land more visibility to populist actors because of their flamboyant style of communication (Mazzoleni 2003; 2008). In turn, populist actors are supposed to exploit the climate of cynicism and disillusionment generated by the media. As a result, populist actors have access to the public debate and their critique of the establishment is backed by the news coverage of the media focused on scandals and corruption. This process has been labelled as *video-malaise* and is considered to trigger the success of populist actors while harming democratic quality.[35]

Several authors highlighted the decisive role of the media in providing an essential space in the public debate to populist actors. According to Ellinas, without the spotlight of the media "Far Right movements might be doomed to political irrelevance and relegated to the margins of political discourse" (2010, 32–33). In a similar vein, Art claims that the failure of populist radical right in Germany is related to the media's attacks on these parties (2006), and Kitschelt maintains that unless the media are willing to disseminate their messages "Far Rightists will not be able to capitalize on the opportunities that are made available in the electoral arena" (1995, 130). In general, the role of the media is considered as a crucial factor both for the emergence of populist parties and for their legitimization (Eatwell 2003; Norris 2005; Rydgren 2007).

[34] Mainly on a theoretical basis; empirical studies are still in their initial phase. About this topic, see Manucci (2017).
[35] Many authors made reference to it, from Robinson (1976) to Mutz and Reeves (2005).

All in all, virtually every European country seems to constitute a fertile ground for populist parties to thrive. As summarized by *The New York Times*, a few factors seem to be unequivocally linked to the breakthrough of far-right parties: "Amid a migrant crisis, sluggish economic growth and growing disillusionment with the European Union, far-right parties – some longstanding, others newly formed – have been achieving electoral success in a number of European nations."[36] The next section provides an extensive review of the most relevant studies on the topic and it shows that the puzzle is far from easily solvable. First, populism does not coincide with far-right parties. Second, different studies offer different interpretations about the same phenomena according to different methods and operationalisations. Third, although every European country is experiencing the same transformations with a similar timing, populism is not equally widespread in each country.

Empirical findings in the literature

A vast literature analyses the factors linked to the electoral success of (mainly right-wing) populist parties, and most of the studies rely on the theoretical framework presented sopra: radical right populism is widely considered as a *counter-revolution* triggered by the effects of modernization and globalization and fuelled by processed such as mediatization of politics and supranational integration.

[36] The New York Times, December 4, 2016. "Europe's Rising Far Right: A Guide to the Most Prominent Parties". Available online (consulted in October 2017): https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/world/europe/europe-far-right-political-parties-listy.html

There are important empirical results that should be taken in consideration about demand side as well as supply side conditions for the electoral performance of populist parties. Supply side explanatory variables concern the conditions that are supposed to create the favourable political opportunity structures for populism, while demand side factors concern the reasons why people vote for populist parties (or show populist attitudes). Several authors emphasize the importance to consider the interaction between these two sets of factors (Eatwell 2003; Norris 2005; Mudde 2007), and here they are presented separately only for sake of clarity.

For each factor, the results of the relevant empirical research are presented. The following section presents and justifies the final choice of the factors that can be considered as relevant for the social acceptability of populist discourses, and not only for the electoral performance of radical or new right-wing populist parties. The aim is to create a set of conditions which are supposed to trigger the social acceptability of populism, and in particular to explain the cross-country variance of populism's social acceptability. As already mentioned, the choice is further restricted by methodological issues as well as by data availability.

Supply side factors

Several supply factors have been identified as relevant for the electoral success of populist parties: low quality of representative democracy; corruption scandals; ideological convergence of the mainstream parties; the presence of a proportional electoral system; the process of mediatization of politics.[37]

1) Concerning the relationship between democracy and populism, the protest voting model argues that people vote for a populist party in order to express their distrust towards the political elite (Fieschi and Heywood 2004). Betz noticed that populist parties "became popular at a time when there was a dramatic rise in public disenchantment with traditional parties, political leadership, the political process, and even the way democracy works in developed democracies" (Betz 2002). In other words, there is space for new political parties (including populist ones) as soon as the political system is inefficient and unstable.

For example, this might be originated by *cartelization*: colluding parties employ the resources of the state to limit political competition and to ensure their own survival and electoral success (Katz and Mair 1995). Cartelization is usually linked to "the rise of

[37] Another element has been mentioned in the literature: the presence of an appealing and well organized populist party (Taggart 2000; van Kessel 2015b). However, the presence of a credible populist party in a certain country might be associated with the national political culture of the country and indirectly with the collective re-elaboration of the fascist past. Including that as a relevant condition would be a tautology and, more importantly, it would generate an endogeneity problem. Therefore this condition will not be further examined.

populist anti-party-system parties that appeal directly to public perceptions that the mainstream parties are indifferent to the desires of ordinary citizens" (Katz and Mair 2009, 759). However, van Kessel found that "populist parties have done well in low-trust countries […] but also in countries […] where people have been relatively satisfied with the way democracy works and where trust in parliament and political parties has been relatively high" (2015b, 97).

Empirical research on this topic remains scarce and unsystematic. However, several studies analysing the link between political discontent and radical right voting found that political distrust has an impact on the probability to vote for a radical right party (Norris 2005; M. Hooghe, Marien, and Pauwels 2011; Caiani, Della Porta, and Wagemann 2012).

2) A similar and interconnected aspect concerns the perception of corruption, which is supposed to trigger the *Parteienverdrossenheit* (Mair 1998)[38]. Unsurprisingly, it has been established a correlation between perception of corruption and low levels of trust in political parties (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Slomczynski and Shabad 2012). However, according to van Kessel (2015b) and Ivarsflaten (2008) corruption does not have a significant impact on the success of populist parties.

3) When political parties converge towards the centre of the political spectrum, this provides expanding political opportunity structures for new right-wing populist parties

[38] *Parteienverdrossenheit* is translatable as "anti-party sentiment" or "disenchantment with the political parties".

(Ignazi 1992; Kitschelt and McGann 1995). More in general the widespread feeling among the electorate that all the parties are "the same" opens the space for new political parties at the extremes of the spectrum and can facilitate the creation of niches within the political space (Kriesi 1999).

Several studies confirmed the convergence thesis (Abedi 2002; Van der Brug, Fennema, and Tillie 2005), although Bornschier (2010b) criticized previous works either because they assume that party positions can be represented on a single left-right dimension or because they assume that voters will support only parties that adequately represent them on both dimensions.

4) Also the presence of a *proportional* rather than majoritarian electoral system is supposed to create favourable conditions for the electoral performance of populist radical right parties (Swank and Betz 2003). Although several studies found support for this hypothesis[39], Arzheimer and Carter (2006) found that, after controlling for socio-demographic variables, the presence of a proportional electoral system even has a negative impact on the performance of radical right parties. Different thresholds for entering the Parliament are another aspect of the electoral system that has been considered, but the empirical findings tend to disprove this hypothesis.[40]

[39] Among others: Jackman and Volpert (1996); Golder (2003).
[40] Jackman and Volpert (1996) found that higher electoral thresholds reduce the support for extreme right parties, but Swank and Betz (2003) and Golder (2003) disproved their findings.

5) Finally, the process of 'mediatization of politics' has been linked to the growing success of radical and populist parties. The idea is that the media-logic and the political-logic are converging; therefore media actors and political actors have common interests in providing and broadcasting emotional and conflictive stories. This means that political actors know more and more how to 'use' the media to gain visibility (a process called 'self-mediatization')[41] while the media find newsworthy and economically successful the presence and actions of populist actors. The two aspects converge and create a relevant opportunity structure for the presence of populism in the public debate. There is empirical evidence that the media system plays an important role in giving visibility to radical and populist parties.[42] Another aspect of the connection between political and media actors concerns the populist attitude of different media outlets. In particular, it has been argued that while tabloid press and commercial television are supposed to work in 'complicity' with populist movements, quality newspapers are supposed to act as 'paladins' of mainstream parties (Mazzoleni 2003).

Demand side factors

Several demand factors have been identified as favourable for the electoral performance of radical right- wing populist parties: economic hardship; high presence of immigrants

[41] The concept was introduced by Meyer (2002) and developed by Strömbäck (2008) and Esser (2013). It refers to the ability of political actors to adapt to the media-logic in order to gain visibility.

[42] In particular, Plasser and Ulram (2003), Biorcio (2003), Birnenbaum and Villa (2003), Hellström et al. (2012) linked the success of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) in Austria, the Lega Nord in Italy, the Front National in France and the Swedish Democrats in Sweden to the role of the media. For an overview on this topic, see Manucci (2017).

and salience of the issue in the public debate; low welfare protection; demographic factors.

1) It is intuitive to link a poor economic performance in one country with a bottom-up critique of its political and economic elites. In turn, this critique is supposed to open the space for populist attitudes among the electorate. However, empirical findings largely contradict this theoretical expectation. Swank and Betz (2003) did not find any evidence that a poor economic performance – which includes growth, unemployment, and inflation rates – affects the vote share for radical right-wing parties independently from other factors, in particular the presence of a strong welfare state. Several authors focused on the levels of unemployment, again with no results confirming the theoretical expectations.[43] On the other hand, Jackman and Volpert (1996) found that higher rates of unemployment provide a favourable environment for radical right parties, while Mughan et al. (2003, 631) claim that job insecurity explains "voting support for populist right-wing alternatives in preference to established parties of government."

Recent studies argue that the voters' preference for populist parties has little to do with the objective economic situation: Mols and Jetten (2016) found that perceived relative deprivation better explains the preference for right-wing populist parties rather than objective relative gratification, and in a similar vein Elchardus and Spruyt (2016) claim that support for populism is a consequence of '*declinism*' (a very negative view of the

[43] Among others: Knigge (1998); Arzheimer and Carter (2006); Bjørklund (2007). Arzheimer and Carter argue that perhaps voters turn to mainstream parties in times of high unemployment because they are considered more experienced.

evolution of society) and the feeling of belonging to a group of people that is unfairly treated by society.

2) The role of immigration is probably the most controversial among the demand side explanatory variables for the success of populist right-wing parties. The presence of immigrants (or refugees), combined with the salience of the topic in the public debate, is considered as extremely relevant[44] or negligible[45] according to different authors. In isolation it seems not to constitute a powerful predictor of the electoral performance of radical right-wing populist parties. All in all, the empirical results are contradictory and the levels of immigration might have different effects according to aspects such as different national political cultures, the presence of a colonial past, or the role of the media.

3) In a context of economic hardship, the presence of a strong welfare system is supposed to reduce the appeal of the extreme right. For example, Swank and Betz (2003) found that universal welfare states decrease the positive effect of immigration on votes for radical right-wing parties. On the other hand, the erosion of the welfare system might constitute an advantage for right-wing political parties proposing its retrenchment in order to exclude non-nationals (Afonso and Papadopoulos 2015). Indeed, populists with a welfare chauvinistic position normally blame the elite for cutting the welfare rights of deserving 'natives' and the non-natives for their excessive claims on the welfare state.

[44] Thränhardt (1992); Lubbers et al. (2002); Anderson (1996); Knigge (1998), Golder (2003).
[45] Mayer and Perrinau (1989); Kitschelt (1995); Norris (2005); Arzheimer and Carter (2006).

4) Finally, there are several voters' sociodemographic features showing a high correlation with the likelihood of voting for populist right-wing parties: for example being male, under-25, and a manual worker compared to being female, middle-aged and a professional (Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Spierings and Zaslove 2017). On the other hand, family income and level of education are not linked to party preference on the cultural axis, namely concerning pro- or against-immigration parties (Van der Brug, Fennema, and Tillie 2005). Moreover manual workers, self-employed, routine non-manual workers and unemployed are more likely to vote for extreme right-wing parties. However, when economic characteristics are added to the model the relationship between unemployment and vote for right wing parties becomes negative (Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers 2002).

Building an explanatory model

After having illustrated the main demand and supply side factors usually considered in the relevant literature, the next step consists in selecting the relevant conditions that are supposed to bear some explanatory power concerning the *Salonfähigkeit* or social acceptability of populism. First, the conditions must be related to populism as a *thin-centred ideology*, independently from the full ideology attached to it. Second, the aim is to explain the cross-country variations in the social acceptability of populism, therefore conditions which are equally present in each country are not helpful in this regard. Third, the data must be available since the 1990s for each of the eight West European countries

considered. For all these reasons, not all the conditions illustrated in the literature review can be adopted and tested.[46]

Moreover, there is a further crucial aspect that must be considered in order to select the relevant conditions. A condition becomes relevant for this study as soon as it is related not only to the electoral dimension of populism but more in general to the social acceptability of populism, given by the combination of three factors forming the outcome to explain: the percentage of populism in electoral manifestos, the degree of radicalism of the party and its electoral performance.

Populism is here understood as an ideology expressed discursively because it makes possible to measure how often populist messages are articulated over time and across countries.[47] However, while the electoral performances of populist parties vary greatly between countries, it is not clear whether this is reflected in the social acceptability of populism. This generates two crucial questions. First: to what extent the variables used to explain the electoral performance of populist parties can also explain the social acceptability of populist discourses in party manifestos? Second: to what extent the electoral success of populist parties and the presence of populist messages in party manifestos overlap?

[46] On a more pragmatic note, it should be stressed that given the number of cases considered in this study (23) and the type of method employed in the analytical section (Qualitative Comparative Analysis) the number of total conditions tested should not be higher than five in order to produce more credible results. Since the stigma of the fascist past will be tested afterwards, no more than four variables will be extracted from the relevant literature.

[47] According to Rovira Kaltwasser (2014, 497) by considering populism as an ideology it is possible to "grasp that its rise and fall is related to both supply side and demand side factors."

Table 1 – Different Approaches to Populism

	Understanding of Populism in the Academic Literature	Understanding of Populism in this Study
Ideological Dimension	Mainly right-wing, rarely left-wing, (virtually) never combined	Populism as thin ideology attached to any possible full ideology
Radicalism	Mainly radical/far/extreme right parties are considered	Populist messages are not necessarily radical
Parties	Mainly new parties, niche parties, social movements	Every party can articulate populist messages
Empirical Manifestation	Electoral component: success and performance in electoral competition	Discursive component: the populist ideology is articulated discursively

Concerning the first question, the existing literature often fails to explain what part of the electoral success of populist parties is linked to their radical features rather than to their populist nature. This is due to the fact that these studies often consider extreme right-wing parties as automatically populist. Moreover, until recently there has been almost no space for the analysis of European left-wing populist parties. In a similar vein, some of the factors tested in literature relate to new or radical parties, which are often considered as automatically populist. Table 1 summarizes the main differences between the focus of the existing literature compared to the approach used in this study.

Concerning the second question, empirically it is possible that a poor electoral performance of populist parties happens in a context characterized by a high social acceptability of populist messages. For instance, this might occur in case mainstream

parties articulate highly populist messages and populist parties score poorly in elections. On the other hand, good electoral results of populist parties can be coupled with a very low presence of populist messages in party manifestos. This might happen in case allegedly populist parties seldom rely on populist messages and so do mainstream parties.

In this study the discursive and electoral approaches, rather than being considered as mutually exclusive, are seen as *complementary* aspects. Indeed, they relate to two distinct but interconnected elements of populism: how often a (more or less radical) political party discursively articulate populist messages, and how well does the same party perform in elections. Despite the conditions triggering the electoral performance of populist parties and those determining the social acceptability of populist discourses might partially overlap, they are not necessarily the same.

Two supply side factors are not included in the analysis. First, the process of mediatization of politics is not selected because it is a common feature of all the countries considered in this study, and also the timing of its development is not significantly different across cases. It would be a relevant condition if one would study how widespread are populist messages in newspaper articles, TV shows, or social media, but this is not the case.

Secondly, the presence of a proportional electoral system is discarded. On the one hand, because it relates to the electoral dimension of populism (but not necessarily to its

discursive dimension), and on the other hand because empirical research shows that the presence of a proportional electoral system seems to have an even negative effect on the performance of radical right parties.[48]

Three supply side factors are not included in the analysis. First, the levels of migrants and asylum-seekers in a country as well as the relevance of the topic in the public debate cannot be selected as a relevant factor for this study because the aim is to explain the presence of populism as a thin ideology, while these aspects mainly relates to the breakthrough of far right parties (which are not necessarily populist) and considerably less to left-wing and centre parties. Moreover, several empirical studies have not found any concluding evidence about the correlation between nativism or the number of asylum-seekers and the extreme right vote; therefore there are no reasons to link this factor to the presence of populism.[49]

The idea that the presence of a strong welfare system is supposed to reduce the appeal of right-wing populist parties is also discarded. By observing empirical cases it would be difficult to explain the presence of populist parties in Scandinavian countries, since they

[48] To be fair, there is not full consensus among scholars on its effects, and one should be careful when evaluating the impact of electoral systems on the performance of radical right-wing populist parties.

[49] According to Lubbers et al (2002) the effect of different levels of anti-immigrant attitudes is large in Norway, the Netherlands and Denmark, but much smaller in Austria, Italy and Sweden. Moreover, on an empirical level, among the European countries with the highest number of migrants per 1000 inhabitants there are Austria and Switzerland (displaying high levels of populism), while among those with the lowest number of migrants there are Italy, France, Poland, and Hungary (also with high levels of populism). Source: Eurostat (online data codes: migr_imm1ctz and migr_pop1ctz). This means that one should also consider other factors such as the salience of the topic in the public debate, as well as the framing and the attention devoted by the media to the topic. However, the data concerning these elements are extremely difficult to obtain in a reliable and comparable way for a period of twenty years across eight countries.

have a strong welfare system. In fact, populist parties such as the Finns Party, the Sweden Democrats, and the Danish People's Party, not only exist since many years, but also obtained significant electoral results. In fact, it could be argued that a *universal* welfare protection – when considered as too inclusive – might constitute an advantage for those parties proposing welfare chauvinism.[50] In conclusion, including a strong welfare system would be problematic since it is empirically unclear whether it triggers or undermine the social acceptability of populist discourses.[51]

Finally, at the micro-level, several voters' sociodemographic features might be linked to the electoral performance of populist parties, but there are no reasons to consider them since they are rather equally distributed across the eight countries included in the study. In particular being male, under-25 and a manual worker is almost equally likely across countries (Table 2).[52]

[50] The work of Ennser-Jedenastik (2017) seems to confirm this impression, although with several caveats. In general, the relationship between right-wing or left-wing populism and types of welfare system remains unclear.

[51] It is also possible to argue that the condition about the economic performance of a country, which includes the Gini coefficient after redistribution, already contains some elements that resonate with the type of welfare system and how inclusive and universal it is.

[52] The statistics about age, ratio of men and median age are obtained through Eurostat. The remaining data are obtained through the database of QoG (Quality of government), and they all refer to the last measurement performed.

Table 2 – Socio-demographic Factors

	Proportion population aged 20-24	Educational attainment 15-24 years (male)	Employment in high-tech sectors (male)	Employment in low-tech manufacturing (male)	Ratio men	Median age
Austria	6.4	11.67	4.9	5.9	48.99	43
France	5.7	12.28	5	5	49.15	41.2
Germany	5.6	12.4	5.2	5.2	49.21	45.8
Italy	5	12.96	4	7.1	48.70	45.5
Netherlands	6.3	13.18	5.2	5.4	49.73	42.4
Sweden	6.7	13.98	6.5	4.5	50.01	40.9
Switzerland	6	11.22	NA	NA	49.52	42.3
United Kingdom	6.6	13.72	6.3	4.1	49.31	40

More interestingly, some studies recently started investigating the presence of 'populist attitudes' among the public (A. Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove 2013; van Hauwaert and van Kessel 2017). It is possible to imagine that supply and demand side factors activate these predispositions. While it is not possible to completely exclude the relevance of socio-demographic factors, it appears premature to claim that individual populist attitudes can explain the cross-country variation.

As shown in Table 3, only four factors can be selected for the present study, and they will be tested in the analytical section: poor economic performance, democratic gap, widespread corruption, and ideological convergence of the party system. However, it is necessary to make another step in order to make these factors relevant for the cross-country variance in the social acceptability of populist discourses: their operationalization. This aspect will be considered in Chapter 7.

Table 3 – Supply and Demand Side Factors

	All Factors	Selected Factors
Demand-Side Factors	Economic Hardship	Yes
	Immigration Flows and their Salience	No
	Low Welfare Protection	No
	Sociodemographic factors	No
Supply Side Factors	Democratic Performance	Yes
	High Levels of Corruption	Yes
	Ideological Convergence	Yes
	Proportional Electoral System	No
	Mediatization of Politics	No

Therefore it is possible to hypothesize that:

H1: the more unfavourable the socio-economic and political-institutional conditions, the higher the social acceptability of populism.

Four sub-hypotheses can be formulated concerning the four factors in isolation.

H1A: the higher the economic hardship, the higher the social acceptability of populism.

H1B: the higher the democratic gap, the higher the social acceptability of populism.

H1C: the higher the perception of corruption, the higher the social acceptability of populism.

H1D: the higher of the ideological convergence of the political system, the higher the social acceptability of populism.

These conditions are operationalized and tested in Chapter 7. Chapter 8, however, discusses the importance of considering not only socio-economic and political institutional factors, but also cultural ones, in particular the role of collective memory and the re-elaboration of the past, in order to explain cross-country variation.

Chapter 3 – Populism, Collective Memory, and Stigma of the Fascist Past

This chapter introduces the main conceptual novelty of the study: the idea that the populist ideology might be more or less legitimate in different countries because of *cultural and historical reasons*. Indeed, it is possible to claim that every country presents a certain political culture which in turn legitimizes or stigmatizes different ideas of power. In particular, the collective memory of the *fascist* past might explain the legitimacy of the populist idea of power in a certain country. This step is necessary, since socio-economic and political-institutional factors do not fully explain the cross-country variation of the social acceptability of populism. The model produced in Chapter 2 is supposed to explain why populism thrives or not, but the literature clearly points to the fact that those conditions do not have the same effect in every country. This indicates that country-specific elements should be considered as well.

The aim is to observe the following cultural structure which has an impact on the presence of populism in each country:

1) The country's re-elaboration of World War II and the collective memory of its own role during the fascist past.[53]
2) According to the type of collective memory of the fascist past, a certain level of stigmatization of that past is present in the country.

[53] As already explained, the general argument refers to any authoritarian past that a country has experienced. Since the focus of this study is on Western Europe, the authoritarian past is here represented by the *fascist* past.

3) A strong stigma of the fascist past produces *unfavourable* cultural opportunity structures, and conversely a weak stigma produces *favourable* cultural opportunity structures.

On the one hand, the conditions for populism to thrive can be more or less favourable according to the economic situation of the country, the levels of corruption, the levels of accountability and responsiveness, and the ideological convergence of the political system. On the other hand, unfavourable cultural opportunity structures might close down the window of opportunity for populism even in countries where the political opportunity structures are favourable, and vice versa.

The fascist past resonates with the populist present because both the fascist and the populist ideas of power are based on *illiberal* elements. The way a society collectively remembers the fascist past and its role vis-à-vis fascist regimes determines to what extent the fascist idea of power is legitimized or stigmatized, and in turn it is supposed to affect the social acceptability of populist discourses in a certain country. This leads to the formulation of the hypothesis that a high stigmatization of the fascist past closes down the cultural opportunity structures for the social acceptability of populism.

The chapter is structured as follows. First it illustrates the concept of cultural opportunity structure and its importance in explaining the cross-country variation in populism's social acceptability. Then it describes a new typology of collective memory and its four different types: culpabilization, heroization, cancellation, and victimization. Each type of collective memory is associated with a certain degree of stigmatization of the fascist past.

Cultural opportunity structures

The strands of literature examined in Chapter 2 converge in acknowledging that the country-level plays a crucial role in explaining different electoral performances of radical right-wing populist parties. Arzheimer (2009, 274) tested all the most common factors linked to the electoral performance of extreme right-wing populist parties and concluded that: "there are striking differences between countries […]. Put differently, given the levels of the variables included in the model, in Austria, Italy, and Denmark the extreme right is persistently much stronger and in Spain, Sweden, and Finland, it is much weaker than one would expect it to be."

Similarly, Lubbers et al. (2002, 366) found that the cross-country variance is linked to the fact that individual political attitudes are unevenly distributed across countries: "[…] variations in the composition of the population, not in social background but in political attitudes, helped account for cross-national differences too. Thus, a considerable part of the original country-level variance was explained." Indeed, the effect of education is small in Austria and Italy, but particularly significant in Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway. On the other hand, the effect of different levels of anti-immigrant attitudes and dissatisfaction with democracy is large in Norway, Netherlands and Denmark, but much smaller in Austria, Italy and Sweden.

These findings resonate with the work of Inglehart and Welzel (2010, 554), which considers socio-cultural changes as path dependent since religious and historic legacies are long-lasting. When trying to explain the shift from survival to self-expression values and from traditional to secular-rational values (in other words the passage from traditional and materialist to modernization-linked and post-materialist values), the authors found that "the nation remains a key unit of shared socialization, and nationality explains far more of the variance than factors such as education, occupation, income, gender or region."

Accordingly, it seems safe to assume that national cultural elements play a pivotal role in determining the presence of populist discourses. In other words, besides structural and short-term elements, country-specific characteristic might have an impact on the social acceptability (*Salonfähigkeit*) of populist messages.[54] The concept of political opportunity structures remains important to understand and explain the presence of populism, but cultural long-lasting elements should also be considered. In other words, the combination of political (short-term) and cultural (long-term) opportunity structures can explain the presence of populism in different countries.

Implicitly developed by Lipsky (1968) and formalized by other authors such as Tilly (1978) and Tarrow (1983), the concept of political opportunity structures refers to "specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate the development of protest movements in some

[54] About the concept of *Salonfähigkeit* and its link to the study of populism, see Art (2006, 103).

instances and constrain them in others" (Kitschelt 1986, 58). In a broader sense, political opportunity structures emphasize the *exogenous* conditions for party success and combine the presence of stable institutional features with volatile or conjectural factors. The combination of supply and demand side factors for the success of populist parties illustrated sopra can be considered as a set of *political opportunity structures*.

As already mentioned, however, socio-economic and political-institutional opportunities are of little use to explain the cross-country variation of the social acceptability of populism. The limitations of the classic approach to political opportunity structures and populism can be overcome by introducing into the picture Putnam's idea that civic traditions are important factors for the political performance of a country (1993; 2002). Putnam argued that differences in the design of institutions are of secondary relevance and that *civic traditions* account for most of the differences in explaining a community's *political performance*. In a similar vein, it is possible to argue that different political cultures influence the perception of different ideas of power and therefore the social acceptability of populist discourses.

As defined by Almond and Verba in their seminal work (1963, 13), political culture is "the particular distribution of patterns of orientation towards political objects among the members of a nation." Since political cultures include all politically relevant beliefs, values, and attitudes among the population, they determine social and political norms at the collective level. In turn, these norms become observable through the ritualization of political behaviors. Different narrations and re-elaborations of the fascist past

retrospectively illuminate different national political cultures and allow estimating the degree of stigma attached to fascism (Connerton 1989). To determine whether in a certain country there are favourable cultural opportunities structures for populism, it is possible to observe the collective memory of the fascist past.

Certain types of collective memory highly stigmatize the fascist past, and therefore create unfavourable opportunity structures for populism. Other types of collective memory do not stigmatize the fascist past, and therefore create favourable opportunity structures for populism.

Cultural opportunity structures can be defined as *specific configurations of symbolical, memorial, and historical elements that shape the range of legitimate and stigmatized political behaviors, discourses, and ideas of power*. A central role is played by the collective memory and re-elaboration of the past. Although other elements such as collective customs and traditions can concur in forming cultural opportunity structures, collective memories can be used as a valid proxy because they are more easily observable.

Figure 3: Opportunity Structures for Populism and the Role of Memory



Figure 3 visualizes the mechanism linking the presence of populism to the presence of political opportunity structures interacting with cultural opportunity structures. In stage I, every country displays a certain pattern of supply and demand side factors for the presence of populism, which in turn form favourable or unfavourable political opportunity structures. However, favourable political opportunity structures are not enough to predict the acceptability of populism. In fact, in stage II a collective memory which highly stigmatizes the fascist past can make the populist idea of power socially unacceptable and outside the realm of *'what can be said*'. This creates unfavourable cultural opportunity structures and therefore and populism is supposed to be socially not accepted.

The link between fascism and populism

Some authors have already linked the presence of populism to different political cultures, while several studies mention the role of traumatic collective memories in blocking the social acceptability of populist discourses, especially concerning the case of Germany (e.g. Art 2006). However, this link has never been analyzed in a systematic way given also the difficulties in measuring something as impalpable as collective memories.[55] Despite the absence of comprehensive and systematic analyses, the relevant literature seems to give for granted that different national political cultures can explain why a populist radical right party is conceived as "a major democratic threat in a country or as a

[55] A notable exception is represented by Art (2011b). More in general, the link between collective memory, political culture and populism, has not been applied to comparative studies but rather to case studies or binary comparisons. Most of them are mentioned in the next pages when analysing the type of collective memory present in each of the eight countries considered.

reliable ally for a government coalition in another country" (Rovira Kaltwasser and Taggart 2016, 211).[56]

The examples in this sense are numerous. In Germany, extreme right-wing populist parties have never become relevant because the debates about the Nazi past of the country closed the possibility for them to emerge (Art 2006, 196; Betz 2002; Bornschier 2012; Decker 2008, 125; Rovira Kaltwasser 2014, 212–13; Kitschelt and McGann 1995). On the other hand, in Austria the elite reactions shaped the legitimacy of the far-right in a totally opposite way (Art 2007, 338). In Spain the ideological links of *Fuerza Nueva* and *Alternativa Española* with fascism and Franco's regime always made these parties "morally distasteful to the great majority of Spanish citizens" (Alonso and Rovira Kaltwasser 2015, 26). Similarly, in Italy the fascist heritage still influences the actions of mainstream parties and the public responses (Tarchi 2002, 135–36), while in the United Kingdom the British National Party's links to Nazism are perceived as particularly negative (Fella 2008, 195).

Concepts such as 'historical burden', 'long-lasting legacy', 'heritage', 'shadows of the past', and 'collective memory' are often associated in the relevant literature to penalizing effects on the electoral performances of radical right-wing political parties. In a similar vein, notions such as 'stigma'[57], 'ostracism' and 'cordon sanitaire' are commonly used to

[56] A similar point is made in Mudde (2007).
[57] The term 'stigma' is often used by researchers examining how mainstream parties interact with the radical right. E.g. Art (2011); Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2015); Van Spanje and Van Der Brug (2007). Erving Goffman defined stigma as '"the situation of the individual who is disqualified from full social acceptance" (1963, 12). The same definition can be used for parties instead of individuals.

describe the reaction of mainstream parties vis-à-vis far right parties (Cfr. Demker 2011; Widfeldt 2004). *In nuce*, this is the core of the concept of cultural opportunity structures: a certain idea of power is more or less acceptable not only because of socio-economic and political-institutional factors, but also because of long-lasting political cultures and collective memories.

Since the literature about populism has only fleetingly interacted with the literature on collective memory, the role of collective re-elaborations of the past has been acknowledged but not studied in a systematic and comparative way.[58] This study aims at connecting different strands of literature including history, memory studies, and political science starting with the assumption that when a country is confronted with an authoritarian regime, in the case of Western Europe *fascist* regimes, it can either stigmatize or legitimize that type of regime and that particular idea of power according to different types of collective memories.[59] In turn, different collective memories indicate favourable or unfavourable cultural opportunity structures thus opening or closing cultural windows of opportunity for the presence of populism.

[58] Historical studies sometimes consider the role of previous regimes on the formation of political cultures. For example Aguilar and Humlebaek (2002) examine the impact of the authoritarian past on Spanish political culture. Similarly, Power and Zucco (2009) wrote about Brazilian political culture and noticed that the transition to democracy after a right-wing authoritarian regime generated the so-called *direita envergohada* ('ashamed right').

[59] A country can be directly under an authoritarian regime, or have to deal with neighboring countries led by an authoritarian regime. The fascist past in Western Europe directly affected only a few countries (Germany, Italy, Portugal, Greece and Spain) but indirectly every other West European country had to take a position and subsequently re-elaborate that past.

Figure 4: Venn Diagram Populism and Fascism



As visualized in Figure 4, the link between populism and fascism is based precisely on a set of illiberal elements they both share.[60] This does not mean that fascism and populism are perfectly overlapping concepts. For example, if a populist party or regime respects democratic procedures (in particular, free elections) it clearly has democratic features, but it might still share some *illiberal* elements with fascism. Indeed, while fascism was historically against electoral representation, populism channels elections in authoritarian terms (Finchelstein 2017, 96). The mechanism linking the fascist past with the present populism is based on the fact that, even if at different levels of radicalism, populism

[60] Many authors described the illiberal elements of populism. Among them: Abts and Rummens (2007); Canovan (1999); Pappas (2014); Pinelli (2011); Plattner (2010); Riker (1988); Rovira Kaltwasser (2012); Urbinati (1998).

includes core elements of fascism at odds with a liberal and constitutional interpretation of democracy.[61]

Historically, fascism in Europe has been a form of political power based on a Manichean separation between the common good of the nation and the threat represented by the conspiracies of evil and foreign elements. While it claimed to interpret the unitary will of the masses, fascism implemented a nationalist, totalitarian and racist ideology. According to Griffin, for example, historically fascism was a fascist populism (1995).

This resonates with the three pillars of the fascist ideology provided by Eatwell (2017, 367): "the creation of a new man", "the forging of a holistic nation in order to survive internal and external threats", and "the creation of a neither capitalist nor communist third way authoritarian state (which involves government for, but not by the people)". In turn, it confirms the observation of de la Torre (2014, 463), who argued that “Populist disrespect of pluralism is explained by their view of the people as a subject with a unitary will and consciousness, and of rivals as enemies of the virtuous people.”

Accordingly, it is possible to disentangle three relevant elements concerning the relationship between fascism and populism in theoretical and empirical terms:

[61] In Umberto Eco's (1995) list of traits typical of the fascist ideology, there is *selective populism*: "Since no large quantity of human beings can have a common will, the Leader pretends to be their interpreter. Having lost their power of delegation, citizens do not act; they are only called on to play the role of the People. Thus the People is only a theatrical fiction. To have a good instance of qualitative populism we no longer need the Piazza Venezia in Rome or the Nuremberg Stadium. There is in our future a TV or Internet populism, in which the emotional response of a selected group of citizens can be presented and accepted as the Voice of the People.'"

1) Both fascism and populism claim that the empty *locus* of power, instead of remaining empty as in constitutional democracy (Lefort 1988), must be filled by a substantive image of the people as a homogeneous unity (Abts and Rummens 2007). For this reason Urbinati claims that a populist regime can only survive if it becomes authoritarian and despotic (1998, 122), while Panizza maintains that the need to protect the fictitious unity of the people might ultimately lead to totalitarianism (2005, 29). In other words, populism can be considered as a *proto-totalitarian* ideology, but it is important to stress that populism does not necessarily displays strictly fascist characteristics such as refusal of democratic elections, para-militarism, corporatism, and imperialism.

2) Both fascism and populism share an illiberal approach based on unconstrained popular will and unmediated relationship between elite and people. Accordingly, they distrust political parties and their competition because every type of intermediary body – apart from populist movements – is seen as carrier of particularistic interests in contrast with the common good. For these reasons, checks and balances are considered as unnecessary obstacles to the implementation of the popular will.

3) Fascism and radical right declinations of populism share a nativist definition of the people based on exclusionary criteria. When populism is attached to a nativist full ideology, it can be understood in terms of a proto-totalitarian ideology because it goes against minority protection and implements a dictatorship of the majority (Abts and Rummens 2007, 406, 422).[62]

[62] Of course this link (and possibly the corresponding stigma) is stronger for neo-fascist and radical right parties articulating populist discourses, and for this reason the levels of populism in

Between 1945 and 1948 – as a reaction to the tragic events that led to World War II and the Holocaust – every Western country has adopted liberal democracy, which emphasizes "checks on the power of each branch of government, equality under the law, impartial courts and tribunals, and separation of church and state" (Fareed 1997, 26). However, not in every country the stigma attached to the fascist past is equally strong, and therefore the cultural opportunity structures for populism are not everywhere the same. While modern populism might constitute a "useful safety valve for discontent in contemporary democracies", it can also pose a threat to liberal democracies as soon as it shows traits such as "egocentric leaders, Manichean demonization and loss of faith in a liberal system based on representative government, compromise and legal rights" (Eatwell 2017, 382). Modern populism "is rooted in a post war reformulation of fascism" and although it is *now* essentially democratic, it is impossible to ignore the fact that populism effectively became fascist *in the interwar years* switching back to democracy after 1945 (Finchelstein 2014, 474–76).[63]

Indeed, when a country is confronted with populist discourses, the literature seems to indicate that the collective memory of the fascist past provides the guidelines for the rejection or acceptance of the illiberal elements of populism, such as lack of minorities' protection, absence of separation of powers, and refusal of pluralism. In other words, a certain type of re-elaboration of the past may open up or close down the cultural

party manifestos will be weighted by the degree of radicalism of each party. See Chapter 4 for more details.

[63] Peronism in Argentina is probably the first example of post-war populist democracy. Finchelstein (2014, 476) observes how "Peronism is not fascism, but fascism represents a key dimension of its origins."

opportunity structure for populism to be socially acceptable in given countries, because collective memories shape and determine the field of 'what can be said' and the ideas of power than can be expressed.

This leads to hypothesize that:

> ***H2: the lower the degree of stigmatization of the fascist past, the higher the social acceptability of populist discourses***.

Collective memories of the fascist past and stigma for populism

Determining which type of collective memory of the fascist past has become mainstream in a given country, and whether secondary narratives emerged, is crucial in order to understand the level of stigmatization of the fascist past and therefore of the populist idea of power.[64] This task is particularly complex, since the formation of collective memories is the outcome of a complex process of *Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit*, a concept that expresses the idea of '*working through* the past'. Alternatively it can be used the term *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, translatable as '*coming to terms* with the past'. However the latter expression has a crucially different meaning since it implies the idea of 'let bygones be bygones', thus silencing the past instead of problematizing it (Adorno 1977).[65]

[64] For a seminal study on the differences and commonalities between individual and collective memory: (Halbwachs 1950). For a comprehensive collection of papers on the topic: Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi, Levy (2011).

[65] The fact that the German language provides the most appropriate terms to define the process of elaboration of the past is clearly not a coincidence. In fact, Germany is the country that more

Here collective memory is defined as the outcome of a social and political process selecting parts of the past in order to create a collective identity (Gildea 2002, 59; T. Berger 2002, 80).[66] The process can be characterized by collective amnesia, removals, and reinterpretations. When divergent historical narratives of the same past exist, this generates a conflict and possibly the adoption of secondary narratives along the master (or mainstream) narrative.

The process of memory building takes place at different levels. Institutional commemorations and holidays, streets names, textbooks, movies and TV shows, symbolic actions, speeches, they all contribute to the formation (and ritualization) of a collective memory. All these aspects create layers of narrations, symbols, discourses, which become part of the collective memory of a country. The result of this process is shaped by the country's political culture, and at the same time contributes to shape it (Berger 2002, 81).

Different types of historical critical junctures can originate a process of 'working through the past', such as revolutions, wars, and regime changes. In the words of Capoccia and Kelemen (2007, 348) critical junctures are "*relatively* short periods of time during which there is a *substantially* heightened probability that agents' choices will affect the outcome of interest." The fascist past in Europe (*a relatively short period*) can be considered as a

than others – in Europe, but probably all over the world – had to face and elaborate its past in order to build a new identity and redefine its political culture.

[66] Other seminal works about the link between collective memories and identities are Todorov (1995) Ricoeur (2004).

critical juncture determining the ideas of power (*outcome*) that are legitimate or stigmatized in a given society (*the agent*).

It is possible to argue that 1945 represents for Western Europe the 'year zero' of collective memory and democracy, and the fascist past is a critical juncture for the development of democratic ideals in Europe. After the end of World War II, every country had to re-elaborate its past, offer a narration of its role during the war, and take position about the fascist regimes that directly or indirectly affected the country. Every European country had to make sense of the Shoah, the fascist and National-Socialist regimes, and had to define the type of collective memory to transmit to future generations. In other words, every country had to define its own new collective identity.

More precisely, the fascist past is the most important moment of definition of national identity for modern nations[67] and it is a common European-wide defining moment. Moreover, contrary to what happened with other historical and social moments of fundamental change (such as imperialism, World War I, civil wars or state formation), the re-elaboration of the fascist past took place in conditions of full democratic mobilization thus involving the masses in the formation of the collective memory.

It is important to notice, however, that it is almost impossible to define the type of collective memory adopted in a given country immediately after World War II. This is the case because – like after every traumatic event – the process of re-elaboration is initially

[67] Comparable only to state formation in the 19th century

blocked by removal and refusal. This initial phase can be labelled as *silencing phase*. It can be more or less protracted over time and it is characterized by the fact that thorny topics are avoided and the past is not confronted. During this phase it is not possible to form any collective stigmatization, and not surprisingly right-wing populist movements such as *Poujadisme* and *Uomo Qualunque* had the chance to emerge in France and Italy in the 1950s. Even in Germany, until the end of the 1950s, it was present in the public debate a clear distinction between "evil Nazis and good Germans" (S. Berger 2010, 121) because the country did not face its past yet.[68]

After the silencing phase, normally in the 1960s but sometimes not before the beginning of the 1970s, countries started examining their role vis-à-vis the fascist past and World War II. Normally the *self-critical* phase is highly conflictual because opposite interpretations collide and the outcome of intellectual and political negotiations determines the country's collective memory. During the self-critical phase, countries decide what has to remain in the mainstream narrative and what has to be excluded because embarrassing or contradictory. It is worth mentioning, however, that some countries might never engage (or engage only to a minimum degree) with such a stage of memory building thus simply removing and ignoring their own role. In other cases, countries might face their past only when forced by external or internal pressure.

Normally, collective memories emerge as the result of the self-critical phase and crystallize into official and – possibly – secondary narratives. It is in this moment that a

[68] Pakier and Stråth (2010) describe in detail the silencing phase and its characteristics.

main narrative clearly emerges and alternative memories either become irrelevant and disappear or become accepted as secondary narratives. This means that in certain cases diverging interpretations maintain a certain acceptability and credibility in the public discourse, while in other cases only an official and mainstream memory is allowed. Once the self-critical phase is concluded, the mainstream and possibly secondary narratives are established and crystallize into an official collective memory.

Moreover, while a correct process of socialization can prevent the fading of collective memories, it might also be the case that a natural generational change combined with the advent of new critical junctures (e.g. the end of the Cold War, the September 11 attacks, the Great Recession) might make societies perceive the 'remote' past as less and less relevant for the present.

Before describing the different types of collective memory, and assign one type to each country (this will be performed in Chapter 6), it is important to explicit four caveats concerning the nature of collective memory and its evolution over time. First, this study does not consider the pre-1970 period because the silencing phase makes impossible to define any collective memory. Second, collective memories can evolve over time. This evolution is triggered by several factors such as debates among historians, international controversies, trials, school programs, movies, and TV shows, and makes memories open to variations caused by short-term junctures as well as by long-term processes. Third, the process of memory building is not relevant for the present analysis, therefore it is considered as a *black box*. In other words, the only relevant aspect is the type of

collective memory that emerged as the *outcome* of the process, and not the process itself. Fourth, not all countries necessarily fit perfectly only one type of collective memory. Indeed, the process of re-elaboration can lead to the formation of two or more coexisting collective memories. In this case, along with a mainstream narrative it is possible to identify one or several secondary narratives.

Types of collective memory and levels of stigma

Operationalizing and measuring different types of collective memory constitutes a relatively unexplored field. One could just consider the historic role of a certain country during the fascist past (victim, perpetrator, or bystander) in order to determine the degree of stigmatization of the past, but this would be highly misleading, since the memory of past events does not coincide with the events themselves. What matters is not the role of the country, but the memory of the country's role and the legitimacy or stigma attached to the country's past actions.

According to the existing literature it is possible to identify a typology with four ideal-types of collective memory regarding the fascist past: culpabilization, heroization, cancellation, and victimization.[69] Each of them entails a specific idea of the role of the country during World War II and vis-à-vis the fascist regimes. This in turn determines different degrees of stigmatization of the illiberal elements that fascism and populism have in common. Indeed, populist discourses are seen as dangerous, and therefore become socially

[69] The typology has been developed by Caramani and Manucci (under review).

unacceptable, because of the unmediated idea of popular sovereignty and the disregard for checks and balances that characterize the populist interpretation of democracy. In a country where the memory of fascism is strongly negative, these elements of populism can be seen as worrying signs for the strength of liberal democracy, while the same elements can be socially accepted in countries where the memory of fascism is more nuanced.

Culpabilization and heroization have in common the fact that they imply a confrontation with the fascist past and its condemnation, which generates respectively very high and high levels of stigma towards illiberalism. When a country elaborates a collective memory based on culpabilization, the fascist past is condemned, the country takes responsibility for the past, and a thorough self-critical examination takes place. The country considers itself as guilty and assumes the burden of guilt for the fascist regime and its perpetrations. This indicates a very high degree of stigmatization of illiberal elements by making amend and compensating in various forms.[70]

Opposed to culpabilization, there is a type of collective memory based on heroization. It also involves a strong condemnation of the fascist past, but for completely different reasons. This type of memory is based on a narration of the country as acting heroically against the fascist threat to defend liberal values and democratic institutions. The degree of stigmatization of illiberal elements is high, but less high compared to culpabilization, since the country was not responsible for the fascist past and does not have to take

[70] The popular expression "once bitten, twice shy" here could be applied to explain why culpabilization implies a higher degree of stigma than heroization.

responsibility.[71] In other words, heroization strongly condemns the fascist past but not as strongly as culpabilization because the country was not "infected" with the "fascist virus" and therefore could not fully develop the antibodies needed to combat it, including stigmatization.[72]

Cancellation and victimization have in common the avoidance of responsibility, in other words they are based on denial.[73] A collective memory based on cancellation takes place when a country decides to forget its role vis-à-vis the fascist past, and avoids responsibility since it considers itself as an external actor. In other words, the country does not problematize its implicit or explicit complicity with, and accommodation of, fascist regimes. The resulting degree of stigmatization of illiberal elements is low, because the country avoids the process of 'working through the past'.[74]

Contrary to cancellation, a re-elaboration based on victimization confronts the past. However, this is done in order to overturn it and escape responsibility. It is worth clarifying that in this study victimization is understood as *self-victimization* or victim playing, and

[71] The countries' past is only partially endogenous to their memory. Collective memories are intrinsically linked to the process of collective re-elaboration which, in turn, is linked to the country's role but also to the construction of memories of the country's role which are not necessarily historically accurate and serve as ex-post justifications.
[72] In this case, the pre-existent national political culture is quite important. If a liberal and democratic political culture has flourished for a long time it can provide the necessary antibodies against illiberal elements. Otherwise, the stigmatization of illiberal elements might result weakened.
[73] In the Oxford Dictionaries, "denial" is defined in one of its meanings as "Failure to acknowledge an unacceptable truth or emotion or to admit it into consciousness, used as a defence mechanism."
[74] In this case, pre-existent national political cultures are extremely important. Since the country does not distance itself from that past but rather refuses to deal with it, the stigmatization of illiberal elements is mainly linked to the long-lasting effect of a pre-existent national political culture.

therefore cannot be applied to countries which were actually victims of fascist regimes.[75] In other words, only in case the country was at least partially ascribable to the group of perpetrators. Indeed, the country was directly or indirectly supporting a fascist regime, but its refusal to 'work through the past' makes it ignoring its responsibilities while standing as a victim. Moreover, the country shifts the blame to external forces while presenting its own national experience in a positive light. This type of memory therefore presents a strong form of *alteration* which makes possible for alternative narratives to be perceived as legitimate: no narrative is really stigmatized – including nostalgic and revisionist ones. The degree of stigmatization of illiberal elements is extremely low because the strong form of self-delusion blocks the formation of negative attitudes towards illiberalism.

Figure 5 shows that the different types of collective memories have a nominal value but, in terms of degree of stigmatization, the four types of narratives can be conceived as a single variable with an ordinal value. At one extreme is culpabilization, with a very high level of stigma due to a combination of two factors: a total acceptation of guilt and an existential stigmatization of fascism (++). A step lower there is heroization, which stigmatizes fascism without fundamentally question the country's identity and national culture (+).

[75] Such as Poland, that never collaborated with the Nazis nor surrendered.

Figure 5: Collective Memories as Proxy for Cultural Opportunity Structures



Culpabilization is expected to close down the space for right-wing populism because the fascist past is completely condemned and becomes a *no-go area*. Collective feeling of guilt and shame, acquired through socialization over generations, makes unacceptable any link with the past. Responsibility and guilt are internalized and undisputed, while holding views associated with the fascist past is socially sanctioned. Also heroization is expected to close down the space for right-wing populism because any link to a past fought through sacrifice becomes shocking and socially sanctioned.

Cancellation, being a type of non-narrative where the past is avoided, neither discusses nor alters the past hence preventing the formation of stigma (-). In the case of victimization, responsibility is rejected and the past is altered and therefore not stigmatized at all (--). In these two narratives the stigma associated with the fascist past is weak or absent – and even when present it can be contested. This is the case because the past, being either ignored or altered, has no negative connotations and holding views in line with that past remains acceptable or not socially sanctioned. In the case of cancellation, this is due to the lack of public debate. In the case of victimization, this is due to the alteration of past roles and to blame-shifting toward external forces.

Before Chapter 5 discusses the amount of populism in each country and Chapter 6 assigns a type of collective memory to each country, it is necessary to introduce in Chapter 4 the case selection and the operationalization used to measure populism in party manifestos, as well as the methodology implemented in order to determine the impact of collective stigmatization of the fascist past.

Chapter 4 – Research Design

This chapter illustrates how populism is operationalized and measured through a process of semi-automated content analysis. Moreover, several key elements of this study are explained and justified, such as the case-selection, the time frame, the criteria for the selection of party manifestos, and the methodology used in the analytical section. The tools employed for the semi-automated content analysis of populist discourses have been designed in the context of the third phase of the NCCR Democracy project at the University of Zurich. A four-years-long joint effort has produced: a common codebook for the analysis of the texts, the training of a large number of highly-skilled coders, and the production of an electronic interface (*Angrist*) that enables the coders to input relational data in a quick and efficient way.[76] In particular, a team of 76 coders has been trained intensively in order to code several types of media outlets. For the present study, only party manifestos for eight countries in the period 1970-2014 are considered.[77] All coders passed a reliability test assessing the validity of their decisions, with a mean agreement of 85.7% in identifying units of analysis within the texts, and a mean interrater reliability of Kappan=0.813 in coding the content of these units of analysis.[78]

[76] Wettstein (2014; 2016). The documentation (retrieved in October 2017) about Angrist is available at: http://www.ipmz.uzh.ch/Abteilungen/Medienpsychologie/Recource/Angrist/ANGRIST_1-2-en.pdf

[77] The actual number of coders involved in this particular research project was actually 43.

[78] About Brennan & Prediger's Kappa, see (Brennan and Prediger 1981)

Table 4 – Kappan Coefficients Coding Populism

Variables measuring populism	Kappan Coefficient
Praising the people's achievements	0.984
Blaming the elites	0.629
Expressing Closeness to the people	0.983
Denouncing the elites	0.778
Excluding of the elite from the people	0.889
Stating a monolithic people	0.740
Claiming power for the people	0.988
Denying power to the elites	0.946
Stressing the virtues of the people	0.980
Summary	0.813

First, a test was conducted on coder validity (checking the coders' agreement with a gold standard solution) and then a hidden reliability test was conducted. During the content analysis, and without notification, coders were assigned single texts from a corpus of 29 texts in German and English. The results of these two tests for every aspect of populism are generally acceptable, with average-levels of Cohen's Kappa of 0.73 for the 'gold standard' test and 0.76 for the hidden reliability test. Table 4 shows the Kappan coefficients for each variable.[79]

Reliability and validity are a necessary but not sufficient condition for the measurement of populism, considering the many different approaches emerged in the literature.[80] The

[79] The values are presented for all the variables, including those used uniquely for the alternative operationalization.
[80] An extensive overview is offered in Aslanidis (2017).

nature of this study, however, is essentially comparative and the absolute levels of the acceptability of populism are less relevant insofar as the differences across countries are correctly represented. Nonetheless, many aspects have to be thoroughly discussed in order to make sure that the measurement is performed in accordance with the definition of populism provided in Chapter 1 and that it allows the highest degree of comparability between countries.

Finally, it is important to highlight why fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) can be considered as the most appropriate method for this study. Since the aim is to understand under which socio-economic and political-institutional opportunity structures populist discourses are more or less socially acceptable, fsQCA allows determining to what extent each condition is necessary for the outcome to occur, and which (combination of) conditions are sufficient. Moreover, it becomes possible to assess to what extent the levels of stigma contribute to form a better explanation for the phenomenon.

Populist discourses in party manifestos

Consistently with the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 1, this study considers populism as an ideology articulated discursively. This implies that the populist ideology becomes empirically measurable as soon as an actor articulates it discursively. This allows measuring populism in a consistent and comparable way across countries and over time (Aslanidis 2017). Ideally, the best measurement for the acceptability of populism

in a certain country at a certain time in point would include each type of discourse circulating in the public debate, as well as every type of speaker.[81]

However, discourses articulated by different types of actors (politicians, journalists, celebrities, common people, or religious leaders) in different media outlets (party manifestos, social media, newspapers, TV shows, or blogs) are not necessarily comparable, and analyzing them can be extremely expensive and time consuming. Moreover, the hypothesis developed in this study stipulates that populist discourses are more or less legitimate according to different levels of stigmatization of the fascist past. Therefore, party manifestos are the most suitable and convenient type of document to analyze for several reasons.

First, by analyzing party manifestos it is possible to observe how often political actors rely on populist discourses when they are free to communicate directly to the electorate, thus articulating – in an unmediated way – their idea of society and, ultimately, their idea of power. Second, non-political actors are less affected by the possible stigma attached to the fascist past. Compared to political actors, who have an institutional and official role, for them it might be more socially acceptable to articulate populist discourses, hence making a comparison highly problematic. Third, the choice of investigating the presence of populism in party manifestos is linked to previous studies which consider this type of

[81] Following previous studies about the presence of populist discourses, I define public debates as the public discussion of ideas, facts, feelings and opinions relevant to politics and involving citizens, politicians, and experts, with the media acting at the same time as 'gatekeepers' and actors themselves (Rooduijn 2014a; Bennett and Entman 2001; Vliegenthart and Roggeband 2007). National newspapers, magazines, television programs, and internet fora all constitute places where the public debate takes place.

material as "an authoritative document that gives a clear overview of the ideas of a party at a certain point in time" as well as appropriate for comparative content analysis (Rooduijn, de Lange, and van der Brug 2014, 566).

The advantage of a semi-automated content analysis over expert survey data is self-evident. Instead of relying on data that might be biased by theoretical expectations regarding how 'populist' is a certain party or politician, this method provides fine-grained and objective measures of the levels of populism in the electoral manifestos of different political actors. In other words, rather than assuming that certain actors are populist by definition, the content analysis allows determining how often each actor articulates populist messages.

Given that analyzing party materials is labor intensive, most studies in this strand of literature focus on specific country cases or engage in small sample cross-national comparisons. One of the strengths of the present study is the combination of a large cross-national sample (eight countries) over a considerable longitudinal extension (from the 1970s to the 2010s).

Case selection

This study focuses on eight West European countries: Austria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. There are several reasons behind the selection of the countries. First, it is in Western Europe – among the world's established democracies – that populist actors are becoming increasingly

successful in elections (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008) and often manage to set the public debate with fiery statements and vicious attacks to their opponents (Mény and Surel 2000). In other words, populist actors often set the agenda of the political debate forcing mainstream actors to strategically adapt and react (Rooduijn 2014a). Therefore, the growing political impact of populism in Western Europe (Mudde 2013) is extremely relevant because it speaks to the nature and future of democracy itself.

Second, Western Europe represents a privileged observation point on several varieties of populist discourses: from extreme left to extreme right actors, from niche to mainstream parties, in Western Europe countries virtually every possible type of populist discourse is articulated by political actors. Moreover, given the longitudinal and comparative dimension of this study, it is important to notice that in Western Europe the archives of party manifestos – both online and offline – are often complete and easily accessible.

Third, the electoral success of populist parties is not uniform across the eight countries analyzed. While in countries such as Austria, Italy, Switzerland and France they are consistently successful over time, in other countries such as Sweden and Germany they are not, with the Netherlands and the United Kingdom as intermediary cases (van Kessel 2015b). As Rooduijn has shown, the diffusion of populist discourses in the public debate varies according to the electoral success of populist parties (2014a), and therefore the variance in the selected countries is important.

Fourth, following a *most similar* systems design (MSSD), these countries display different levels of populism, but share similar patterns of state formation, nation-building and

democratization.[82] On the other hand, following a *most different* systems design (MDSD), it might be the case that countries with similar levels of populism have different political cultures. While Switzerland and Germany are consensus democratic systems and the United Kingdom is a clear majoritarian democracy, France is a unique example of a premier-presidential system and the other cases are parliamentary systems (Lijphart 1999; Lijphart 2012).[83] Moreover, the selected countries show a fair amount of variability in terms of accountability and responsiveness of the political system, perception of corruption, and economic performance. This variance is important in order to test which socio-economic and political-institutional conditions are necessary or sufficient for the social acceptability of populism.

Finally, every West European country has been confronted – more or less directly – with fascism and World War II. Consequently, each country had to develop a narration of those events in order to define its new collective identity. This means that they have formed collective memories about the same authoritarian past, in this case the *fascist* past, therefore making possible to test the impact of stigmatization of the past on the presence of populist discourses.

Moreover, on a pragmatic note, it was not possible to include every West European country in the content analysis, mainly because of practical reasons linked to the amount of time available and to obvious financial restrictions. However, the eight selected

[82] See e.g. Bartolini (1993) and Sartori (1991)
[83] Papadopoulos (2002, 53) discusses in detail the impact of the institutional dimension on the degree of populism.

countries are supposed to represent other countries such as Denmark, Norway, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Ireland since they show similar institutional features, political systems, socio-economic conditions, and collective memories of the fascist past compared to the included countries.

On the longitudinal dimension, five time points have been selected. In particular, for each country has been chosen one national election per decade.[84] The aim is to have, for each decade, elections as close as possible one to another in each country, in order to provide the maximum degree of comparability. Moreover, in France the first round of presidential elections is preferred to legislative elections, given France's unique semi-presidential system and the importance that presidential elections play in its political system.[85] Moreover, Italy in the 2000s has been excluded since the two different electoral systems used in 2001 and 2006 forced the parties to form broad coalitions rather than participating alone, and therefore separate manifestos are not available.[86]

[84] Although populist parties perform even better in the context of the elections for the European Parliament, National elections are more appropriate than European ones as the latter are mostly second-order national elections (Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996).
[85] In the first round of presidential elections all the candidates are still participating in the electoral campaign, and therefore it is possible to retrieve an electoral manifesto for each party. On the other hand, legislative elections are relatively less relevant given the French semi-presidential system.
[86] In 2006 the centre-left coalition "L'Unione", for example, counted 9 founding parties. The Italian election of 2008 would have been technically available, because the different parties presented separate electoral manifestos. However, this would have been in contradiction with one of the criteria stated above: since all the other countries considered hold elections in the period 2001-2003, selecting an election from 2008 would have diminished the degree of comparability.

Table 5 – Corpus Manifestos: Overview

Country	Election Years	N. Manifestos	Statements in Manifestos
Austria	1975, 1983, 1994, 2002, 2013	21	1723
France	1974, 1981, 1995, 2002, 2012	22	1812
Germany	1972, 1983, 1994, 2002, 2013	19	1489
Italy	1972, 1983, 1994, 2013	17	2470
Netherlands	1972, 1982, 1994, 2002, 2012	24	2429
Sweden	1973, 1982, 1994, 2002, 2014	29	1113
Switzerland	1975, 1983, 1995, 2003, 2011	26	1185
United Kingdom	1974, 1983, 1992, 2001, 2010	15	1843
SUM		173	14064

The party manifestos issued before the election periods have been selected since they are supposed to be particularly suited in order to observe populist discourses. Indeed, during election campaigns political actors are particularly active in communicating their positions to voters, and in particular they might express more frequently their opinion concerning different ideas of power, and about the role of the elite and the people in the decision-making process. The party manifestos have been retrieved by the *Comparative Manifesto Project* (Lehmann et al. 2016) or from parties' websites. Alternatively, the

author personally contacted the political parties and asked for the missing manifestos. As Table 5 shows, the content analysis concerns 173 party manifestos for a total of 14102 coded statements. Appendix 1 provides some descriptive data about the manifestos, while Appendix 3 lists for each analyzed manifesto the total number of statements and populist statements.

Measuring the social acceptability of populism

The social acceptability of populism is here measured as the percentage of populist statements in a party manifesto, which is then weighted by two other factors: the degree of radicalism of the party and the vote share the party received in that election. Populist statements are identified according to the ad-hoc codebook produced in the context of the NCCR Democracy project, and six indicators are used to detect the presence of populist messages (Table 6). This section describes in detail the procedure for the measurement of populism in party manifestos.

Populism is measured – in each party manifesto[87] – as the percentage of populist statements compared to the total amount of political statements, which constitute the unit of measure. Those statements which do not contain either an evaluation of a social actor or a position regarding a political issue are removed from the total amount of political

[87] Other authors use paragraphs as sample unit. I use the whole manifesto because, as explained by Aslanidis (2017, 10), paragraphs "frequently contain bullet-pointed lists and short motivational sentences or quotes, features that further undermine comparability. […] segmentation into paragraphs still involves a discount in semantic resolution, since mildly populist paragraphs receive identical scores with intensely populist ones that carry greater informative content."

statements because they do not contain any relevant information about the speaker's ideology, idea of power, or issue positioning.[88] In other words, a speaker (in this case a political party) articulates a political statement as soon as an evaluation is expressed:

1) About other social actors. These actors can be political actors (politicians, parties, parliaments, or governments), but also economic actors, national and supranational organizations, the people, judiciary actors, the police or the army, as well as religious actors or the media.

2) About a political issue. It was used a set of 12 issue-categories which includes: economy, culture, welfare, budget, army, immigration, Europe, security, institutional reforms, army, ecology, infrastructures. Each statement in which a position on one of these issues is expressed has been coded.

In order to make the measurement as strict and objective as possible, and with the aim of reducing if not eliminating type I errors (false positives), the coders have been trained to code only explicit statements. Implications, hints, and context knowledge is never applied to the coding process. Even if a coder realizes that, between the lines, a message has a certain implicit meaning, this is irrelevant, since the statement is only coded in case the meaning is explicit.[89] Another relevant aspect concerns the absolute number of coded

[88] A statement that is discarded from the coding process because it does not include any actor evaluation or issue positioning, might sound like: "Next year there will be elections and our party will participate" or "This manifesto aims at illustrating the goals of our party."
[89] The golden rule expressed in the codebook about this aspect reads as follows: "If you have to ask yourself whether a statement is explicit enough to code it, it is not."

statements. Indeed, only one statement toward each issue or target is coded for each speaker in a party manifesto. This means that if the speaker makes several statements on a specific issue (e.g. 'welfare') or target (e.g. 'the journalists'), these are considered as one single statement although the message is articulated over several sentences. If the speaker is criticizing the government because 'it does not listen to the people' several times in the text, this is only coded once.

After having identified the main characteristics of the unit of measure (political statements), it is crucial to identify populist statements (Table 6). A statement is coded as populist – according to the conceptualization outlined in Chapter 1 – whenever a party:

– Claims to be close to the people;
– Mentions the people as a monolithic actor with a common will;
– Stresses the virtues of the people;
– Praises the positive achievements of the people;
– Introduces a cleavage between the elites and the people
– Demands more power for the people

Moreover, three caveats are crucial in order to fully describe the operationalization of populism used in this study. First, "exclusion of the elite from the people" is coded as present only in case the target of the critique is the elite as a whole. Therefore, a critique targeting only part of the elite – like a specific party, or a certain politician – is not considered as a populist statement.

On the other hand, the *type* of elite as a whole which is criticized varies according to the broader ideology of the speaker. The critique might target political elites (‘established parties’ or ‘the government’), but also financial (‘the capitalists’), economic (‘the banks’), cultural (‘the academics’, 'the media'), or unspecified elites (‘the mighty ones’). Moreover, in this way a critique of the elites as a whole is coded as populist only if the critique is made with a reference to the people.

Second, the concept of ‘people’ can also be declined in different ways according to the speaker's full ideology. The codebook includes generic expressions concerning the people, but also expressions defining the people as ethnos (‘the Dutch’), as a function (‘the voters’), as a hypothetical prototype of the people (‘the man in the street'), or any other term which can stand for ‘the majority in the society’.

Third, contrary to other studies (Rooduijn 2014a, 734; Rooduijn, de Lange, and van der Brug 2014, 567) the co-occurrence of people-centrism and anti-elitism is not required, since each statement containing one of the six elements can be considered as populist (alternative operationalization in Appendix 10, Table 36).

Table 6 – Operationalization of Populism

Dimensions	Questions in the Codebook
Closeness to the people	Does the speaker claim to belong / be close to / know / speak for / care for / agree with / perform everyday actions like / represent / embody the people?
Stating a monolithic people	Does the speaker describe the people as homogeneous, sharing common feelings, desires, or opinions?
Stressing the virtues of the people	Does the speaker describe the people in a positive way (moral, credible, competent, no lack of understanding, etc.)?
Praising the people's achievements	Does the speaker stress positive actions and positive past and future impacts of the people (responsible for a positive development / situation, not being responsible for a mistake, etc.)?
Exclusion of the elite from the people	Does the speaker describe the elites as not belonging to / not being close to / not knowing the needs of / not caring about / not speaking on behalf of / not empowering / deceiving the people?
Claiming power for the people	Does the speaker argue that the people should have / gain / not lose power? Does the speaker give the people the competence to act or decide on a specific political issue? Does the speaker demand institutional reforms for more participation of the people in politics?

This approach has several advantages. For example, it reduces the number manifestos with no populism, thus making more meaningful the quantitative comparison.[90] Moreover, it eliminates cases in which a manifesto contains high levels of people-centrism but no anti-elitism thus resulting in a 'zero' as percentage of populism, while with just one anti-

[90] The number of manifestos that would have "zero" populism with the co-occurrence principle, but that in fact show populism with this operationalization is 57 (around 33% of the sample): 8 in the 1970s, 9 in the 1980s, 16 in the 1990s, 10 in the 2000s, and 14 in the 2010s.

elitist statement the percentage of populism would have been much higher.[91] On the other and, since this study relies on a definition of populism based on both anti-elitism and people-centrism, this operationalization also requires several adjustments and clarifications.

For example, a critique of the elites is not coded as populist unless it explicitly makes reference to the people. Since a critique of the elite can be sufficient to speak of populism following this operationalization, it would be highly problematic to code every critique to the elites as populist, and therefore this is done more restrictively: only in case the anti-elitist critique is carried on in the name of the people (and, as explained before, in case the elite is considered as a whole and not a specific actor).

On the other hand, the opposite is not necessarily true: a people-centric message, if coded as proposed here, does not require explicit anti-elitism in order to be coded as populist, because it already incorporates it. For example, political statements like "We are truly on the side of the people" (Closeness to the people, intending that other parties are not), "The people are tired of this dramatic situation" (Stating a monolithic people, as in a purely populist fashion), “The people should decide what is better for the future of this country” (Stressing virtues of the people, as opposed to those of the elites), “It is thanks to the courage of the common people if the situation improved” (Praising the people’s achievements, as opposed to a passive or negative role of the elites), or “The people

[91] For example, the Labour Party (UK) and the ÖVP (CH) in the 2000s and 2010s, but also the FDP (CH) and the FPÖ (AT) in the 2010s would have been coded as having no populism, precisely because they show people-centrism but no explicit anti-elitism.

should decide on this issue through a referendum" (Claiming power for the people, as opposed to the power of the elites) are coded as populist even without an explicit critique of the elites, because they clearly embed it. Indeed, when a party takes the side of the people in its electoral manifesto, it is clearly doing so in opposition to the other parties.

Moreover, not counting people-centric statements as populist would be highly problematic. Indeed, the vast majority of anti-elitist critiques are directed towards *political* elites (such as the government, the parliamentary majority, or the established parties) and therefore almost exclusively oppositional and non-mainstream parties would be able to articulate anti-elitist statements (hence being able to show traces of populism in their manifestos). This means that by using an operationalization of populism that relies on the co-occurrence of people-centrism and anti-elitism, governmental parties and mainstream parties would almost never turn out to be populist thus generating type II errors (false negatives).[92]

Even with the operationalization applied in this study, which evens out differences between mainstream and non-mainstream parties, it clearly appears that new non-mainstream parties (the *'usual suspects*', so to speak) are anyway much more populist that established mainstream parties. The results are not much different from those that

[92] Rooduijn et al. (2014, 567), for example, use the co-occurrence operationalization, and indeed nearly all mainstream parties have a very low populism score.

would have been obtained by using a co-occurrence principle, which are anyway fully reported in Appendix 10 (Table 37).[93]

According to the description of the measurement offered above, the overall amount of populism for each manifesto can theoretically range from 0 (none of the coded statements is populist) to 100 (each coded statement is populist). The results of the content analysis are presented in Chapter 6, but for the moment it is possible to anticipate that 715 out of 14,064 political statements (almost 5.1%) have been coded as populist. The populism scores of the manifestos empirically range from 0% (which is the case for 47 of the 173 manifestos, 24 of which are from Swedish parties) to 30% (e.g. the Green Party of Germany in 2013)[94] of populist statements, and on average a manifesto contains 4.9% of populist statements.

In order to determine whether in a certain country populism is socially accepted, two additional steps are implemented. First, the percentage of populist statements is weighted by two additional factors: the *vote share* and the *degree of radicalism* of the party. Figure 6 presents a three-dimensional overview of the composition of the outcome (or dependent variable). Second, the levels of populism in a certain country at a certain time in point (country-decade) are obtained by *aggregating* the weighted levels of populism form all the manifestos containing populist statements in that particular election.

[93] Appendix 10 (Table 38) shows the raw and fuzzy values of populism according to the alternative operationalization; from Figure 37 to Figure 40 it is visualized the average percentage of populism per manifesto as well as the levels across countries.
[94] The Socialist Party in Italy in the 1970s has a score of 40%, but the populist statements are 2 out of 5, therefore the reliability of such a measurement is questionable.

The percentage of populist statements is weighted by radicalism and vote share because what is relevant in this study is the degree of acceptability of populist discourses in a certain country. If a manifesto contains remarkable levels of populism

Figure 6: Salonfähigkeit of Populism in Three Dimensions



(say 10%), but the party is not radical (1.5 in a 1-to-6 scale where 1 is non radical and 6 is very radical) and it obtained only 5% of the vote share, the weighted level of populism for that manifesto will be *75* (10*1.5*5). On the other hand, if a manifesto containing the same amount of populism (10%) is written by a very radical party (say 5 out of 6) which obtained a striking electoral result (say 25% of the vote share), the weighted level of populism for that manifesto will be *1,250* (10*5*25). This means that *a party can articulate more or less populist messages in its manifesto, but what also matters in order to understand how acceptable is populism in a certain country is how radical and successful is that party and therefore its discourse*. If a very populist manifesto written by a very radical party obtains less than 1% of the votes, it is safe to assume that the party's message is insignificant in the public debate.

Following a similar approach, the level of populism in a certain country is obtained by aggregating the weighted levels of populism of all the manifestos containing populist statements in that particular election. This means that if one single moderate party (say 2 out of 6) with a populist manifesto (say 10%) obtains 40% of the vote share, while none of the other parties participating in that election articulates populism, the total amount is 800 (2*10*40). The same amount is reached in case four moderate parties (2) with equally populist manifestos (10%) obtain each 10% of the vote share. Calculating the average amount of populist messages among all the manifestos would render irrelevant the fact that in a certain country there are several credible populist actors, and assign higher scores to countries with one mainstream party articulating populist discourses. On the other hand in this way it is possible to compare the United Kingdom to other countries, since one single party with a considerable vote share can count as much as several smaller parties.

Theoretically a country in a certain time in point can have a level of weighted populism ranging from 0 to 60,000.[95] The higher end is empirically unimaginable, since it describes a country in which extremely radical parties (6 in a scale from 1 to 6) obtained 100% of the vote share while only articulating populist statements in their manifestos (6*100*100). The observed values are, of course, much lower. The highest level of weighted populism

[95] The levels of the outcome are then transformed in a 0 to 1 scale in order to perform the analysis and the thresholds for cases to be considered as being members of the outcome or not are explained in detail in the *Operationalization and calibration* section of Chapter 7. A simple logarithmic normalization form 0 to 100 based on maximum and minimum values would leave most of the cases below 50 for example, thus making the interpretation of the values even harder.

registered consists in the 3,418 total points scored by Austria in 2013. In particular, this level is linked to the presence of the manifesto of the Austrian Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs – FPÖ), which alone scores 2,028 (more than 21% populist statements, 4.7/6 in radicalism, 20.5% of the vote share). Apart from the manifesto of the FPÖ, it is worth noticing that also the other five coded manifestos in the same election have significant levels of populism: SPÖ (3.3%), NEOS (5.1%), Grüne (7.1%); ÖVP (11.9%), Team Stronach (13.9%), and that all together these six parties cover 94.4% of the vote share.

Methodology

The hypotheses formulated are tested through fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). This method postulates that the presence (or absence) of a dependent variable, called outcome, can be explained by a combination of different independent variables, called conditions, therefore identifying multiple causal patterns. This is in contrast with the concept of additivity, which postulates that single variables have their own independent impact on the dependent variable. This work follows the reasons brought by van Kessel in his book that employs QCA to study the conditions for the electoral success of populist parties in Europe (2015b, 29–30).

Indeed, several key concepts of QCA are essential in explaining why this particular methodology fits the task of this study. The principle of *equifinality* states that the same outcome can be explained by different (combinations of) conditions. At the same time, QCA is also based on *multifinality*, meaning that the same (combinations of) conditions

can explain different outcomes. Another central concept in QCA is *conjunctural causation*, meaning that it is a configuration of combined conditions that relates to a certain outcome. This implies that single conditions are not supposed to affect the outcome independently, but in combination. Finally, QCA relies on the concept of *causal asymmetry*, meaning that the presence or absence of a certain outcome might be explained by different configurations of conditions. All these factors are particularly relevant considering that the literature examined in Chapter 2 clearly points to the presence of multiple factors and their combinations in order to explain the presence of populism.[96]

Moreover, the ultimate goal of QCA is to analyse set-theoretic sufficiency relations. The aim is to verify whether a single condition always leads to the same outcome.[97] Indeed, the main feature and aim of QCA consists in determining necessary and sufficient conditions for a certain outcome to occur (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). The first step consists in assessing the presence of any explanatory condition that is necessary for the presence of the outcome. At the same time, it is also determined the presence of any condition necessary for the absence of the outcome (or, in other words, for the presence of its negation). In a further step, through Boolean minimization, the analysis determines the presence of (combinations of) conditions whose presence is sufficient for the presence (or absence) of the outcome. This normally brings to the definition of a solution formula showing the sufficient (combination of) conditions for the occurrence of the

[96] The most important theoretical works about the concepts used in QCA are: Ragin 2008; Ragin 1987; Ragin 2000; Schneider and Wagemann 2012.
[97] This is a general principle of every comparative method and it goes back (at least) to John Stuart Mill (1906), who anyway did not believe it was possible to apply the method to social sciences as explained in Caramani (2009).

outcome. The solution can be conservative, intermediate or parsimonious according to the assumptions made about the logical reminders (this aspect will be discussed in Chapter 7). Each solution has a value for consistency and a value for coverage, which illustrate how 'precise' is the solution formula in explaining the occurrence of the outcome (consistency or inclusion), and how many cases are covered by that solution formula (coverage).

In this study the dependent variable to be explained, or outcome in the QCA terminology, is represented by the social acceptability of populist discourses, measured as the levels of populism in party manifestos weighted by the degree of radicalism and vote share of the party. In order to obtain a deeper understanding of the conditions linked to the social acceptability of populism (POP), it is also tested the impact of the conditions on the acceptability of *left-wing* (POP_L) and *right-wing* (POP_R) populism separately, for a total of three different outcomes. This is done because the social acceptability of right-wing populism might be explained by a different combination of conditions compared to left-wing populism.

The cases observed are represented by eight countries, each analysed during three election points in the period 1990-2015, bringing the total of cases to 24. Given the peculiar electoral law used in Italy for the elections of 2001, it was not possible to find electoral manifestos for the single parties but only the manifestos of the two main coalitions. Therefore the number of cases dropped to 23 (see in Chapter 6 the section about populism Italy). The first part of the QCA analysis presented in Chapter 7 is

performed in order to assess the impact of high levels of corruption, poor economic performance, low levels of accountability and responsiveness, and high ideological convergence on the social acceptability of populism. The second part of the analysis, presented in Chapter 8, introduces the level of stigma, a newly constructed condition aiming at assessing whether the level of stigmatization of the fascist past can contribute to better explain the same outcomes.

Chapter 5 – Populism in Eight West European Countries since the 1970s

This chapter presents the descriptive results of the content analysis described in Chapter 4. In particular, it illustrates the trend for the presence of populism in party manifestos in eight European countries since the 1970s up to now. Moreover, it disentangles between left-wing and right-wing variants of populism. Finally, it describes each country in detail explaining which party manifestos articulate populist discourses, giving examples and discussing whether the findings are in line with the literature on the topic.

The data presented concern also two time points which are not used in the analysis because the data which are used to operationalize the conditions to be tested are inexistent or incomplete for the decades before 1990. Hence, only the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s will be object of the QCA analysis. However, it is interesting to present a more long-term picture concerning the development of populism in Western Europe. In particular, by including the 1970s and 1980s three considerations can be made. First: the last elections (2010s) are characterized by unprecedented levels of populism. Second: it is not since the 1990s – as it is often argued – that populism started growing. In fact, the overall levels in the 1970s are higher than in the 2000s. Third, on average left-wing parties articulate populist discourses more often than right-wing parties. All the data are reported in Appendix 1 (Table 16 to Table 20).

Figure 7: Average Populism in Manifestos (Percentage)



Figure 7 represents the average percentage of populist statements in each manifesto for every decade. It shows that, on average, a right-wing manifesto (dashed line) in the 2010s contains on average much more populism than in the 1970s (despite a slight downturn in the 2000s). The manifestos of left-wing parties, on the other hand, were on average more populist in the 1970s compared to the three following decades (dotted line). Overall, the percentage of populist statements in all party manifestos (solid line) shows that the manifestos written for the last elections have been the most populist, but the increase has not been steadfast: the percentage of populist statements in the 1970s and 1980s was higher compared to the 2000s.

Figure 8: Average Populism in Manifestos (Weighted)



Figure 8 shows the evolution of the social acceptability of populist discourses. The average percentage of populist statements in each manifesto is here weighted by the degree of radicalism and vote share of the party author of the manifesto. Compared to Figure 7, it appears clearly that by considering the two additional parameters the difference between populism in left-wing and right-wing manifestos in the 1970s and 1980s is even more accentuated. This makes the fall of populism in left-wing manifestos even more spectacular between the 1970s and the 2000s. Right-wing populism, on the other hand, has remained rather stable between the 1990s and the 2010s. Finally, the overall levels of populism were almost identical in the 1970s (295) and the 2010s (294),

with very constant levels in the 1980s and 1990s as well, and the usual downturn in the 2000s.

In Appendix 2, Table 21 and Table 22 show that the development over time is statistically not significant (only the 1980s compared to the 2010s show a significant negative coefficient with a confidence interval of 95%). Moreover, Appendix 10 shows the same descriptive data (including the statistical significance tests) based on the alternative operationalization implementing the co-occurrence principle. The main difference consists in the fact that the alternative operationalization based on co-occurrence raises the amount of right-wing populism in the 2000s.

The main focus of this study, however, consists in understanding how much populist discourses are acceptable in a given country compared to other countries, rather than the average content of populism in manifestos over time. For this reason, Figures Figure 9 and Figure 10 show the average amount of populism at the country level. Here the focus is on the average level of populism across the eight countries considered, and the unit of measure is country-decade, not manifestos. The amount of populism in a certain country-decade is calculated as the sum of all populist manifestos, and finally the values reported describe the average value of populism across the eight countries analyzed. The data concerning the amount of populism per country-decade, both as a percentage of populist statements in manifesto (unweighted) and their combination with radicalism and vote share (weighted) are presented in Table 7.

Table 7 – Populism by Country-Decade Raw and Weighted

Country	Decade	R.W. Populism (weighted)	L.W. Populism (weighted)	Total Populism (weighted)	R.W. Populism (%)	L.W. Populism (%)	Total Populism (%)
AT	1970	206.5556	790.0541	996.6096	3.703704	5.405405	9.109109
AT	1980	353.0646	2281.856	2634.92	12.23602	15.46392	27.69994
AT	1990	2341.717	523.5	2865.217	26.11945	7.142857	33.2623
AT	2000	419.5641	205.5516	625.1158	4.248836	4.798535	9.047371
AT	2010	2967.758	450.4299	3418.187	51.96133	10.38728	62.34861
CH	1970	0	591.4167	591.4167	0	11.80556	11.80556
CH	1980	0	0	0	0	0	0
CH	1990	1269.662	800.0878	2069.75	26.66283	15.40149	42.06433
CH	2000	1724.367	436.7815	2161.148	21.04998	6.430785	27.48077
CH	2010	745.8495	1143.037	1888.887	22.83163	11.87522	34.70685
DE	1970	0	196.2857	196.2857	0	1.785714	1.785714
DE	1980	1312.933	2050.566	3363.499	12.77778	37.23077	50.00855
DE	1990	331.6313	1264.726	1596.358	6.045874	17.15138	23.19725
DE	2000	177.239	309.6667	486.9057	5.676063	5.121816	10.79788
DE	2010	0	2546.252	2546.252	0	69.72222	69.72222
FR	1970	381.4737	752.0015	1133.475	12.63158	12.78	27.98246
FR	1980	459.7297	600.5217	1060.251	12.16216	8.122683	20.28485
FR	1990	801.7422	1089.845	1891.587	16.38403	25.2571	41.64112
FR	2000	1358.749	296.3123	1655.061	25.18881	9.561404	34.75021
FR	2010	437.3862	295.4952	732.8814	8.070292	9.51021	17.5805
IT	1970	0	2312.95	2312.95	0	45	45
IT	1980	21.64265	277.7736	299.4162	3.089811	6.764032	9.853843
IT	1990	1174.214	24.4	1198.614	29.72955	1.176471	30.90602
IT	2010	637.4272	547.8737	1043.827	26.93498	14.5614	33.60165
NL	1970	0	470.5475	470.5475	0	12.21627	12.21627
NL	1980	0	866.5747	866.5747	0	9.195402	9.195402
NL	1990	120.4819	108.9844	229.4663	2.409639	3.90625	6.315889
NL	2000	562.8437	513.0619	1075.906	8.638752	22.92001	31.55876
NL	2010	631.8984	183.9767	815.8752	12.21218	3.343671	15.55585
SE	1970	0	258.6061	258.6061	0	3.030303	3.030303
SE	1980	0	0	0	0	0	0
SE	1990	0	0	0	0	0	0
SE	2000	73.2439	0	73.2439	2.439024	0	2.439024
SE	2010	233.807	207	440.807	4.417582	11.11111	15.52869
UK	1970	211.5455	1462.635	1674.18	4.545455	16.21563	20.76108
UK	1980	438.284	720.213	1158.497	5.929229	5.325444	11.25467
UK	1990	290.8128	972.6094	1263.422	1.826484	9.061738	10.88822
UK	2000	516.3711	454.4821	970.8531	4.402516	12.84542	17.24793
UK	2010	1093.857	472.8221	1566.679	9.774436	13.24143	23.01586

These data will be discussed in detail in the remainder of the chapter. For the moment it is interesting to observe that when considering the total levels of populism, summing left-wing and right-wing populism (solid line), the last decade is remarkably "more populist" than any other before. In particular, this is made even more evident in comparison with the levels registered in the 2000s, which are consistent with the data on manifestos discussed sopra.

In the 1970s and 1980s, left-wing populism (dotted line) was dominant, compared to right-wing populism (dashed line), but the situation was reversed in the 1990s and 2000s. Since the 1990s right-wing populism becomes widely widespread, with an exponential growth compared to the previous decades, while left-wing populism seems to enter a phase of crisis in the same period. The 2010s elections, however, changed the scenario once again. Indeed, in absolute terms (Figure 9) left-wing populism has never been as much present as in the last elections, while right-wing populism has remained stable between the 1990s and the 2010s.

When taking into consideration not only the amount of populism in party manifestos at the country level, but also the degree of radicalism of the parties as well as their electoral performance (Figure 10), in other words the Salonfähigkeit of populist discourses) the picture that emerges is even more distant from the expectations generated by the relevant literature. For example, the downfall in the 2000s is even

Figure 9: Average Populism per Country (Percentage)



more unexplainable (although it does not occur with the operationalization based on co-occurrence), given the steady increase in the decades preceding and following the 2000s. Moreover, when weighted, right-wing populism in the 2010s is actually higher than left-wing populism, because of the degree of radicalism of right-wing parties but mainly because of their electoral success.

Figure 10: Average Populism per Country (Weighted)



By comparing weighted and unweighted data, it appears that the total amount of populism for the last elections is unprecedented in absolute terms, but it is not particularly extraordinary if weighted (Figure 10). This might indicate that *parties articulating populist discourses are becoming less and less radical, or in other words more mainstream*. Indeed, if one considers only the 68 manifestos with at least 5% of populist statements, the average value of radicalism (in a scale from 1 to 6) was 3.1 in the 1970s, 3 in the 1980s, 3.2 in the 1990s, 2.8 in the 2000s and down to 2.7 in the 2010s.

By observing these aggregated data, one can argue that several assumptions formulated in the relevant literature about populism in Western Europe are not correct. First, it is difficult to understand how *globalization and mediatization* of politics can be directly linked to the levels of populism in party manifestos and to the social acceptability of populism. *If this would be the case, it would be possible to observe a sudden rise from the 1990s compared to the two previous decades, but this does not reflect the findings*.[98] One could argue that these mechanisms bear a stronger explanatory power in relation to right-wing populism only, but also in this case the effect is not particularly visible. Second, although most of the literature focuses on right-wing parties, populism is more present in manifestos of left-wing parties, and therefore this aspect should be investigated with greater attention. Third, if one considers also the elections held in France, Austria, and the Netherlands after 2015 (not included in this study), the electoral performance of highly populist and rather radical parties such as FPÖ, ÖVP, PVV and Front National, seems to indicate that the social acceptability of (especially right-wing) populism reached unprecedented new heights. Fourth, populism seems to grow over time but it could also be understood as a rather cyclical phenomenon, since its levels and its social acceptability go up and down over time.

The remainder of the chapter presents the results country by country, describing which parties have consistently articulated populist discourses in their manifestos and whether this is in line with the relevant literature.

[98] The measurement based on co-occurrence is different but gives similar results, and the rise over time is not statistically significant. See Appendix 14 (Table 47 and Table 48).

Austria

Several factors are often used to explain the *Systemverdrossenheit* (alienation and hostility to those in power) and consequently the success of populist parties in Austria: e.g. partocracy (Kitschelt and McGann 1995), cartel politics (Müller 2002), lack of transparency, the structure of the proportional system (Heinisch 2002) and in general a process of de-alignment of the electorate.

In particular, the literature points at the Austrian Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs – FPÖ) as one of the main examples of populist party. The reason for its success seems to be in line with the expectations: in Austria the collective memory of the fascist past is based on victimization (Chapter 6). Indeed, as Heinisch argues, Austria's unapologetic stance about its own role during World War II "allowed the party to take political advantage when many Austrians were irritated by international criticism that the country had not come to terms with its culpability in World War II and the Holocaust − particularly during the '*Waldheim affair*' in 1986" (2002, 70–71).

In a similar vein, Bishof and Pelinka claim that the FPÖ, which was founded in the 1950s, offered representation to German nationalists who ended up being the political losers of post-war Austria (1997). Quite unsurprisingly, "the FPÖ's political opponents have indeed claimed that its policy proposals conflict with those values central to liberal democracies" (Müller 2002, 173).

Its former leader, *Jörg Haider* – who died in a car crash in 2008 – insisted that the Austrian nation was an ideological miscarriage. Tellingly, Haider was born in Carinthia, considered Austrian's stronghold of pan-German nationalist thinking. In 2005 Haider split from the FPÖ and founded a new political formation called Alliance for the Future of Austria (Bündnis Zukunft Österreich – BZÖ).

Also the BZÖ is usually indicated as a populist radical right party, but since it failed to cross the electoral threshold in 2013 it is not included in the content analysis. Finally, the short-lived Team Stronach, launched by the millionaire Frank Stronach and already dissolved in September 2017, was supposed to articulate a populist discourse based on Euroscepticism and anti-bureaucracy when it participated in the 2013 elections (Akkerman, de Lange, and Rooduijn 2016).

The content analysis on party manifestos confirms that the FPÖ is highly populist. Its 2013 manifesto is one of the most populist of the whole corpus (21%) and also the 1994 manifesto is above average (10.6%). However, in the 1970s as well as in 2002 it was not particularly populist or not at all. To remain on the right-wing side, also the Christian Democratic Party (Österreichische Volkspartei – ÖVP) articulated populist messages on a consistent basis (almost 12% in 2013), while Team Stronach and NEOS show above average levels of populism in their manifestos for 2013.

Figure 11: Populism in Austria



Also on the left-wing side, both mainstream and new left-wing parties emerge as extremely populist over time. The Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs – SPÖ) with the exception of 2002 articulated high levels of populism in its manifestos (with 15.5% in the 1980s), as well as the Green Party (Die Grünen). All in all, Austrian party manifestos appear to contain particularly high level of populism. Figure 11

presents the levels of populism's social acceptability for each country in grey, with the levels of Austria highlighted in red.

Concerning right-wing populism's social acceptability, Austria has always very high levels. More in particular, while in 1994 and especially in 2013 the levels are above the average, in 2002 the levels are particularly low compared to the other decades.[99] Concerning left-wing populism's acceptability, once again the levels during the elections of 2002 are exceptionally low, but the levels are extremely high in the 1970s and 1980s. The other two elections points show levels of populism in line (1994) and above the average (2013) if compared to the other countries.

France

In France, the link between monarchism and fascist tendencies was already established before World War II: the factors cementing the union were the fascination for "an authoritarian order with anti-capitalist, anti-market sentiments" (Kitschelt and McGann 1995, 92), which kept together Catholics, populist and Bonapartist movements. These traits were at the basis of *Vichy France*, which under Philippe Pétain collaborated with the Nazis from 1940 to 1944.[100]

[99] In 2013 the weighted measure for right-wing populism in Austria is 2968, the highest recorded for every country in any decade, and Austria also holds the second position with 2341 in the 1990s.

[100] Even before the beginning of the 19th century, the so-called Boulangism (from the founder Georges Boulanger) was considered a populist threat for the French Republic, although from rather left-wing positions (Chebel d'Appollonia 1996).

In the 1950s, the Poujadist movement, founded by *Pierre Poujade*, continued on this track combining anti-capitalism and authoritarianism. It peaked at the 1956 elections when it reached almost 13% of the vote share (under the name Union et fraternité française), and for a brief moment it seemed to constitute a serious threat to the very same foundations of the French Republic (Eatwell 1982). In the 1950s the process of memory building was still fluid, and therefore it is difficult to identify the type of mainstream collective memory that took ground so shortly after World War II. However, it might not be a coincidence that this type of movement was successful not only in France, but also in Italy with the Common Man's Front: yet another country characterized by a collective memory based on victimization (Chapter 6).

The Poujadist experience, often labeled as populist (Winock 1997), was important also because the French populist par excellence – *Jan-Marie Le Pen* – started his career as a national delegate of Poujade's movement. Le Pen's party, the National Front (Front National – FN) was founded in 1972 and it was able to unite a fragmented right. It was not particularly successful in the 1970s but increasingly so from the 1980s. Kitschelt linked the party's success to two factors: on the one hand it abandoned the anti-capitalist approach of Poujadisme, and on the other hand – as a reaction to the movement of 1968 – it showed that it was possible to have a new right-wing ideology beyond the traditional extreme right, similarly to what the Italian Social Movement (MSI) was doing in Italy at the time. While ethno-nationalism remained a core message of the party, other issues have been more or less relevant in the party's message over time, such as anti-communism, anti-immigration, and welfare chauvinism (van Kessel 2015b).

Figure 12: Populism in France



Moreover, the party always maintained a strong anti-establishment stance in its discourses, calling the establishment "a nomenklatura that pursues its own interests at the expenses of the national good" (Flood 1998, 28) while claiming to be "the only force to defend the people", the "ordinary folk", and the "excluded" (Balent 2013, 177)

The structural reasons associated to the success of the FN and other populist movements in France, usually include the dissolution of the two major parties blocs, media attention, and the strategic response of the established parties (Kitschelt and McGann 1995, 96 ff.). Rydgren mentions also *political alienation and discontent*, and argues that although ethno-nationalism has re-emerged periodically in France, it was not electorally successful before the FN because extreme right parties usually endorsed elements of the *Nazi ideology* (Rydgren 2008). Surel argues that the new Constitution from 1958 and its focus on the people can be considered as a condition for the re-emergence of populism in France, as well as economic difficulties, financial scandals, and the end of the traditional alignment across parties and within voters (Surel 2002, 144).

The impact of the FN on French politics goes beyond its electoral performance. For example, Surel argues that in 1995 even Jacques Chirac "pursued the strategy of embracing a number of populist themes and ideas in order to create a space within the party system and to establish himself as the alternative candidate" (2002, 149). Mondon identifies also Sarkozy among those who followed the FN's message by trying to present himself as "the candidate of the people against the elite" (2014, 306). In other words, themes and messages which were typical of the French extreme right, over time have been exploited by *mainstream* parties as well.

The FN survived a split in 2007, the replacement of Jean-Marie by his daughter Marine in 2011, and reached once again the second round at the presidential elections in 2017,

while the third-generation Le Pen, Marion-Maréchal, youngest MP in modern political history at the age of 22, seems to be ready to further distance the party from political extremism and anti-Semitism.

The content analysis confirms that the FN articulates populist messages in its party manifestos: the level in 1995 is above average (5.9% of populist statements), the level of 2002 is definitely high (10.4%), but it surprisingly drops down in 2012 (1.7%).[101] The analysis reveals also that the mainstream right-wing party Rally for the Republic (Rassemblement pour la République – RPR)[102] has been consistently very populist: from the 1970s to the 1990s the levels of populism in its manifestos have been very high (12.6%, 12.2% and 6.1%). It merged into the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) of Nicolas Sarkozy in 2002, and continued to show traces of populism (2.9% and 2.5%). Also the moderate and rather centrist Union for French Democracy (UDF) in the 1990s and 2000s showed high (4.4%) and very high (12%) levels of populism, thus confirming that the mainstream parties in France are not alien to populist discourses.

Also mainstream parties on the left are prone to articulate highly populist messages, as the case of the Socialists (PS) illustrates. In the 1970s their manifesto shows a very high 15.3% of populism (thus being the most populist of the French manifestos analyzed), and it constantly remained populist over time (2.3% in the 1980s, 13.9% in the 1990s, 7.9% in the 200s, and still 2.1% in 2012).

[101] The election of 2017 is not included in the content analysis.
[102] Until 1976 it was called Union for the Defence of the Republic (Union pour la Défense de la République – UDR).

Concerning the non-mainstream left, also the Communist Party (PCF), which shared the same manifesto of the PS in the 1970s, remained populist over time. Workers' Struggle (Lutte Ouvrière – LO) and but also the Left Front (Front de Gauche – FdG) and The Greens (Europe Écologie Les Verts – EELV) show high levels of populism, but paradoxically less than the mainstream left.

Concerning right-wing populism's social acceptability, France shows very high levels. The trend over time, however, goes against the general one: in fact, there is less and less populism in right-wing party manifestos since the 1990s. Concerning left-wing populism's acceptability the levels are rather high, but once again there is a rather consistent decrease over time. Figure 12 presents the levels of populism's social acceptability for each country in grey, with the levels of Austria highlighted in blue.

Germany

Germany is a country with a collective memory based on culpabilization (Chapter 6) and this is reflected in the historically very poor electoral performance and credibility of populist parties. The *Historikerstreit*, the controversy about the past, spanned the years 1986-1989 and concerned the nature (uniqueness or comparability) of the atrocities committed by the Nazi regime. This already signals how Germany was the only country working through its past, taking full responsibility for its actions and making amendments, thus generating a strong stigma that was always a major disadvantage for right-wing populist actors.

The social stigma appears very clearly, for example, when examining the case of the Republicans (Die Republikaner – REP), an extreme right party quite popular during the 1980s and 1990s founded by Franz Schönhuber (former Waffen-SS). They demanded to *decriminalize the German past* because they argued that it should no longer be reduced to Auschwitz and the gas chambers. The Republicans used the widespread resentments associated with the process of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* and suggested that Germany should hence historicize its Nazi legacy and be a normal country (Betz 2002, 200). This suggestion, however, was heavily criticized, and the party never entered the Parliament, constantly losing votes over time.

More in general, after 1949 Germany never saw legislators of a Nazi successor organization, contrary to what happened, for example, in Italy. Since the international vigilance focused primarily on Germany, the new German democratic regime was forced to "exercise more political control when successor organizations of the Nazi party attempted to stage a comeback than the Italian postwar governments when facing neofascist movements" (Kitschelt and McGann 1995, 205). Also all the other extreme right parties failed to capture any significant vote share. For example the NPD (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands – National Democratic Party) never made it into the Bundestag, and the law and order Schill Party (Partei Rechtsstaatlicher Offensive) failed to expand nationally after having performed exceptionally well in Hamburg in 2001.

For these reasons, although Germany seemed to show the right conditions for populism to thrive, *right-wing populist parties were never successful*. In the 1980s, post-industrial transformations and a growing number of asylum seekers seemed to offer the perfect opportunity structure but in the 1990s, the emergence of right-wing populist parties "was constrained by the long-term historical legacy of Germany's Nazi past" (Kitschelt and McGann 1995, 221). Also the process of European integration, which is normally associated to the success of populism, in Germany was not perceived as a threat to national identity and sovereignty. On the contrary, even left-wing intellectuals argued that it would have represented a complement of the national identity which might "release Germany from the legacy of the real trauma, the disastrous attempt to realize the utopia of *völkish* nationalism under Hitler" (Trägårdh 2002, 103).

Decker, among the reasons at the basis of the weakness of right-wing populism in Germany, names the institutional framework and political opportunity structures, but also the "the historical burden that weighs on Germany's political culture". In his words, the Nazi past and the way it was re-elaborated created "a deeper stigma attached to right-wing extremism in Germany than in any other European country" (2008, 125).

Figure 13: Populism in Germany



Indeed, the content analysis confirms that in Germany there are low levels of populism, and that no purely "populist" party ever collected more than 5% of the vote share. For this reason none of the Republicans' or NPD's manifestos have been coded, while Alternative for Germany (*Alternative für Deutschland* – AfD) almost made it in 2013 and entered the parliament at the next elections in 2017 (Arzheimer 2015). The content analysis shows therefore that only mainstream parties like the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Free Democratic Party (FPD) articulate populist discourses in their manifestos. However,

the levels are usually way below the average (with an interesting exception in the 1980s, which however is not included in the following analysis).[103]

The situation changes completely when analysing left-wing manifestos. In this case, populist discourses are present both in mainstream and niche party manifestos. More importantly, the levels are constantly in line with other countries presenting very high levels of populism. Indeed, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) always articulated populist discourses in its manifestos since the 1970s, with exceptionally high levels in the 1980s (29.2%) and 2010s (19.2%). The same applies to the Green Party (Grüne), always articulating populist discourses since the 1980s but scoring exceptionally high in the 2010s (29.6%). Also The Left (Die Linke) in the 2010s presented an extremely populist manifesto (20.8%).

Germany has usually high levels of left-wing populism, and in 2013 the amount of left-wing populism is even the highest recorded in a single country. This seems to imply that the collective stigmatization of the Nazi past does not affect left-wing parties. Probably, Decker is right when he argues that Die Linke "is immune in every respect to any suspicion of fascism" despite its roots in the ruling socialist party of the German Democratic Republic. Therefore it can now address issues and resort to methods "that are normally associated with right-wing populism" (Decker 2008, 134).

[103] This is the case because the analysis focuses on the last three decades only. This is the case because the data concerning the conditions to test are not available for the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, measured according to the co-occurrence principle the value of populism would be zero (both CDU and FDP show only people-centrism but no anti-elitism).

On the other hand, the opposite scenario appears as soon as one considers only populism in right-wing party manifestos, and their social acceptability. As Figure 13 shows, Germany (golden line), with the partial exception of the 1980s[104] constantly scores way below the average of the other countries concerning the social acceptability of right-wing populism. The already low levels of the 1990s continued dropping in the 2000s and in the 2010s. Moreover, it is not possible to argue that mainstream parties incorporated populist issues over time because there is no right-wing populism at all in the 2010s manifestos (unique case). All in all, it already seems safe to assume that the stigma associated to the Nazi past plays a crucial role in blocking right-wing populist parties, while this is not the case for left-wing parties. Possibly, the stigma associated with the Nazi past works only in one direction and leaves untouched the cultural opportunity structure for left-wing populism to thrive. This might be the case because the Nazi past resonates strongly with new radical right parties but not with the full ideology articulated by left-wing parties.

Italy

The historic development of populism in Italy has been completely different from the German case and much more similar to the French and Austrian ones, with which indeed Italy shares a collective memory based on victimization (Chapter 6). Immediately after the end of World War II, the Italian Social Movement (Movimento Sociale Italiano – MSI) was founded by supporters of *Benito Mussolini*, and it was even more directly linked to ultra

[104] The exception is only "partial" because with a different operationalization the value of right-wing populism would be zero.

nationalist and anti-democratic positions than the FPÖ in Austria. This, however, was also the reason why the party could not adapt at the changing political scenario in the 1990s and eventually disappeared (Kitschelt and McGann 1995). It actually did not completely disappear, but it rather transformed itself into a more modern and post-fascist movement, National Alliance (AN), under the leadership of Gianfranco Fini.

The party, after the "Fiuggi turning point" could finally present itself as fully democratic, and eventually became part of all three coalition governments led by Silvio Berlusconi together with the North League (*Lega Nord*). National Alliance finally merged into the People of Freedom (*Popolo della Libertà* – PdL) in 2009. The North League, on the other hand, remained an independent party and continued its own transformation. Born as Liga Veneta and then Liga Lombarda, it became over time a national party insisting mainly on issues such as immigration and Euroscepticism but less and less on issues concerning regionalism and separatism. In other words, the party first "re-opened a centre-periphery cleavage which was never completely sealed" (Tarchi 2008, 87), but then became a more traditional populist party focusing on immigration and law enforcement. From the 1990s, they presented themselves as a populist movement of protest and identity (Taguieff 1995).

Populism in Italy seems to be so widespread that even *Silvio Berlusconi*, probably the most mainstream among the populist political actors usually identified in the literature and leader of Go Italy (*Forza Italia* – FI)[105], continued through his all career to depict himself

[105] Previously called "People of Freedom" (PdL).

as the embodiment of the popular will against the corrupt political parties, the Communists, the judiciary system, and the mass media. "Paternalistic and reassuring, Berlusconi never misses an opportunity to proclaim himself as the interpreter and defender of the popular will. [...] 'Abstract principles' and 'complicated ideologies' are, therefore, explicitly banned from Forza Italia which must remain 'a movement' and expresses an open 'aversion to party politics'" (Tarchi 2008, 93).

Anti-establishment positions, discourses against political, economic and media elites, appeals to popular sovereignty, post-fascist and regionalist movements: Italy seems to represent the perfect *thriving ground for populist actors* (Zanatta 2002). Indeed, many scholars pointed to a multiplicity of reasons for this: first of all partocracy and ideological convergence (Kitschelt and McGann 1995), as well as public disaffection and cynicism with the political system (Betz 1994), traits which already emerged in the 1940s with the populist movement Common Man's Front (L'Uomo Qualunque), similar in many regards to the Poujadist movement in France (Setta 2005).[106] The general discontent was fueled among other things (Morlino and Tarchi 1996) by one of the most notorious corruption scandals of the 20th century: Tangentopoli (Bribesville). Between 1992 and 1994 all the previously existing political parties disappeared (apart from the North League). After ten

[106] *Qualunquismo* "presented itself as the voice of ordinary people, those excluded from the division of power, fed up with greedy and corrupt politicians, indifferent to ideologies they saw as a mere cover for elite ambitions of domination, skeptical of any program and mistrustful of electoral promises they expected to be systematically broken by those elected" (Tarchi 2002, 122).

years of pentapartito (controlled by the Christian Democrats), the first Republic collapsed.[107]

However, despite all the most favourable conditions for the success of populist discourses, the content analysis shows that the social acceptability of populism in Italy is less outstanding compared to the expectations (Figure 14, light blue line). Moreover, it was not possible to measure the levels of populism in 2001 given the special conditions of those elections: because of the complex electoral law adopted at the time (the so-called "Mattarellum") the parties had to form broad coalitions rather than participating alone. Hence, the single parties did not even write separate manifestos in that occasion. Again, it is important to remind that the values for 2001 are reported as zero in order to visualize the line, but they are actually missing data (the same applies to right-wing populism in the 1970s since most of the manifestos were not found). Therefore the only two time-points considered in the following analysis will be 1994 and 2013.

Contrary to the expectations, populism does not emerge "as the basic feature in the programs and communicative style of Forza Italia" (Tarchi 2008, 133).[108] Both in 1994 and 2013 Berlusconi's party articulated some populist message in its manifestos (1.7% and 5.9%), but with much lower levels compared to other parties typically referred to as populist. In this sense it is possible to share the argument of McDonnel about the fact that Berlusconi's parties might be personal rather than populist (McDonnell 2013).

[107] The five-party coalition that governed Italy between June 1981 and April 1991.It comprised: Christian Democracy (DC), Italian Socialist Party (PSI), Italian Democratic Socialist Party (PSDI), Italian Liberal Party (PLI) and Italian Republican Party (PRI).

[108] Also other scholars consider Come on Italy (Forza Italia) as a populist party. Among others: Raniolo (2006), Pasquino (2007), Ruzza and Fella (2009).

Figure 14: Populism in Italy



The fact that even the manifesto of Civic Choice (*Scelta Civica* – SC), the party founded by the former technocratic Prime Minister Mario Monti, scored an astonishing 13.1% in 2013 speaks volumes about the unexpected levels for Berlusconi's party. The manifestos of National Alliance and North League in 1994 both show traces of populism (7.4% and 5.3%), which is not low but once again below the expectations. On the other hand, each and every one of the eighteen coded manifestos contains traces of populism, meaning that right-wing populist discourses in Italy have always been largely acceptable.

Concerning left-wing party manifestos, they were highly populist in the 1970s, with a remarkable 40% for the Socialist Party (which can however be explained with the five total coded statements) and – to a lesser extent – with the Communist Party, which scored 5% and 1.7% in the 1970s and 1980s. The Democratic Party (PD) led by Matteo Renzi scores 6.7% in 2013, in line with the PDS (PD's predecessor, the Democratic Party of the Left), which scored 7.5% in the 1990s.[109]

The Five Star Movement (Movimento Cinque Stelle – M5S), which is coded both as right-wing and left-wing because it is the only unclassifiable party of the whole sample, scores 7.9% in 2013, which is a rather average value, but it is comparatively high since it is the third highest level in Italy.

Concerning the social acceptability of right-wing populism, Italy follows the expectations especially in 1994, while in 2013 the levels are lower than expected.[110] The trend is similar for the levels of left-wing populism: they are pretty low in 1994, while they are closer to the average in 2013. All in all, it is already possible to claim that, compared to the expectations generated by the relevant literature and taking into consideration the collective memory based on victimization, Italy shows lower levels of populism but on the other hand every party in Italy seems to articulate populist messages to a certain extent.

[109] The *Democratic Party of the Left* is oddly coded as right-wing in 1994 according to the Party Manifesto Project. For the purposes of the analysis, this does not make any difference, although it is clearly debatable to what extent the PDS was proposing a truly left-wing manifesto at the time.

[110] In 1994, even if the PDS would have been coded as left-wing (as it is normally considered), Italy would still belong to the outcome. On the other hand, it would still not belong to the outcome for left-wing populism, although it would be close enough to the crossover point.

Netherlands

Concerning supply and demand side factors for populism, the Netherlands are probably the most interesting case among the eight countries included in this study. Here populism seems to be articulated mainly by flamboyant personalities able to exploit a favourable political-institutional context such as *Pim Fortuyn* or *Geert Wilders*. The perfectly proportional system and the fragmented party system, combined with economic stagnation and immigration (Lucardie 2008) are supposed to create a mix of favourable socio-economic and political-institutional factors, but the success of populist actors has always been discontinuous in the country. This is even more puzzling considered the country's collective memory based on cancellation (Chapter 6), but it might be linked to deeper traits of the country's political culture such as liberalism and multiculturalism.

In 2002, Pim Fortuyn was among the most notable exceptions to the electoral failure of populist actors. Former Marxist and member of the Labour Party (PvdA), his movement gained 17% of the vote share, also because of the emotional situation provoked by Fortuyn's violent homicide ten days before the elections.[111] In 2006 the list of Pim Fortuyn did not get any seat (only 0.2% of the votes) but Geert Wilders, founder of the one-man show Party for Freedom (*Partij voor de Vrijhei*d – PVV) and former VVD member (People's Party for Freedom and Democracy)[112], gained six seats and replaced Fortuyn's list in the Parliament.

[111] In 2002 also Fortuyn's former party – Liveable Netherlands – obtained two seats in the House of Representatives.
[112] Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie.

While Fortuyn's former party Liveable Netherlands (Leefbaar Nederland) politically disappeared very quickly, Wilders continued the populist discourse centred on restoring democracy and returning the power to the people, while appealing to the 'ordinary people' even more explicitly (van Kessel 2015a). In 2010 Wilders received a surprising 15.5% of the vote share Fortuyn (entering also a short lived coalition government), his best result until now. All in all, as already mentioned, the electoral results of populist actors have never been particularly striking when compared to other European countries. Moreover, another peculiarity of Dutch right-wing populists is their relatively liberal attitude towards cultural issues such as the emancipation of women and gay people (Inglehart and Andeweg 1993). Pim Fortuyn – who was openly gay himself – was concerned about the preservation of the Dutch liberal values, and Wilders too embraces liberal values and stresses how Islam threatens them (Akkerman 2005).

On the left, populist discourses were articulated before right-wing populism became successful in the country. During the 1970s and 1980s, indeed, populist discourses were articulated almost exclusively by left-wing parties such as the Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid – PvdA). The Socialist Party (SP) is another case usually associated with populism, although it is included in the analysis only since the 2000s, when it already toned down its radicalism and dropped references to its communist past (March 2011). Before 2002 it never reached the 5% of the vote share, while in 2006 obtained its best result so far, with 16.6% of the votes. Its two analysed manifestos, indeed, contain medium (4.7% in 2002) and low (0.7% in 2012) levels of populism.

Figure 15: Populism in the Netherlands



All in all, according to the content analysis visualized in Figure 15, the Netherlands (green line) represent a borderline case, and often it is difficult to classify the country and decide whether populist discourses are socially acceptable or not. Concerning right-wing populism, it shows a high acceptability in 2002 and 2012, when apart from Fortuyn and Wilders also the Christian Democrats and the mainstream VVD and the Christian Democrats (Christen-Democratisch Appèl – CDA) articulated populist discourses. In

1994, however, the levels were particularly low.[113] Concerning left-wing populism, it was exceptionally acceptable in the 1970s and 1980s, but much less in the 1990s and 2010s. On the other hand in 2002, when all four left-wing parties articulate populism in their manifestos, the country has the highest levels of left-wing populism.

Switzerland

The Swiss Confederation is often portrayed as a *populist paradise*, because the peculiar features of the country's political system and culture make "the gap between democracy and populism […] very narrow, since self-determination and participation are part of the Swiss democratic system" (Albertazzi 2008, 102). In other words, the Swiss political system, based on direct democracy, already goes in the direction of a populist democracy. This means that political-institutional conditions have always been favourable for the presence of populism. Mechanisms such as *consociationalism and direct democracy* produce a constant bottom-up pressure on policy-making processes and in general on the established parties (Kriesi 2005). Moreover, the Swiss political culture is based on concepts such as *self-government, participation, neutrality and localism*, which also produced over time different forms of discrimination for the new minorities (Albertazzi 2008). Finally, also the type of collective memory based on cancellation, is supposed not to block populism (Chapter 6).

[113] In that occasion the centre party D66 (*Democraten 66*) is coded as left-wing according to the Comparative Manifesto Project. However, even if it was coded as right-wing, the Netherland sin 1994 would still not belong to the outcome for right-wing populism.

The history of political movements and parties considered as populist is therefore quite bustling. Between the 1960s and 1980s two anti-foreigner movements were rather widespread: National Action, now Swiss Democrats (Schweizer Demokraten – SD), and the Republican Movement which dissolved in 1989 when most of its members joined the Federal Democratic Union (Eidgenössisch-Demokratische Union – EDU). Between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s the Automobile Party (Autopartei) and the Swiss Democrats were quite successful thanks to their message against established parties and state bureaucracy. In 1991 the Ticino League (Lega dei Ticinesi) was founded, exploiting the center-periphery cleavage and claiming to represent the interests of the common people against environmentalists, the state, and the political establishment (Betz 1994). However, none of these parties collected more than 5% of the votes during the 1970s or 1980s.

Populism started becoming part of mainstream politics in Switzerland since the 1990s, and populism in Switzerland nowadays means Swiss People's Party (*Schweizerische Volkspartei* – SVP), not only in terms of electoral results but also of organization and funding (Bornschier 2010a, 133; Zaslove 2012). The party was formed in1971 as a merging product of the Party of Farmers, Traders and Independents with the Democratic Party. It was only since the 1990s, however, that the party started a process of radicalization following the Zürich party-branch led by *Christoph Blocher*, and thus transforming into a populist party (Afonso and Papadopoulos 2015).

In line with the SVP's campaigns, and in fact led by Blocher himself from 1986 to 2003, the organization "Campaign for an Independent and Neutral Switzerland" is very active in launching and opposing referenda. Among other things, the organization founded by Blocher and Otto Fischer from the Free Democratic Party (Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei – FDP) campaigned to maintain the Swiss military, opposed Switzerland joining the EU, and campaigned to end "mass immigration".

The SVP is the first party in terms of vote share since 2003, and in 2015 it obtained its best result, with almost 30% of the votes. In 2005 the *Geneva Citizens' Movement* was founded, but like other Swiss populist movements they barely manage to obtain any seat in the parliament. The SVP, on the other hand, managed to change the *Swiss magic formula*, the unofficial way of dividing the seven executive seats of the Swiss Federal Council. Since 1959 the FDP, the Christian Democratic People's Party (Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei der Schweiz – CVP) and the Social Democratic Party (SP) each got two seats, while the SVP received the remaining one. The SVP took one seat form the CVP in 2003 and since 2008 some SVP members split from the party and created the Conservative Democratic Party of Switzerland (Bürgerlich-Demokratische Partei Schweiz – BDP). Nonetheless, the SVP obtained its best electoral results after the split, in 2015.

Figure 16: Populism in Switzerland



As Figure 16 shows, Switzerland (red line) always had rather a high social acceptability of populism in the last three elections, while this was not the case in the 1970s and 1980s. On the right, there are no traces of populism until 1995, when three parties articulated highly populist messages: SVP (6.8%), CVP (12.1%), and FDP (7.7%). In the two

following decades, the CVP did not articulate any populist message in its manifestos, leaving FDP and SVP as the only two parties articulating populist messages. On the left, two parties have been constantly populist since the 1990s: the Social Democratic Party (SP) and the Green Party (Grüne Partei der Schweiz – GPS). The SP was populist already in the 1970s (but not in the 1980s) together with the Alliance of Independents (Landesring der Unabhängigen – LdU). In the 2011 elections, both the SP and the SVP have been extremely populist in their manifestos (9.7% and 18.7%). All in all, Switzerland emerges as one of the cases where populism is most socially accepted, in line with the expectations.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom, having a collective memory of World War II based on heroization (Chapter 6), was supposed to show high levels of populism's social acceptability. However, a quick glance at the results of the content analysis (Figure 17) is enough to understand that this is not the case. *Populism exists, and it is mainstream*. This result is even more puzzling if one considers that in the 1990s the United Kingdom was supposed not to have favourable political-institutional conditions for the emergence of radical right-wing parties (Kitschelt and McGann 1995). On the other hand, favourable opportunity structures subsequently developed: indeed there has been a decline in identification with, and support for, the two main parties, and the presence of tabloids like *The Sun* with a fierce populist agenda (Fella 2008). Populism in the United Kingdom seems to be unsuccessful when combined with radicalism, and it seems safe to assume that Britain entered the realm of populist democracy (Mair 2002).

The *National Front*, a far right party founded in 1967, has always been almost irrelevant in elections (it never reached 1% of the vote share) and never got any elected representative at any level. On the right-wing side, successful populism is never combined with radical and extreme parties, but rather to the mainstream Conservative party. It was the British conservatism that through Thatcherism, “their own unique right-wing populism” (Kitschelt and McGann 1995, 242) drained attention away from the National Front. No fringe or niche party ever used the so-called 'winning formula': economic liberalism combined with political and cultural authoritarianism. The *British National Party* (BNP), despite the fact that Nick Griffin became leader in 1999 and tried to distance the party from its fascist roots, also never had any seat and the best electoral result they achieved was the 1.9% of the vote share in 2010.

About the failure of extreme right movements in the 1970s and 1980s, Kitschelt explains that contrary to what happened in Germany or Italy, "whatever constraints the extreme Right was facing had more to do with the position on the major parties in the dominant competitive arena than with the historical legacy of the extreme Right" (1995, 242). Apart from a British culture of deference which makes it unlikely for new parties to be able to challenge the political system (Almond and Verba 1963), there is indeed a further obstacle for populist parties: the first-past-the-post electoral system makes it almost impossible for new parties to effectively challenge the two major parties. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that according to the content analysis populism in the United Kingdom is a permanent feature of the two mainstream parties: both the Conservatives and the Labour

Party constantly articulated populist messages since the 1970s, as well as the Liberal Party, for a total of 15 out of 15 manifestos showing traces of populism.

The Conservatives have been moderately populist both in the 1970s (4.5%) and in the 2000s (4.4%), very populist in the 2010s (9.8%), but showed almost no traces of populist messages in their manifestos in the 1980s (1.2%) and 1990s (1.8%). Also the Labour Party has been constantly populist, with rather average levels in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2010s (5.3, 5.7, and 4.8%) and *high levels in the 1970s and 2000s (7.6 and 8.1%). Because of the electoral system,* UKIP never won any seat in the House of Commons until 2015, when for the first time it also scored better than the 5% threshold used for the content analysis.[114] However, the last British election considered was 2010; therefore the only other political movement included in the analysis apart from the two mainstream ones is the Liberal Democratic Party which was the result of the union between the Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party in 1988. The Lib Dems, always considered left-wing apart for the 1983 elections, articulated levels of populism similar compared to the manifestos of the Labour Party, with particularly populist peaks in the 1970s (8.6%) and 2010s (8.4%).

All in all, the levels of populism's social acceptability in the United Kingdom are puzzling because if on the one hand there is no single manifesto showing more than 10% of populist statements, on the other hand that each and every manifesto shows traces of populism.

[114] UKIP, contrary to the other right-wing movements mentioned above, has the advantage of being free from any Fascist associations.

Figure 17: Populism in the United Kingdom



Moreover, the levels of right-wing populism seem to be higher than expected for a country whose memory is based on heroization. In particular, the 2010 elections show very high levels of populism, with only Austria scoring higher. The levels of left-wing populism,

although never particularly elevated, are always high enough to declare that the country belongs to the outcome, thus composing a particularly puzzling situation.

Sweden

When dealing with populism in Western Europe, Sweden always represents an exceptional case (Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Dahlström and Esaiasson 2013). Indeed, Sweden is often pointed out as a *negative case*: despite favourable conditions for the presence of populism, and while all comparable countries in the continent (and in the region) witness the growing success of populist actors, in Sweden there is virtually no trace of populism. This has been substantially true over several decades, but it might be no longer accurate since the last elections in 2014.

Developed by the Social Democrats, the core concept of people's home (*Folkhemmet*) has been able to merge demos and ethnos in one concept, hence creating a strong link between being Swedish and being democratic (Trägårdh 2002, 77). This approach allowed the *Social Democrats* (Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetareparti) to fight the national socialist appeal of the Nazi by declining concepts revolving around the idea of *folk* (and not *klass* anymore after 1929) in a democratic way. By studying the national political culture of the country, it is possible to find several other reasons why Nazi groups in Sweden were never successful, and this might explain why despite its memory based on cancellation in the 1970s and 1980s the country never experienced high levels of populism, and eventually developed a memory based on culpabilization (Chapter 6).

For example, Sweden – together with Switzerland – claimed to have the most ancient tradition of popular rule, and the tradition of nation-statism became central after the war, contrary to Germany where civil society became the key figure of the new State. Moreover, concepts such as 'national community' have been invested with positive connotations because in the collective memory they are linked to the resolution of the political and social crisis of the 1930s. The process of nationalization went hand in hand with the concept of welfare and solidarity, thus gaining a positive connotation.

The "lucrative neutrality" the country decided to adopt during World War II (Colla 2002) was never fully investigated and the country decided to rather impose itself a silence treatment on the issue and to describe itself as a 'moral superpower' always on the side of the oppressed, thus protecting the purity of the Folkhemmet (Dahl 2006). Nonetheless, Sweden apparently did not need to fully acknowledge its responsibility in order to develop a strong stigma attached to the fascist past. Probably other characteristics of the country's political culture can help explain the Swedish approach to populism.

Also Kitschelt suggest that the lack of a credible far right in Sweden is linked to *historical events* and to the country's unique political organization: "[…] in Scandinavia there was little basis for a strong antidemocratic fascist mobilization in the Great depression of the late 1920s. The German occupation of Norway and Denmark during World War II and the puppet regimes set up by the Nazi state further discredited right-wing mobilization after the war and prevented any kind of extremist mass appeal" (Kitschelt and McGann 1995, 124). However, while this is true for Sweden, it was not the case for Denmark and Norway

where extreme right-wing parties have been relatively successful already since the 1970s (Betz 1994).

One party which is usually labelled as populist might have not been included in the content analysis: New Democracy (*Ny Demokrati*), which gained 6.7% of the vote share in 1991, while for the 1990s in Sweden were has been selected the 1994 election. Considered as a typical right-wing party against the establishment, New Democracy was launched in 1991 by two media personalities but rapidly disappeared and never repeated its first electoral exploit.

In general, however, Figure 18 clearly shows that populism in Sweden is almost non-existent and therefore unacceptable. Only five out of twenty-nine analysed manifestos show any trace of populism, and three of them are from the 2014 elections. The manifesto of the Moderate Party contain very low levels of populism (0.6%), while the manifestos of the *Swedish Democrats* in 2014 (3.8%), Christian Democrats in 2002 (2.4%) and Centre party in the 1970s (3%) contain average amounts of populism. The only manifesto which could be considered as clearly populist is the Green Party's manifesto in 2014 (11.1%).[115]

[115] Miljöpartiet de gröna (M).

Figure 18: Populism in Sweden



The other right-wing populist party apart from New Democracy, the Swedish Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna), articulates populist messages in its manifesto, but the levels seem to be rather low compared to the manifestos of other right-wing populist parties. The Swedish Democrats, since the second half of the 1990s tried to build a respectable façade and break the links with fascism (Rydgren 2008b), and this translated in better electoral performances but probably not in higher levels of populism.

They have been the third party at the 2014 elections, with almost 13% of the vote share, although they have been participating in elections since 1988. This shows that the existing socio-cultural situation might now be exploited by a party insisting on anti-immigration. It is quite remarkable, however, that so far despite political discontent, alienation, declining party identification, de-alignment and re-alignment processes providing favourable political opportunity structures for emerging populist parties, populism is virtually absent in Sweden. Since the 1990s the country never displayed high levels of populism neither on the left nor on the right. This is a unique case among the eight countries analyzed. It remains to be seen whether the favourable conditions will eventually make populism thrive also in Sweden: "First, widespread xenophobia exists in Sweden. […] Second, Sweden has a high level of political distrust in and discontent with political parties and other political institutions […]. Third, there is possibly potential for an emerging RRP party to exploit anti-EU sentiments" (Rydgren 2002, 48). So far, this does not seem to be the case, and populism remains largely unacceptable.

Conclusions

The content analysis of 173 party manifestos from eight countries in five elections reveals that five of the six manifestos containing the highest percentage of populist statements have been written either in the 1970s or in the 2010s[116], and they are mainly from left-wing parties: the Socialist Party Italy (40%) in the 1970s, The Green, The Left, and the

[116] With the exception of the SPD (Germany) in the 1980s.

Social Democrats in Germany in 2013 (29.6%, 20.8%, and 19.2%), and finally the FPÖ in Austria in 2013 (21%).[117]

Concerning the social acceptability of populism (which considers vote share and degree of radicalism) the picture is similar but not identical. Once again, in the top-6 there are mainly left-wing parties from the 1970s and 1980s, as well as the right-wing FPÖ in the 1990s and 2010s. This also confirms that *left-wing populism is available to mainstream parties, while right-wing populism is mainly articulated by niche or extreme parties and not by mainstream and established parties*.

Concerning right-wing populism, among the twelve most populist manifestos, eleven come from only three countries: France (4), Austria (4), and Switzerland (3). Quite surprising the remaining one is from the Italian Civic Choice, Monti's (technocratic) party. Among them, only two are not from the 1990s-2010s and they are both French: the UDR (in the 1970s) and the RPR (in the 1980s). Around 69% of the coded manifestos from right-wing parties contain populism (63 out of 91).

Concerning left-wing populism, among the fifteen most populist manifestos all the eight countries are represented: Germany (5), France, Switzerland, and the Netherlands (2), Italy, Austria, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (1). Among them, nine are either from the

[117] 47 (around 27%) of the coded manifestos did not show any trace of populism. They are mainly manifestos of Swedish parties (23), as well as Swiss manifestos from the 1970s and 1980s (11), and Dutch manifestos from the 1970s-1990s (6).

1970s or the 2010s, while none is form the 2000s. Around 77% of the coded manifestos from right-wing parties contain populism (64 out of 83).

Concerning the expectations at the country-level, the results seem to be in line with the type of collective memory assigned in the next Chapter, but with some remarkable exception. The countries characterized by a memory based on victimization display a high social acceptability of populism, and this is especially true for right-wing populist parties. Austria and France seem to follow this pattern more precisely compared to Italy, which has slightly lower levels than expected. The countries characterized by a memory based on cancellation are on the other hand more difficult to interpret. Switzerland has very high values of populism, even higher than Italy for example. The Dutch case is a puzzling one because the levels of populism vary significantly over time in ways which do not follow the general trend, and they are often lower than expected. On the other hand Sweden in the 1970s and 1980s, also characterized by cancellation, does not show any trace of populism, a phenomenon that becomes more understandable from the 1990s when the country's memory is characterized by culpabilization. Germany, on the other hand, is in line with the expectations concerning the social acceptability of right-wing populism, but shows exceptionally high levels of left-wing populism. Finally, the United Kingdom, only case characterized by heroization, registers a surprisingly high social acceptability of populism over time, concerning both right-wing and left-wing parties. These aspects are fully investigated in the next chapter.

Chapter 6 – Memory and stigma in eight West European countries

This chapter assigns to each country a type of collective memory and possibly one or more secondary narratives. This is done by analysing the relevant secondary literature about each country's collective memory of the fascist past.[118] Longitudinal variations, potential secondary narratives, and disagreement among sources are taken into consideration, and eventually the levels of stigmatization of the fascist past are assigned to each country over a time-span of four decades.

To determine which types of collective memory are present in a country and how they develop over time, secondary sources are used. By relying on a large bulk of single-country and comparative studies it is possible to determine the outcome of decades of research in each country from several and complementary approaches such as history, sociology, and political science. The process of memory building – understood as the dynamic relationship between conflicting narratives in the public debate, school programs, and popular culture – here remains as a *black box*. The present study does not aim at looking inside the box, but rather at analysing the outcome of that process, understood as the type of mainstream and (possibly) secondary narratives that emerged from that conflictual process. Only major academic publications are used as sources, and despite the impossibility to include every relevant publication it is safe to assume that the

[118] It builds on (and expands) the analysis already presented in Caramani and Manucci (under review).

type of collective memory and the degree of stigmatization of the fascist past are correctly identified.[119]

This approach is *case-oriented* and the *intensive knowledge* of cases is decisive in the attribution of values and it can be defined as direct method of calibration (Verkuilen 2005; Ragin 2008). Each country can display each type of collective memory in a scale from 0 to 1, where 0 (full non-membership) means that the country does not have any trace of that type of collective memory, 1 (full membership) means that the country fully belongs to that category, and 0.5 (crossover value) means that the country does neither belong to that category nor it is excluded from it. When secondary narratives are present, the sum of the values cannot exceed 1.

This type of grading might be considered as too fine-grained. However, a deep qualitative knowledge of the cases grants credibility to the values assigned while constituting a pillar of the logic on which QCA relies. The assignment of the values is not at all arbitrary. First of all, it is transparently discussed and justified. Second, it derives from informed decisions that are based on a substantive familiarity with the topic. One might be conservative and assign only coarse thresholds such as 0–0.33–0.66–1 to indicate full membership and non-membership (1 and 0), or 'more in than out' and 'more out than in' (0.66 and 0.33). However, rather than constituting an advantage for the analysis, this approach would represent an unjustified loss of information.

[119] The advantage of this method consists in effectively addressing two of the caveats identified in Chapter 3: the presence of *secondary narratives* and the *variation over time* of collective memories.

Table 8 – Types of Memory and Levels of Stigma in Eight Countries

Country	Year	CULP	VICT	HERO	CANC	Stigma
Austria (AT)	1975	0	0.7	0	0.3	0.1
	1983	0	0.7	0	0.3	0.1
	1994	0.3	0.7	0	0	0.3
	2002	0.3	0.7	0	0	0.3
	2013	0.3	0.7	0	0	0.3
Switzerland (CH)	1975	0	0	0	1	0.3
	1983	0	0	0	1	0.3
	1994	0	0	0	1	0.3
	2003	0	0.4	0	0.6	0.2
	2011	0	0.4	0	0.6	0.2
Germany (DE)	1972	1	0	0	0	1.0
	1983	1	0	0	0	1.0
	1994	0.8	0	0.1	0.1	0.9
	2002	0.8	0	0.1	0.1	0.9
	2013	0.8	0	0.1	0.1	0.9
France (FR)	1974	0	0.6	0.2	0.2	0.2
	1981	0	0.6	0.2	0.2	0.2
	1995	0	0.7	0.2	0.1	0.2
	2002	0	0.7	0.2	0.1	0.2
	2012	0	0.7	0.2	0.1	0.2
Italy (ITA)	1972	0	0.6	0.2	0.2	0.2
	1983	0	0.6	0.2	0.2	0.2
	1994	0	0.8	0.1	0.1	0.1
	2001	0	0.8	0.1	0.1	0.1
	2013	0	0.8	0.1	0.1	0.1
Netherlands (NL)	1972	0	0.2	0	0.8	0.3
	1982	0	0.2	0	0.8	0.3
	1994	0	0.2	0	0.8	0.3
	2002	0	0.2	0	0.8	0.3
	2012	0	0.2	0	0.8	0.3
Sweden (SE)	1973	0.3	0.0	0.1	0.6	0.6
	1982	0.3	0.0	0.1	0.6	0.6
	1994	0.6	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.8
	2002	0.6	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.8
	2014	0.6	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.8
United Kingdom	1974	0	0	1	0	0.7
	1983	0	0	1	0	0.7
	1992	0	0	1	0	0.7
	2001	0	0	1	0	0.7
	2010	0	0	1	0	0.7

Moreover, the final amount of stigma of the fascist past is calculated in a way that further reduces the disputability of the values assigned. Indeed, in order to establish the level of stigma towards the fascist past present in each country, the values of culpabilization is multiplied by 1 (highest stigma), victimization by 0 (lowest stigma), while heroization and cancellation are multiplied respectively by 0.66 and 0.33 (see Figure 5). This means that, for example, whether a country displays 0.6, 0.7 or 0.8 of victimization and 0.4, 0.3, or 0.2 of cancellation, the level of stigma remains 0.1.

The next section assigns different type of collective memories to the eight countries starting from the lowest levels of stigma and progressively moving towards the highest levels of stigma. Table 8 summarizes the findings.

Italy

In Italy the collective memory is one of *victimization* (De Luna 2011, 43) based on *selective amnesia* (Oliva 2006) and *removal* (Del Boca 1996) in order to forget the fascist past (Fogu 2006). The main recurrent element of this narration consists in portraying Italians as "*brava gente*" (good folks), thus creating a myth which allows to differentiate Italy from Germany and distance itself from the guilt and responsibility associated to the Nazi and fascist regime (Bidussa 1994; Del Boca 2005; Focardi 2013). Another goal of this myth consists in trying too whitewash the massacres of the Italian occupation perpetrated in Africa and the Balkans (Consonni 2011; Sluga 1999).

Italy's historical narrative revolves around victimization with the aim of portraying the country not as perpetrator but as victim of the fascist regime and its propaganda, victim of Hitler's decisions, and essentially victim of history. The paradigm of victimization is effectively illustrated by Berger (2010, 122): "official memory policy […] concentrated on Italian victims, above all the victims of German-occupied Italy after 1943, thereby highlighting the national struggle against a foreign enemy. The history of Italian fascism was presented as a struggle of the Italian people first against fascism and then against foreign occupants." This passage already shows how *the victimization narrative works hand in glove with cancellation and heroization*.

Italians, according to the mainstream victimization narrative, were not supporting fascism but rather its *victims* and they heroically fought to free themselves from its yoke. This narrative is possible because the real role of Italy and Italians is denied (Franzinelli 2002).[120] While prefects, superintendents, and public security commissioners remained largely the same after 1945 – Battini (2003) speaks of a missed 'Italian Nurnberg trial' – the government granted several amnesties to former fascist: in 1946, 1948, and 1966 (Franzinelli 2006; Ponzani 2008).

[120] Italy describes as 'victims' even the fascist soldiers killed in the North-East by Tito's partisans. Neo-fascist organizations, indeed, can openly celebrate the "victims of Communism" each 10th February, during the recently institutionalized "National Memorial Day of the Exiles and Foibe". To diminish the atrocities of the fascist regime the mantra of those "killed in the *foibe*" is very recurrent and not only among extreme right-wing activists. See Tenca Montini (2014). Tellingly, a picture that often circulates to represent "the atrocities against the poor Italian victims" actually depicts Italian soldiers killing civilians in Slovenia. In this way twenty years of fascist violence in the Balkans are removed. What remains is the victimization of a country that pretends not to remember what Italians did in Istria and Dalmatia (Focardi and Klinkhammer 2004).

As summarized by Fogu (2006, 159) the victimization memory in Italy was based on the following memory-building procedure: "hide the black *ventennio* below the glorious carpet of the red *biennio*." In other words, the political exploitation of the Resistance movement made it possible to portray the country as essentially antifascist and therefore to foster a narrative of heroization. In this way Italians reinvented themselves as antifascist by selectively remembering certain aspects of the past linked to the *resistenza* while deciding to forget others (Poggiolini 2002, 224). As Consonni (2011, 215) stresses, Italians constructed a national memory as one of occupation "through the memory of patriotic resistance and the total negation of any aspect of collaboration with Germany."

The victimization narrative was questioned only by some isolated voices in the 1960s and 1970s (S. Berger 2010), which however did not manage to challenge the main narrative. After the end of the so-called 'First Republic', caused among other things by the corruption scandal 'Bribesville', more critical voices were present. De Luna (2011) defined that critical moment as the end of the "memorial pact" of the old parties. However, rather than losing its hegemony, the mainstream narrative based on victimization fully succeeded in marginalizing any other narrative. As it will emerge clearly in analyzing other countries, debates do not always imply a re-definition of the mainstream narrative and they can even lead to its reinforcement.

Elements of denial and cancellation of the past have become so strong over time that the victimization narrative made it possible for post-fascist parties such as AN (National Alliance – *Alleanza Nazionale*) to obtain the institutionalization of a 'memory day' to

remember the Italian victims in the context of the conflict between Italy and Tito's Yugoslavia while the requests of the left-wing parties to commemorate the victims of fascism and Italian colonialism were not even discussed (Focardi 2013). Not even the discovery of the so-called "armoire of shame" changed the mainstream narrative.[121]

To sum up, one can conclude that the myth of the "good Italian" is functional to the removal of every uncomfortable national memory (cancellation) thus fostering the idea that Italian fascism was less brutal than Nazism, and that the movement for liberation has washed away the sins and redeemed the popular support to fascism (heroization).

Considering the literature on the topic, the values attributed to the collective memory in Italy are the following: during the 1970s and 1980s, it was composed mainly by victimization (0.6) and secondarily by both cancellation (0.2) and heroization (0.2). From 1992, after the end of the first Republic and, the victimization narrative became even more prominent (0.8) and in parallel the actions of the Resistance movement became even less relevant (0.1) and cancellation was eroded (0.1) by an even stronger victimization. Therefore, the degree of stigmatization of the fascist past passed from an already low 0.2 to an even lower 0.1.

France

[121] In 1994, 695 documents about war crimes perpetrated by fascist and Nazi soldiers (composing the memorandum titled *Atrocities in Italy*) were discovered in a wooden cabinet (Franzinelli 2002). This did not diminish the social and political acceptability of post-fascist parties

The memory of fascism and the Second World War in France is characterized by a process of *cancellation and heroization* similar to the one described for Italy. The main difference consists in the fact that in France the *national myth* created by De Gaulle describing French people as "all participating to the resistance" was even stronger. This was the case because – in France – the Resistance movement was considered as homogeneous and national, while in Italy it was considered as a divisive heritage due to the prominent role of the communists.

The Vichy regime is portrayed in the French collective memory as an "aberration", an "interlude", something totally alien to the national history and culture (Judt 1992, 96; S. Berger 2010, 123). Moreover the fascist Vichy regime, which collaborated with the Nazis, is considered as imposed by the Germans although this is historically inaccurate and ignores the fact that the head of that regime – *Philippe Pétain* – was hugely popular in France (Jackson 2014).

During the 1980s, the president Mitterand strategically developed the Gaullist myth of the good German to portray both French and Germans as victims of the Nazi regime, thus fostering both cancellation and heroization (Gildea 2002). Since France decided to describe itself as inherently anti-fascist and not to question its own political culture but rather to create a myth of resisting French (similar to the one describing Italians as inherently "good folks"), it follows that France can only be described as victim of the Nazi regime (Gildea 2002, 75). This narrative made possible to avoid and block out any type of responsibility (Michel 2011, 182).

A narrative based on victimization, like in the case of Italy, relies in parallel to elements of cancellation and heroization. On the one hand, the Gaullist myth of Resistance portrays the French population as heroically opposed to the fascist regime (Golsan 2006, 78). On the other hand, it presents a positively accentuated national history which denies the support for Vichy as well as the country's responsibilities towards former colonies (Bell 2013, 156; S. Berger 2010, 131).

Since the 1960 the "mythe résistencialiste" (Rousso 1990, 101) crystallized into a national monument which could not be broken even when France was confronted with its past. The Barbie trial (1972-84), Paxton's publication (1972), or the movie "Le Chagrin et la Pitié" (1969), put the controversial role of France during World War II more or less at the center of the public debate, but instead of entailing a change of narrative this resulted in a lost occasion (Rousso 1990). Even when in 1995 Jacques Chirac for the first time publicly acknowledged French participation in the Holocaust (Art 2011a, 363), this did not result in taking responsibility and the victimization narrative even got reinforced.[122]

Considering the literature on the topic, the values attributed to the collective memory in France are the following: during the 1970s and 1980s, it was composed mainly by

[122] Things might further evolve in the near future. In July 2017, French President Emmanuel Macron publicly denounced France's collaboration in the Holocaust, and declared that "It is convenient to see the Vichy regime as born of nothingness, returned to nothingness. Yes, it's convenient, but it is false. We cannot build pride upon a lie." 17 July 2017, The New York Times, "Macron Denounces Anti-Zionism as 'Reinvented Form of Anti-Semitism'", by Russell Goldman, July 17, 2017 available online (consulted in July 2017): https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/17/world/europe/macron-israel-holocaust-antisemitism.html.

victimization (0.6) and secondarily by both cancellation (0.2) and heroization (0.2). From the 1990s the victimization narrative became even more prominent (0.7) and in parallel the cancellation narrative was eroded (0.1) because the past was confronted but altered and therefore considered acceptable. Accordingly, the degree of stigmatization of the fascist past passed remained always at a low level of 0.2.

Austria

Similarly to the cases of Italy and France, the type of collective memory established in Austria is based on *victimization* (Ludi 2004), *amnesia* (Art 2007, 338), *self-delusion* (Pick 2000, 198), *distancing* (Berger 2010, 121), and *avoidance of any responsibility* (Judt 1992). The main difference consists in the fact that Austria could not develop any heroic narrative due to the lack of a Resistance movement.

The victimization narrative revolves around the *Anschluss* ("annexation") as a central element. Since in 1938 the country was invaded and incorporated in the Third Reich, the mainstream narrative goes, Austria cannot be blamed for World War II and the Holocaust (Pick 2000, 198). The tone of the narrative is apologetic and avoids any type of responsibility or admission of guilt, and goes along with the strategy of the Allies and their effort to avoid any excessive emphasis on Austria's past in order not to alienate them from the Western bloc (Judt 1992, 88).[123]

[123] A telling joke about Austria's collective memory is attributed to Billy Wilder, Austrian-born Jewish American filmmaker: "The Austrians have accomplished the feat of turning Beethoven into an Austrian, and Hitler into a German." Der Spiegel, May 16, 1994. Author: Hellmuth Karasek. Title: "Späte Heimkehr".

Uhl (2006) identifies the *Rot-Weiß-Rot-Buch* (Red-White-Red Book), a governmental publication from 1946, as the official source for the "victim theory". Collective memory has been developed, since the beginning, on the idea that Austria was not just *a* victim of Nazism, but rather as *the* first victim of Hitler (Berger 2010, 120). This narrative, however, has no historical confirmation (Art 2006, 42) and ignores several facts such as the overwhelming support of Austrians for the Anschluss.

Two critical points can be identified in the evolution of collective memory in Austria: the "*Waldheim affair*" in 1986 and the speech of then Chancellor Franz Vranitzky in 1991. Kurt Waldheim became the ninth President of Austria although it emerged during the electoral campaign that he previously lied about having being drafted into the *Wehrmacht*. This sparked a long and heated debate. On the one hand it produced a partial revision of the victim theory and "mainstream public opinion internalized the idea of Austrian responsibility" (S. Berger 2010, 126) introducing a modified "co-responsibility thesis" (Uhl 2006, 63). On the other hand, Heinish (2002) stresses that despite the international community criticized Austria, Waldheim won those elections and as a reaction the FPÖ gained consensus. In fact, the debate in a first moment produced a rather nationalistic and Anti-Semitic answer (Art 2006; Wodak 1990).

The change in the mainstream narrative is however certified in 1991, when for the first time in history that Austrian Chancellor, *Franz Vranitzky*, highlighted live on TV Austrian culpability (Pick 2000, 199). The country had to make a very formal amend for the past and this created more debate which was translated into more polarization (Art 2011a).

The fact that it constituted such a delayed apology confirms how rooted and difficult to challenge was the victimization narrative. However, it also stresses how important it was, at least at the symbolic level, an official admission of guilt and a partial adoption of the culpabilization narrative. Bischof argues that since then, Austria can no longer be considered the "black sheep of Europe" when it comes to dealing with the Nazi past (Bischof 2004, 25). In sum, it is possible to claim that a new secondary narrative based on culpabilization emerged between 1983 and 1994 replacing cancellation, while the narrative based on victimization remained mainstream and provided a greater electoral success for the party insisting on that narrative: the FPÖ.

Considering the literature on the topic, the values attributed to the collective memory in Austria are the following: during the 1970s and 1980s, it was composed mainly by victimization (0.7) and secondarily by cancellation (0.3). From 1994 the victimization narrative remained prominent (0.7) but cancellation was not possible anymore and was replaced by culpabilization. Therefore, the degree of stigmatization of the fascist past passed from 0.1 to 0.3.

Switzerland

Contrary to victimization narratives, *cancellation* narratives imply that the past is not altered but rather neglected or denied. This is precisely what happened in Switzerland, where neutrality during the World War II has been considered for decades as a sufficient reason not to look closely at the country's active and passive collaboration with authoritarian regimes at least until 1995 (Kellerhals-Maeder 2000).

As Ludi puts it "the common representations of the past have been *highly selective*, and most efforts to address thorny questions have been doomed" (2004, 119). Similarly, Judt describes the Swiss memory as "purged" (1992, 96). Among the thorny issues that Switzerland decided to exclude from the public debate there are the distinction the country made between Jews and non-Jewish Germans, with the former returned to the Nazis whenever they attempted cross the border (Judt 1992, 96), as well as the delivery of Swiss arms to Nazi Germany and the dismissal of Jews from Swiss companies (Berger 2010, 129).

For the Swiss, *neutrality* is a pillar of their national identity (Lebow 2006, 20) and this is at the base of the mainstream narrative describing Switzerland as a *small country unable to defend itself against external enemies* (Berger 2010, 124). The idea of the Helvetic Confederation as the charitable home of the Red Cross with a long tradition of neutrality allowed the formation and consolidation of a traditional national identity and fostered the *Sonderfall Schweiz* myth, describing Switzerland as a 'special case' and therefore helping to avoid the debate (Ludi 2004, 126).

The absence of a debate can be linked directly to the fact that *the government restricted the access to archives and documents* – Berger claims that the Swiss state "was extraordinary active in preventing a different memory" by restricting access to archives and documents and sponsoring official publications. It seems safe to assume that the memory based on cancellation was an intended consequence of the government’s policy (Ludi 2004, 124).

Although critical voices such as Edgar Bonjour existed at least since the 1970s[124], Switzerland could afford not to officially face its past until the 1990s, when (mostly external) pressures forced the country to take action. Already in 1995 the Swiss president Kaspar Villiger apologized to the Jewish people for the country's asylum policy during World War II, but the confrontation of the past became particularly pressing in 1996 when Jewish organizations forced Swiss banks to undercover dormant accounts of Holocaust victims, an issue that had been ignored for a long time and that created irritation. As a reaction the Swiss government refused to acknowledge its dark past while outburst of antisemitism characterized the public debate (Ludi 2004, 120–22).[125]

The reports published between 1998 and 2002 by the Volcker Commission (also known as 'Independent Committee of Experts' or *ICE*) did not help to settle a real mainstream narrative, also because the media barely took notice of them. The Swiss collective memory remained based on denial and removal because the revision of the country's history was driven by "the urge to exculpate Switzerland", to "deny the necessity of acknowledging responsibility", and "to refuse to feel ashamed of what had happened in the Nazi era" (Ludi 2004, 138).

In parallel to the constantly mainstream narrative based on cancellation, a secondary narrative based on victimization developed after 1995. Ludi claims that being forced to face its past between 1995 and 2002, and by refusing the allegations of wartime

[124] Edgar Bonjour, a Swiss historian, questioned the neutrality of the country and examined its implications. See Bonjour (1970).
[125] Similarly to what happened in Austria after the Waldheim's affair.

accommodation, Switzerland had to "turn the table" generating a secondary victimization narrative – similarly to the Austrian one – minimizing the country's culpability and responsibility (2006, 212).

Considering the literature on the topic, the values attributed to the collective memory in Switzerland are the following: a value of 1 to cancellation between 1970s and 1994, while for the 2000s and 2010s they are 0.4 (victimization) and 0.6 (cancellation) since the debate about the country's responsibilities was revitalized from 1996 but instead of resulting in culpabilization it generated a secondary narrative based on victimization. The overall level of stigma therefore passed from 0.3 to 0.2.

Netherlands

Similarly to the Swiss case, the Dutch national collective memory has been *highly selective* and, in line with the Italian and French narratives, fostered the inaccurate image of the "Good Dutch". This image was instrumental in distancing the Netherlands from the Nazi regime and made it possible to avoid controversial aspects of the country's role during World War II (Brants 2000; De Haan 2011; Judt 1992). In other words, the main narrative in the Netherlands portrayed the Dutch as *reluctant collaborators despite the complicity of the population* (Brants 2000, 229).

The Dutch self-portrayal focuses on the narrative of 'a small country without a choice' against an external aggression, and consequently ignores its collaboration with the Nazi regime. As Judt explains, "the active and enthusiastic collaboration of some Flemings and

Dutch was stricken from the public record" (1992, 96).[126] Moreover, two other important and embarrassing elements were excluded: the fact that in the Netherlands Jews had the lowest chances to survive compared to any other European country, and the fact that Queen Wilhelmina could have done more in fostering anti-German and pro-Jews interventions during her radio speeches (Bovenkerk 2000).

The narrative distinguishing between the categories of *goed* Dutch and *fout* collaborators remained the main paradigm in Dutch historiography and collective memory for decades.[127] Like in other countries, only in the 1970s and 1980s "more critical voices highlighted the extent of Dutch collaboration with the Nazi occupiers" (S. Berger 2010, 127). Although the country's role during World War II had become salient in the public debate this was not enough to change the mainstream narrative while in fact it rather reinforced it (De Haan 2011, 85).

Considering the literature on the topic, the values attributed to the collective memory in the Netherlands are the following: a value of 0.8 to cancellation and 0.2 to victimization. The two values remain stable over time because there is no trace in the literature of a change of narrative. Even after an increase of the saliency of the country's past, it seems like denial and amnesia remained the glue of the national collective memory. The level of stigma, therefore, remains constantly at 0.3 during the whole period.

[126] Tellingly, only a small amount of collaborators were prosecuted and none of them served a sentence of more than fifteen years (De Haan 2011, 78).
[127] De Jong (1978).

Sweden

In Sweden, the collective memory about the country's role vis-à-vis fascism revolves around the "*small state realism*" narrative (Johansson 1997, 175). Similarly to Switzerland and the Netherlands, the country depicted itself as a small victim, a *bystander without any choice* against the German aggression: limited concessions and neutrality were considered as the best possible outcome for the nation and its neighbors (Östling 2011, 128).

This narrative of *cancellation* is based on denial and removal and therefore, as Johansson puts it, difficult questions were "swept under the carpet" (1997, 176). According to Colla, many elements of the country's history were not only excluded by the national collective memory, but conveniently forgotten (2002). Similarly, Judt claims that abiding memories were "purged from the national collective memory" (1992, 96). The country decided not to address issues such as: the *Wehrmacht* being allowed to use Sweden for military transport; the trade of iron, wood, and coal which maintained alive the German war machine; last but not least, the eugenics program of compulsory sterilization established since the 1930s. These and other memories were removed in the name of realpolitik (Gilmour 2010, 70; Spektorowski and Mizrachi 2004).

Through a process of cancellation, according to Östling, "small-state realism became Sweden’s patriotic narrative of the Second World War" (2008). This originated a myth

which describes values of solidarity and humanism as inherently Swedish.[128] The collective memory established wide "repressed areas" in order to protect the idea and purity of the *folkhemmet* (the "people's house", in other words Sweden and its welfare state as political culture). In parallel to cancellation, the myth of Sweden centered on humanitarian efforts originated a secondary narrative of heroism (Östling 2008, 203).

It is precisely this deeply rooted idea of *folkhemmet* that characterises the Swedish collective memory and its uniqueness. Indeed, contrary to other cases of cancellation such as Switzerland and Netherlands, pre-existing political cultural elements linked to the idea of *folkhemmet* closed the door for a nationalist interpretation of the events linked to World War II and enhanced the levels of stigmatization of that past (Trägårdh 2002). For this reason, Sweden interestingly displays a higher degree of stigma compared to other cases of cancellation.

This also explains the presence of another, and stronger, secondary narrative based on culpabilization, which became dominant especially from the 1990s. The culpabilization narrative was articulated and legitimated by several schools of thought and not necessarily for the same reasons: "The leitmotiv of this critical interpretation was that the coalition government, with its concessions to Nazi Germany, had pursued a morally irresponsible policy, whose only purpose had been unconditionally to keep Sweden out of the great power conflict" (Östling 2011, 132).

[128] Although the myth does not necessarily contain only truth, since "myth and historical consciousness tend to be mutually exclusive as approaches to reality" (Colla 2002, 131).

Although the culpabilization narrative was present already in the years immediately following the war, it was only since the "decade of debates" (Östling 2011, 139) – the 1990s – that it became prominent. In parallel, the small-state narrative progressively lost its monopoly. A book in particular originated much debate about the country's role: Boëthius' "Sweden and the Second World War" (1991). It paved the way for a more critical narrative and marked the beginning of the gradual transition from a narrative based on cancellation to a narrative based on culpabilization (Östling 2011, 137).

Sweden was reticent in developing a clear *culpabilization narrative* (or it might have been given for granted) but after decades of cancellation, culpabilization became the mainstream narrative and the stigma of Nazism became "a powerful weapon in domestic debates" (Östling 2016, 152). This was also visible in the government's research program "Sweden's Relations with Nazism, Nazi Germany and the Holocaust" started in 2000.[129]

Considering the literature on the topic, the values attributed to the collective memory in Sweden are the following: a value of 0.6 to cancellation, 0.1 to heroization, and 0.3 to the culpabilization in the 1970s and 1980s. From the 1990s the small-state realism narrative lost its monopoly and Sweden was more resolute in facing its past, hence culpabilization increased (reaching 0.6) while cancellation went down to 0.3. The levels of stigma thus increased from 0.6 to 0.8.

[129] It also included a survey published (in English) in 2003 and titled "Sweden's Relations with Nazism, Nazi Germany and the Holocaust: A Survey of Research."

United Kingdom

The British narrative of the country's role during World War II is unanimously considered as one of *heroization*. The fight against fascist regimes is described as Britain's "finest hour" (S. Berger 2010, 124; Reynolds 2016, 11–14), in line with the *topos* introduced by Winston Churchill in one of his speeches from 1940 (commonly referred to as ' Their Finest Hour').[130]

The British collective memory is based on the narrative of World War II as a '*good*' war liberating Europe from evil (Bell 2013, 156), a people's war with *epic and heroic* connotations depicting Britain as a fortress standing alone against hostility (Reynolds 2013, 204), linked to the idea of British heroism as "totemic of an indomitable Albion" (Tombs 2013, 3).

The collective memory of the country's role is extremely consistent over time and does not contain any secondary narrative. Some elements have been omitted or underplayed, such as the contribution of the Commonwealth (Reynolds 2013, 204) or the question of whether Britain could have done more to protect European Jews (Bell 2013, 156). However, the total opposition to fascist regimes and the defense of liberal values has never been at stake.

[130] A few passages of the speech delivered in Parliament at Westminster, 18 June 1940, are worth being mentioned to better understand the British heroization narrative (author's italics): "Upon this battle depends the *survival of Christian civilisation*. Upon it depends our own *British life*, and the *long continuity of our institutions* and our Empire. (…) Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this island or lose the war. (…) Let us therefore brace ourselves to our *duties*, and so bear ourselves, that if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men will still say: "*this was their finest hour*."

The heroization narrative has remained the only accepted one in the public discourse, and it has never been questioned over time. As Berger claims (2010, 130) heroic and positive memories of the war and remembrances of solidarity in suffering "continued to dominate memory discourses up to the present day." It is therefore safe to claim that the main narrative of heroization has not been undermined by passage of time (Bell 2013).

Considering the literature on the topic, the values attributed to the collective memory in the United Kingdom is the following: a value of 1 to heroization through the whole time span. Therefore, the level of stigma remained stable at 0.7.

Germany

Germany constitutes a textbook case of culpabilization. A large literature on *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* (or 'coming to terms with the past') shows that Germany decided to face the past and to take responsibility for it (Art 2006, 19–20; T. Berger 2012, 63–64; Reichel 2001; Niven 2002; Olick 2007), while “the historical experience of other countries before and after the Nazi regime suggests that silence, avoidance, repression of the memory and past crimes are the norm rather than the exception” (Herf 2002, 184). As Judt puts it, the decision to blame everything on Germany "was one of the few matters on which all sides, within each country and among the Allied powers, could readily agree" (Judt 1992, 87).

Collective re-elaboration in Germany formed a memory built upon pillars such as collective guilt (Maier 1988), culture of contrition (Art 2007, 338), *Nie Wieder* or 'never again' (Art 2006, 20), *Aufrechnung* or 'settling of accounts' (Moeller 2006, 111) and *Aufarbeitung Der Vergangenheit* or 'working through the past' (Adorno 1977).[131] The German approach to the events which led to World War II and the Holocaust is based on the acceptance of its own responsibility (Judt 1992, 87). However, it was not an immediate and spontaneous achievement. The pre-condition for the creation of a self-culpabilizing memory of the Holocaust was the Allied military victory which the resulted in the Nurnberg trials and the de-Nazification process (Herf 2002, 185).

Initially, under Konrad Adenauer, Germany produced a victimization narrative portraying the people as victim of the Nazi regime (Moeller 2005; Niven 2010; S. Berger 2010, 91; Gregor N. 2008). In 1952, however, the *Bundespräsident* Theodor Heuss said: "*Diese Scham nimmt uns niemand ab*! No one will lift this shame from us", a speech which entered in the German political culture and "began an elite tradition of political recollection that would eventually contribute to broader public discussion and action" (Herf 2002, 190–92), although it is not until the end of the 1950s that the country established its process of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* (Kansteiner 2006, 102).

The culpabilization narrative was never seriously challenged in Western Germany, and the main contrast was represented by the possibility of comparing the Holocaust with other events. In the period 1986-87 this debate was particularly intense, to the point that

[131] For an overview: Assmann and Frevert (1999).

it was labelled *Historikerstreit*, the "historians' dispute" (S. Berger 2010, 131; Baldwin 1990). Subsequently, according to several authors the country went through a process of 'normalization' (Olick 1998; T. Berger 2002, 99) which led to the possibility to show once again some degree of patriotism and to shed the ghosts of the past, for example with the 2006 football World Cup or with or the 1999 NATO campaign in Kosovo.[132] Therefore, it is possible to claim that – in an effort to normalize the country's past – cancellation became part of the official narrative, in particular as a result of a politics of memory (*Geschichtspolitik*) fostered by the Chancellor Helmut Kohl (Art 2006, 50).

Another factor to consider is the impact of reunification on the country's collective memory, given the different memories that for decades developed within the same territory (T. Berger 2002, 99; Herf 2002, 192). In the East the collective memory was one of heroization, because "Eastern Germany argued that it represented the opposition to fascism and thus bore no responsibility for the crimes of the regime it replaced" (Olick 1998, 559). Therefore, "the communist narrative presented East Germans as heroic antifascists who had liberated themselves from the Nazi capitalists" (Art 2006, 43). This heroic narrative made it possible for the East to reject and deny any responsibility (Herf 1997, 161; Herf 2016).

Considering the literature on the topic, the values attributed to the collective memory in Germany are the following: a value of 1 to culpabilization for the 1970s and 80s. After reunification in 1989, the level goes down to 0.8 because it starts the process of

[132] It is very difficult to determine to what extent the process of normalization is linked to the *Historikerstreit*, but it might be a result of a more nuanced interpretation of the country's past.

normalization of the German past, introducing cancellation (0.1). Moreover, the reunification introduces in Germany of yet another type collective memory: the Eastern German narrative, which is one of heroization for the fight against the Nazi. For these reasons there is a 0.1 of both heroization and cancellation from the 1990s.

Chapter 7 – Explaining Populism "The Usual Way"

This is the first of two analytical chapters aiming at understanding which factors, or combination of factors, explain the different levels of populism's social acceptability in different countries over time. It presents the results of the fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) testing the impact of four conditions: levels of corruption, accountability and responsiveness, levels of ideological convergence of the political system, and levels of economic performance. The selection of these conditions was derived from the vast literature on the electoral performance of populist parties and it has been adapted to the scope of this study as explained in detail in Chapter 2. The next chapter will introduce the role of stigmatization of the fascist past because, as argued in Chapter 3, these four conditions are supposed to leave partially unexplained the cross-country variation concerning the presence of populism.

Operationalization and calibration

In fsQCA the data is expressed in fuzzy set membership scores ranging from 0 to 1. Therefore the aim is to obtain the raw data for each country concerning each of the conditions as well as for the outcome, and in a second step to calibrate the raw data into fuzzy set scores. Fuzzy rather than crisp membership scores offer the possibility to overcome a pure dichotomization of data (Ragin 2000), and the calibration procedure is a key element in order to obtain fuzzy set memberships as adequate as possible, and for this reason a deep qualitative knowledge of the cases is an essential precondition. Rather

than arbitrarily, in fact, calibration should be done in an informed way through a substantive familiarity with the topic.

This section discusses the operationalization conditions and outcomes, as well as their calibration.[133] According to the different situations, both substantive theoretical knowledge and empirical evidence have been used as parameters for the calibration. When the direct method of calibration is used, by means of a logarithmic function the software calculates the membership scores for each case in the different sets. A value of 1 is assigned to cases which are fully member of that set, while 0.5 is the point of maximum ambiguity, which means that it is not possible to establish whether the case is member or non-member of the set, and 0 indicates full non-membership (Ragin 2008). As much as possible, purely data-driven calibrations are avoided since they usually are void of any substantive meaning (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). On the other hand, a great amount of attention is devoted to the location of qualitative anchors. Table 9 summarizes the calibration process for the conditions as well as for the outcomes, while the Appendix 4 shows raw and fuzzy values for the four conditions (Table 24) and the three outcomes (Table 25).

Outcome: social acceptability of populism

The outcome to be explained is the social acceptability of populism, which is also further disentangled in left-wing and right-wing populism, for a total of three outcomes that will

[133] Next chapter relies on the same conditions, operationalization and calibration, therefore the will not be explained again.

be tested. It is measured as the percentage of populist statements in a manifesto and then weighted by the degree of radicalism of the party as well as its vote share in that election, as explained in Chapter 4. The values are displayed in Appendix 3 (Table 23). In case, during an election, more than one party manifesto had traces of populism, the percentages were aggregated.

In order to assign the full membership or non-membership of the cases in the outcomes, as well as the crossover points, it is essential to observe the empirical data. Each choice is here justified and explained in detail, in order to transparently expose the process of calibration and link it to the intensive knowledge of each case.

Social Acceptability of Populism

A country displays high levels of social acceptability of populism, and therefore is a full member of the outcome, in case it shows a value which is equal or higher than the one displayed in France in 1995 (1,891). Cases with even higher values than France in 1995 are considered as outliers and extraneous variation. France in 1995 is considered as fully member of the outcome because each and every manifesto analyzed contains populism. Three are from left-wing parties, and three from right-wing parties. On the left, both mainstream (PS) and non-mainstream parties (PCF, LO) show average or very high levels of populism in their manifestos (between 4% and 13%). On the right, the situation is similar, with the mainstream RPR and UDF articulating populist messages (6 and 4%) as well as the Front National (5%). Moreover, the PS and the RPR obtained together over

44% of the vote share, and the degree of radicalism of the non-mainstream parties is extremely elevated (between 4.3 and 6). These factors combined bring to the conclusion that France in 1995 is a case which deserves full membership in the outcome. Switzerland in 2011 shows very similar values (1,888) and it could have been chosen as well. Moreover, there is a clear gap in the scale since both cases precede a jump in the values. Indeed, the next case (Switzerland in 1995) shows a much higher level (178 points difference).

The crossover point is identified in a value of 816, meaning that the United Kingdom in 2003 is considered as being member of the outcome but not the Netherlands in 2012. There is an obvious gap in the levels of populism of these two cases, but also more substantial reasons. It is true that all six coded manifestos in the Netherlands in 2012 show traces of populism, but all six are definitely below the average (5.7% for right-wing manifestos and 7.6% for left-wing ones), with only the PVV goes close to it (5.1%). This makes it particularly difficult to interpret the actual level of social acceptability of populism in the country at that time. Moreover, in the Netherlands the levels of radicalism are low or very low, once again with the exception of the PVV. On the other hand, in the United Kingdom in 2003 the three coded manifestos have average or high levels of populism (The Labour's manifesto reaches 8.1%), and they together cover more than 90% of the vote share. All the cases with values higher than the one of the Netherlands in 2012 are therefore considered as more in than out of the category concerning the social acceptability of populism, while those below are more out than in.[134]

[134] The point at which a country has full non-membership in the outcome is 0 for all the examined types of populism (total, right-wing, and left-wing).

Only 8 cases are below the crossover point, while 14 are above it. The fact that only a few cases are more out than in simply reflects the fact that, in Western Europe in the last three decades, populism is a constant feature of party manifestos. Moreover, considering the levels of radicalism and the voter share received by parties articulating populist messages, it is possible to observe how populism has become socially acceptable. This confirms how important details and characteristics of each case are in order to perform calibration. Finally, the low number of cases which do not belong to the outcome suggests that it would be interesting to expand the analysis to countries with a lower social acceptability of populism in order to produce more generalizable results.

Social Acceptability of Left-Wing *Populism*

A country displays high levels of social acceptability of left-wing populism, and therefore is a full member of the outcome, in case it shows a value which is equal or higher than the one displayed in Switzerland in 1995 (800). Cases with even higher values are considered as outliers and extraneous variation. Switzerland in 1995 can be considered as a full member of the outcome because both coded manifestos from left-wing parties display levels of populism close to or extremely above the average percentage of populism in left-wing manifestos (5.6%). In particular, the Green party has a level of 3.8%, while the Socialist Party displays a remarkable 11.6% that, combined with the medium level of radicalism (3) and a good electoral result (21.8%), confirms that in Switzerland mainstream left-wing parties can be highly populist, and therefore left-wing populism is socially acceptable. On the other hand the case below, Austria in 1994, cannot be

considered as a full member because there is only one left-wing populist manifesto (SPÖ, 7.1%).

The crossover point is identified in a value of 435, meaning that Switzerland in 2003 is considered as being member of the outcome while Germany in 2002 (310) is not. Apart from the clear gap in the levels, other substantial reasons for the calibration exist. In Switzerland both party manifestos contain populism: although the levels are below the average (they show levels of 3.1% and 3.3% compared to an average level of 5.6%), the mainstream left-wing party (SP) is not only populist but also highly radical (4.8).[135] On the other hand, it is true that also in Germany both coded manifestos contain populism, but in lower percentages (3.6% and 1.5%). Moreover, the mainstream left-wing party (SPD) is very moderate compared to the Swiss socialist party (2 in the radicalism scale). All the cases with values higher than the one of Germany in 2002 are therefore considered as more in than out of the category concerning the social acceptability of left-wing populism, while those below are more out than in.

This time, the distribution is more even: while 11 cases are below the crossover point, 12 are above it. Compared to the overall levels of acceptability of populism, left-wing populism seems to be less socially accepted as displayed in Figure 10. It would be interesting to expand the analysis to South-European countries such as Spain, Greece, and Portugal in order to produce more generalizable results.

[135] For Switzerland the data are derived from the Party Manifesto Project, since the Chapel Hill survey does not include the country.

Social Acceptability of Right-Wing *Populism*

A country displays high levels of social acceptability of right-wing populism, and therefore is a full member of the outcome, in case it shows a value which is equal or higher than the one displayed in France in 1995 (802). Cases with even higher values are considered as outliers and extraneous variation. France in 1995 can be considered as a full member of the outcome because all three coded manifestos from right-wing parties display levels of populism close to or above the average percentage of populism in right-wing manifestos (4.5%). Moreover the three parties combined obtained more than 54% of the vote share, with the Front National showing the highest possible degree of radicalism. Switzerland in 2011 has similar values, and could have been used as well.

The crossover point is identified in a value of 418, meaning that Austria in 2002 is considered as being member of the outcome while Germany in 1994 is not. In Austria both right-wing party manifestos contain populism, although the level is below average (3.5% and 0.7% compared to an average of 4.5%). Moreover, they both present a high degree of radicalism and the two parties combined obtained more than 46% of the vote share. On the other hand, although also in Germany both party manifestos show traces of populism (actually slightly higher than in Austria, 2.4% and 3.7%) the parties are less radical and obtained a smaller part of the vote share. All the cases with values higher than the one of Austria in 2002 are therefore considered as more in than out of the category concerning the social acceptability of right-wing populism, while those below are more out than in. It follows that only 8 cases are below the crossover point, while 15 are

above it. It would be interesting to expand the analysis to countries with a low social acceptability of right-wing populism in order to produce more generalizable results. Appendix 5 shows the distribution of cases in the three outcomes (Figure 26 to Figure 28).

Condition 1: corruption

The first condition refers to the levels of corruption. The row data are obtained scaling and standardizing the values from the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) by Transparency International – measuring the overall extent of perceived corruption in the public and political sectors) – and the data published by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) – assessing the levels of corruption within the political system.[136] I take into account the average levels of corruption for the last four years before the election and then reverse them in order to obtain a value of 1 in case the level of corruption is very high and 0 in case it is very low, because populism is supposed to become more socially accepted when corruption scandals are widespread and corruption is perceived as problematic.

The determination of full membership and non-membership of the cases is based on the most extreme cases in the distribution. Sweden and Switzerland in the 1990s are the two countries with the lowest perception of corruption, scoring values above 90, while Italy both in 1994 and 2013 has the lowest values (12). The average value for all countries is

[136] Normalization and Standardization are operated by the Democracy Barometer in the indicator "Absence of Corruption". It is considered as parts of the features determining the governmental capabilities and in particular its transparency.

68, and it is used to determine the crossover point. Hence, 8 cases are below average, while 15 cases are above it. Sweden, Switzerland, and the Netherlands are always members of the outcome; Austria, Germany, United Kingdom two times out of three. Italy (2) and France (3) are never members of the outcome. This distribution mirrors the fact that in West European countries the levels of corruption are generally low, while at the same time it takes into consideration the average value in order to set a threshold.

Condition 2: accountability and responsiveness

The second condition refers to the levels of accountability and responsiveness, here unified in a single measure. The two concepts are intertwined and both insist on democratic elements that play a prominent role in the populist critique of liberal democracy. While responsiveness consists in "reflecting and giving expression to the will of the people" (Pennock 1952, 790), accountability refers to politician's capability to respond to citizens for the decisions taken, and it is assessed in terms of the "ends achieved" and the "means employed" to achieve them (Moncrieffe 1998, 388–89).

Determining these aspects is a particularly complex task, and it was necessary to construct a (certainly rough) proxy by combining four indicators present in the Democracy Barometer (DB).[137] For responsiveness, two indicators have been selected from the Democracy Barometer: governmental capability and representation. The former combines measures for the government's length, stability, and popular support, while the

[137] Merkel, Wolfgang and Daniel Bochsler (project leaders); Bousbah, Karima; Bühlmann, Marc; Giebler, Heiko; Hänni, Miriam; Heyne, Lea; Müller, Lisa; Ruth, Saskia; Wessels, Bernhard (2016). Democracy Barometer. Codebook. Version 5. Aarau: Zentrum für Demokratie.

latter combines measures for anti-government actions, political interference by the military and religion, and effective implementation of government decisions. For accountability, two indicators have been selected from the Democracy Barometer: transparency of the political process and fairness of competition. The former combines measures for freedom of information, informational openness, and the transparency of government policy, while the latter combines measures for the openness and competitiveness of elections.[138]

The goal is to measure the quality of democratic mechanisms regulating the relationship between the people and their representatives, a key element of the populist critique to the liberal idea of democracy. The stronger are accountability and responsiveness, the less space there should be for a populist critique, therefore making populism less socially acceptable.

The final value of the condition is obtained by calculating the average values of the four indicators (two for accountability and two for responsiveness) in the four years before the elections (Appendix 4, Table 26). The distribution of cases was considered to obtain the anchors for calibration. Since a low level of accountability and responsiveness is supposed to trigger populism, the DB's values have subsequently been reversed.

[138] The codebook provides all the information concerning the sources of the data, their scaling and standardization. Moreover, it offers detailed definitions of the concepts employed and notes about the measurements. The dataset of the Democracy Barometer does not directly refer to concepts such as responsiveness and accountability, therefore I use their dataset by interpreting the type of information it contains in order to adapt it to the scope of this analysis.

Table 9 – Conditions and Their Calibration

Conditions	Description	Calibration
POP	Percentage (combined) of populist statements in the party manifestos per country in each decade (weighted by radicalism and vote share)	1= 1,891 0.5= 816 0= 0
POP_L	Percentage (combined) of populist statements in left wing party manifestos per country in each decade (weighted by radicalism and vote share)	1= 800 0.5= 436 0= 0
POP_R	Percentage (combined) of populist statements in right wing party manifestos per country in each decade (weighted by radicalism and vote share)	1= 802 0.5= 418 0= 0
C	High levels of corruption	1=12 0.5=68 0=92
D	Poor democratic performance in terms of accountability and responsiveness	1=48 0.5=65 0=75
E	Poor economic performance: slow growth GDP per capita, high Gini Household Disposable Income coefficient, high unemployment rate	1=16 0.5=10 0=5
CNVG	High ideological convergence of the political parties	1=0.22 0.5=0.45 0=0.67
S	Low levels of stigmatization of the fascist past	1= 0 0.5= 0.5 0= 1 See Chapter 3

Switzerland in 2011 scores better than any other country (75), therefore it is taken as the anchor for full non-membership. The United Kingdom in 1995 has the lowest value (48) and it is therefore selected as anchor for full membership. The average value for all countries is 62.5 but the selected crossover point is 65. This is due to the fact that Austria and Germany in 2013 would have been members of the outcome by taking into consideration just the overall average, but if one considers the average for the specific decade (64.6) they fall below that level. The same applies to Austria in 2002, which scores below the average for the decade (64.7). Therefore, the crossover point is established at 65, and the only three countries included in the set are Sweden, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. On the other hand Austria, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom are always non-members of the condition. This shows a clear demarcation between countries delivering in terms of accountability and responsiveness, and countries that do not deliver. Moreover, it suggests that – despite every Western Europe country can be considered as fully democratized – some democratic mechanisms such as those considered here can and should be improved.

Condition 3: economic performance

The third condition concerns the economic performance of the countries. It includes the average values in the four years before elections for three parameters: unemployment rate, Gini household disposable income, and the growth of GDP per capita. The final value consists of the sum of the data for unemployment and Gini coefficient, minus the value for unemployment (since the first two have high values when the situation is

negative, while the last works in the other direction). High values indicate a poor economic performance, which in turn is supposed to trigger populism.

The data for unemployment are obtained from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)[139] and from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)[140] for the missing cases. The Gini household disposable income is considered more precise than the general Gini coefficient because it measures inequality after redistribution, and it is obtained from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database.[141] It is important to consider inequality since the gap between the poor and the rich which is supposed to be a key element in triggering populism, otherwise the presence of populism in rich countries would remain unexplainable. Finally, the data concerning the growth of GDP per capita are obtained from the World Bank.[142]

The determination of full membership and non-membership is based on the most extreme cases in the distribution (Appendix 4, Table 27). Sweden in 2002 scores better than any other country (5), therefore it is taken as the anchor for full non-membership in the condition 'poor economic performance'. Italy in 2013 has the worst value (16) and it is therefore selected as anchor for full membership. The average value for all countries is 10.2 and this is used as crossover point, making of Switzerland in 2011 the most ambiguous case. This reflects the importance of including in the measure the levels of inequality after redistribution, in which Switzerland in 2011 scores rather poorly, while for

[139] OECD (2017), Unemployment rate (indicator). Accessed on October 2017.
[140] International Financial Statistics, June 2015.
[141] Solt (2016) SWIID version 5.1.
[142] World Development Indicators, December 2015.

example its unemployment rate was very low. All in all, the distribution of cases is homogeneous (11 cases are member of the condition while 12 are not). Interestingly, no country is always a member or a non-member (apart from Italy, which is a member two time out of two). Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden are non-members in two cases out of three. Switzerland, France, and the United Kingdom are members in two cases out of three.

Condition 4: ideological convergence

The fourth condition refers to the ideological convergence of the party system, and it is calculated following Dalton's formula (2008) which takes into account the number of parties, their vote share and their positioning on the right-left scale.[143] The degree of radicalism is provided as explained in Chapter 4. The measurement includes all the parties which obtained at least 5% of the vote share. Since the formula measures polarization (going from 0 when all parties are located at the same position on the Left-Right scale to 10 when all parties are located at the extreme positions), the values for ideological polarization are reversed in order to provide the degree of ideological convergence in a scale from 0 (lowest) to 1 (maximum convergence). This is done

[143] Dalton measures the Polarization Index (PI) as follows.
PI = SQRT{Σ(party vote share$_i$)*([party L/R score$_i$ – party systemaverage L/R score]/5)^2}.
In particular, "$_i$" represents individual parties. Here the formula is slightly adjusted. First, the left-right score is calculated according to the Chapel Hill survey or, since the survey does not cover the 1990s, the Party Manifesto Project is used (see notes of Appendix 3). Second, the effective number of parties is here intended as the number of parties which obtained at least 5% of the vote share, in order to include only those parties whose electoral manifestos are included in the analysis. The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) provides all the information needed to measure the polarization index: http://www.cses.org (consulted in October 2017).

because the ideological convergence of the political spectrum is often considered as a trigger for the social acceptability of populism.

One might argue that the ideological convergence of the political system (measured with Dalton's formula and therefore taking into consideration the parties' vote share and degree of radicalism) is endogenous to populism's social acceptability (which also includes the parties vote share as well as their degree of radicalism). This, however, it is not necessarily true. First, it is hard to think of any potential uncontrolled confounder causing both the ideological convergence and the social acceptability of populism. Second, it is unlikely that the social acceptability of populism can cause the convergence of the ideological space.[144] For example, Ezrow et al. (2010) show that mainstream and niche political parties rely on different strategies to adjust their position on the left-right scale as a reaction to the shift of voters' positions. Therefore it would be difficult to imagine that the social acceptability of populism explains the convergence of the ideological space. To be completely sure about the fact that including this condition does not alter the results because of endogeneity, a robustness test that excludes convergence is performed.[145]

The determination of full membership and non-membership is based on the most extreme cases in the distribution. The Netherlands in 1994 have the lowest value of polarization

[144] It might rather cause ideological polarization, because parties would have an incentive to become more extreme as soon as populism is more widespread and socially accepted.
[145] The results remain consistent, both with the normal operationalization (Appendix 9, Table 34and Table 35) and with the alternative one based on the co-occurrence principle (Appendix 13, Table 45 and Table 46).

(0.22) and therefore it represents the anchor for full membership. On the other hand, Switzerland in 2003 has the highest values of polarization (0.67) and it represents the anchor for full non-membership. The average is 0.45 and there are no theoretical reasons not to use it as crossover point. Accordingly, 14 cases belong to the outcome while 9 cases do not. This means that a majority of the cases analysed shows a (relatively) high level of ideological convergence. Appendix 5 (Figure 29) shows the distribution of the cases in the four conditions.

Condition 5: stigma of the fascist past

The levels of stigma are assigned to each country in Chapter 5, where the choices made are explained in detail and justified according to the existing literature. Since the relationship hypothesized is between the presence of high levels of social acceptability of populism and low levels of stigma, the values assigned in Chapter 5 are reversed: in this way a level of stigma equals to 1 becomes a 0 and vice versa. Indeed, a country is a full member if its levels of stigma are extremely low, which is supposed to trigger a high social acceptability of populism.

Results

This section presents the results of the fsQCA analysis. First it tests whether it is possible to assess any necessary condition for the presence of the social acceptability of populism. Second, it tests whether any combination of conditions is sufficient for the presence of

the outcome. The analysis is then repeated with the same conditions but considering first only left-wing and then only right-wing parties.[146]

According to the common notation system in QCA, all the conditions as well as the three outcome variables are indicated by a capital letter to indicate their presence (D), and a lowercase for the absence (d). Moreover, in Boolean algebra the signs + (addition) and * (multiplication) are used to explain the relation between several conditions. The addition sign (+) stands for the logical 'or', while the multiplication sign (*) means a logical 'and'. Finally, there are three possible solutions in QCA that can be reported: conservative (or complex), intermediate and parsimonious solution. They differ with regards to the assumption they make about logical remainders.[147] They are fully reported in the Appendix 6, but the analysis focuses on the most parsimonious solution. Since the aim is to confront the results with or without the introduction of the levels of stigma of the fascist past, the assumptions made would be the same and the results are easier to interpret. Moreover, Appendix 9 shows the parsimonious solution for the analysis performed without the condition measuring the ideological convergence of the political spectrum (with similar results).

According to the principle of causal asymmetry, necessity and sufficiency are tested also for the absence of the three outcomes, as well as the absence of conditions is tested both for the outcomes and their absence. Only relevant results (over the conventional

[146] In Appendix 11 are reported all the solution formulas for the alternative operationalization (Table 39 to Table 41).
[147] Schneider and Wagemann (2012, 165–77).

consistency threshold of 0.75) will be reported. Deviant and typical cases are analysed in Chapter 8 in order to assess whether the introduction of the levels of stigma is a difference-maker in explaining the social acceptability of populism. All analyses are performed using the free software R, in particular the package 'Set methods: Functions for Set-Theoretic Multi-Method Research and Advanced QCA' (Medzihorsky et al. 2016).

Explaining the social acceptability of populism

This section examines the presence of necessary and sufficient conditions for the social acceptability of populism (it includes all manifestos analysed, both right-wing and left-wing). The conditions tested are low levels of accountability and responsiveness (D), poor economic performance (E), high levels of corruption (C) and of ideological convergence (CNVG). The levels of stigma associated to the fascist past will be introduced in Chapter 8.

The analysis for necessity evaluates whether the outcome is a subset of any of the analysed conditions, meaning that the condition appears every time the outcome is present. I check whether each condition has an inclusion coefficient possibly close to 1 and never below 0.9. This is not the case, and the same applies to the absence of the outcome. The analysis for the absence of the conditions, in line with the theoretical expectations, does not produce any significant result. This means that none of the four conditions (neither their absence) is a necessary condition for the presence or the absence of the outcome. The plot between the outcome and each individual condition is reported in Appendix 5 (Figure 30).

The next step consists in assessing sufficiency, in other words to determine which (combination of) conditions are sufficient for the presence (or absence) of the outcome. If a condition (or configuration of conditions) is sufficient, it means that it is a subset of the outcome, and this implies that when the configuration is present, also the outcome must be present. Each case, a certain country in a certain time-point, can be a member of only one configuration of conditions (following the crisp approach that for each condition a case can only be in or out, below or above the 0.5 threshold).

This is visualized in the truth table (Table 10), which displays 16 rows because the tested conditions (k) are 4 and this means that there are 16 possible configurations (2^k). The column "Populism" indicates whether a certain configuration leads to the outcome (1: high social acceptability of populism) or to its absence (0: low social acceptability of populism).

The logical reminders, configurations which are not covered by any empirically observed case, are represented by the last four rows. They represent configurations of conditions which are not covered by any empirical case here analysed. In the most parsimonious solution, assumptions are made about the outcome attributed to these configurations. The level of inclusion shows to what extent each configuration is sufficient for the outcome, and the last column indicates which cases cover that configuration.

Table 10 – Truth Table: Total Populism

Conditions				**Outcome**			
C	D	E	CNVG	Populism	n	Inclusion	Cases
1	1	0	0	1	1	0.9859	AT_94
1	1	1	0	1	1	0.9627	FR_12
0	1	1	0	1	2	0.9613	DE_13,UK_95
0	1	1	1	1	1	0.9375	AT_13
0	0	1	1	1	2	0.9246	CH_95,CH_11
1	1	1	1	1	4	0.9246	FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
1	1	0	1	1	2	0.9070	DE_02,FR_02
0	1	0	0	1	2	0.8992	AT_02,DE_94
0	0	1	0	1	2	0.8874	NL_12,SE_94
0	0	0	0	0	1	0.8710	CH_03
0	1	0	1	0	1	0.8703	UK_03
0	0	0	1	0	4	0.7548	NL_94,NL_02,SE_02,SE_14
1	0	0	0	?	0	-	
1	0	0	1	?	0	-	
1	0	1	0	?	0	-	
1	0	1	1	?	0	-	

This analysis considers only configurations with an inclusion coefficient higher than 0.88. This means that the first nine rows indicate the configurations that are considered as sufficient for the outcome: 17 out of 23 cases are therefore covered. All the other rows are not considered as sufficient configuration for the outcome. The inclusion threshold is rather high (.88) because of the distribution of the cases concerning the outcome.

Since a majority of cases is more in than out for the presence of the outcome, only those rows with a higher explanatory power are included. Normally a clear jump in the

coefficients would be used, but in this case there is no clear jump.[148] Therefore .88 seems to provide a reasonable cutting point. Importantly, the same criteria will be applied when explaining the two outcomes: populism in right-wing and left-wing party manifestos. Moreover, the choice of the cut point is not the most relevant for the type of analysis performed in this study: since the crucial point is the difference between the two models, with and without the levels of stigma of the fascist past, what ultimately matters is that the same inclusion point is selected in the two models in order to observe whether more or less cases can be explained.

The truth table is then logically minimized through a Boolean process (performed via software) that identifies irrelevant conditions in a particular configuration. The first solution is called complex or conservative, and it makes no assumptions on the configurations for which there are no observed cases (logical reminders). The intermediate solution, on the other hand, includes directional expectation: in other words each condition is supposed to trigger high levels of social acceptability of populism. Finally, for the most parsimonious solution a hypothetical outcome is allocated to the configurations without observed cases as long as this leads to a simpler (more parsimonious) solution. For this type of solution, it is important there are no simplifying assumptions (certain configurations without an observed outcome might be assumed to explain both the outcome and its absence, which would be a contradiction).[149]

[148] Other inclusion cuts have been tested but they are not reported for reasons of space. The results remain consistent with the expectations.
[149] See Ragin (1987) about different ways to treat logical reminders.

All the sufficient rows with inclusion higher than .88 were included after checking also for contradictory rows (configurations with observed cases leading both to the outcome and to its absence). For reasons of space I will avoid presenting here the conservative and intermediate solutions (Table 28 in Appendix 6) as well as all those solutions failing to display levels of inclusion and coverage beyond a coefficient of .75. The formula obtained for the most parsimonious solution is:

C + E + D*cnvg=> POP

This means that high levels of corruption (C), or (+) a low economic performance (E), or a combination of low accountability and responsiveness with (*) a low ideological convergence of the political space (D*cnvg) are sufficient to explain the social acceptability of populism. Figure 19 represents the plot between the solution formula and the social acceptability of populism.[150]

[150] All the cases are displayed in Figure 19. However, typical cases and deviant cases consistency (in relation to sufficient terms or single terms) are not interpretable through this plot. When relevant, this is done separately (e.g. Appendix 8). What is interpretable and relevant for process tracing and causality mechanisms when plotting the whole solution like in this case, is the comparison between deviant cases coverage and individually irrelevant cases (Rohlfing and Schneider 2013).

Figure 19: Plot with Solution for Total levels of Populism

This solution has an inclusion coefficient of .791 indicating that generally cases fall quite close to the line (the effect of the configuration is predicted quite precisely), and a consistency coefficient of .767 indicating that some deviant cases coverage have a higher score in the solution rather than in the outcome (upper-left quadrant): Switzerland and the United Kingdom in 2003, and the Netherlands in 2002. They are therefore truly logically contradictory cases, because despite the absence of the solution they do have a high social acceptability of populism, therefore there must be another condition that was not included in this model but that explains the presence of the outcome. Moreover, there are

several deviant cases for consistency. They should be members of the outcome, but for some reason they are not: Sweden in 1994, Austria and Germany in 2002, France in 2012 and Italy in 2013.

Explaining the social acceptability of right-wing populism

This section repeats the analysis, but this time trying to explain the social acceptability of *right-wing* populism only. Once again, all the conditions are tested, apart from the levels of stigma. The analysis does not indicate any necessary condition for the presence (or the absence) of the outcome. Also the absence of conditions does not give any result. All the coefficients are far from the .9 threshold typically assumed to positively indicate necessity. This means that none of the four conditions (neither their absence) is a necessary condition for the presence or the absence of the outcome. The plot between the outcome and each individual condition is reported in Appendix 5 (Figure 31).

The next step consists in assessing sufficiency, in other words the aim is to determine which (combination of) conditions are sufficient for the presence (or absence) of the outcome. The analysis reveals that no configuration is sufficient for the absence of the outcome. The truth table presents the results for the presence of the outcome, and it is composed of 16 rows displaying all the possible configurations. For the subsequent

Table 11 – Truth Table: Right-wing Populism

Conditions				Outcome			
C	D	E	CNVG	Right-Wing Populism	n	Inclusion	Cases
1	1	0	0	1	1	0.9327	AT_94
1	1	1	0	1	1	0.9266	FR_12
1	1	1	1	1	4	0.9121	FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
0	0	1	1	1	2	0.8399	CH_95,CH_11
0	1	1	1	1	1	0.8356	AT_13
0	0	1	0	0	2	0.8257	NL_12,SE_94
0	0	0	0	0	1	0.8233	CH_03
1	1	0	1	0	2	0.8184	DE_02,FR_02
0	1	1	0	0	2	0.7887	DE_13,UK_95
0	1	0	0	0	2	0.7829	AT_02,DE_94
0	1	0	1	0	1	0.7740	UK_03
0	0	0	1	0	4	0.6914	NL_94,NL_02,SE_02,SE_14
1	0	0	0	?	0	-	
1	0	0	1	?	0	-	
1	0	1	0	?	0	-	
1	0	1	1	?	0	-	

minimization only configurations with an inclusion coefficient of at least 0.83 are included.[151] This means that only the first five rows indicate the configurations that are considered as sufficient for the outcome: 9 out of 23 cases are therefore covered. The other rows are not considered as sufficient configuration for the outcome.

[151] An inclusion cut of .81 (closer to the jump in the values) gives extremely similar results.

The truth table (Table 11) is then logically minimized through a Boolean process (performed through the software) that identifies irrelevant conditions in a particular configuration. The conservative and the intermediate solutions are reported in Appendix 6 (Table 29). A high social acceptability of right-wing populism is explained by the following parsimonious formula:

C*cnvg + E*CNVG => POP_R

However, the solution plotted in Figure 20 cannot be accepted since the coefficient for coverage is too low (.600). This indicates that this solution formula explains just 60% of the cases. Although it can be considered a sufficient path to explain the outcome because the empirical information does not deviate much from a perfect subset relation (.896 the coefficient for inclusion), it also covers a small part of the outcome.

In fact, as the plot shows, many cases are in the upper-left quadrant, thus being deviant in kind because their high social acceptability of populism remains unexplained by the solution formula. The deviant cases with a higher score in the solution rather than in the outcome represent around a third of the cases, and this indicates the necessity to include another condition in the model

.

Figure 20: Plot with Solution for Right-wing Populism

Explaining the social acceptability of left-wing populism

This section repeats the analysis, but this time trying to explain the social acceptability of *left-wing* populism only. Once again, all the conditions are tested, apart from the levels of stigma. The analysis does not indicate any necessary condition for the presence (or the absence) of the outcome. Also the absence of conditions does not give any result. This means that none of the four conditions (neither their absence) is a necessary condition for the presence or the absence of the outcome. The coefficients are always way below the conventional .9 threshold for necessity.

Table 12 – Truth table: Left-wing Populism

Conditions				Outcome			
C	D	E	CNVG	Left-Wing Populism	n	Inclusion	Cases
0	1	1	0	1	2	0.9128	DE_13,UK_95
0	1	1	1	1	1	0.9125	AT_13
1	1	0	0	1	1	0.8854	AT_94
0	0	1	1	1	2	0.8645	CH_95,CH_11
0	1	0	1	1	1	0.8450	UK_03
0	1	0	0	1	2	0.8418	AT_02,DE_94
0	0	1	0	0	2	0.8123	NL_12,SE_94
1	1	1	0	0	1	0.8078	FR_12
1	1	0	1	0	2	0.7978	DE_02,FR_02
0	0	0	0	0	1	0.7555	CH_03
1	1	1	1	0	4	0.7388	FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
0	0	0	1	0	4	0.7022	NL_94,NL_02,SE_02,SE_14
1	0	0	0	?	0	-	
1	0	0	1	?	0	-	
1	0	1	0	?	0	-	
1	0	1	1	?	0	-	

The plot between the outcome and each individual condition is reported in Appendix 5 (Figure 32).

The next step consists in assessing sufficiency, in other words to determine which (combination of) conditions are sufficient for the presence (or absence) of the outcome. The truth table (Table 12) is composed of 16 rows displaying all the possible configurations, and for the subsequent minimization only configurations with an inclusion

coefficient higher than .84 are included.[152] This means that only the first six rows indicate the configurations that are sufficient for the outcome: 9 out of 23 cases are therefore covered, the other rows are not considered as sufficient configuration for the outcome.

The truth table is then logically minimized through a Boolean process (performed through the software) that identifies irrelevant conditions in a particular configuration. Both the conservative and the intermediate solutions are identical, and they are reported together with the details concerning the parsimonious solutions in Appendix 6 (Table 30). There are four different most parsimonious solutions, none of which reaches a satisfactory coefficient for coverage, and therefore none of them can be accepted:

S1: c*D + (c*E*CNVG + C*e*cnvg) => POP_L

S2: c*D + (c*E*CNVG + D*e*cnvg) => POP_L

S3: c*D + (C*e*cnvg + d*E*CNVG) => POP_L

S4: c*D + (d*E*CNVG + D*e*cnvg) => POP_L

None of the solutions can be used given the low coverage. Moreover, even if the coefficient for coverage would have been acceptable (above .750), these solutions are extremely difficult to interpret. What they all share is the first term of the solution: c*D.

[152] Again, there is no clear jump in the inclusion. Given the membership of the cases in the outcome a rather high threshold is used. Higher thresholds have been tried as well, but they give less interpretable solutions.

Figure 21: Plot with Solution for Left-wing Populism

It represents a combination of low corruption and low accountability and responsiveness. Alternatively, a very complex combination of two terms (d*E*CNVG + D*e*cnvg) constitutes the second term of the solution. In Figure 21, it is represented the plot between the outcome and the fourth solution, which has an inclusion coefficient of .782 and a coefficient for coverage of .708 (the highest among the four solutions).

Conclusions

The first step of analysis, consisting in assessing necessary and sufficient conditions for the outcome to occur, produced mixed results. The model tested in this chapter focuses on short-term supply and demand side factors derived from the relevant literature, and seems to explain quite well the overall levels of social acceptability of populism. None of the single conditions is necessary for the outcome to be present (or absent), but high levels of corruption, or a poor economic performance, or a combination of low accountability and responsiveness with a low convergence of the ideological space (expressed in Boolean algebra as C + E + D*cnvg => POP) are sufficient to explain the social acceptability of populism in more than 75% of the cases (.767) while having an acceptable coefficient for inclusion (.791).

Three cases do not display high levels of populism's social acceptability although they are member of the solution: the Netherlands in 2002, Switzerland and the United Kingdom in 2003. The goal is to explain these cases by introducing the levels of stigma in the model, because the idea is that short-term supply and demand side factors interact with cultural opportunity structures in determining the social acceptability of populism.

Concerning the social acceptability of right-wing populism, once again none of the single conditions is necessary for the outcome to be present (or absent), and it was also impossible to find a sufficient path to explain the social acceptability of right-wing populism. In fact, the parsimonious solution cannot be accepted, since only a very small

part of the cases is explained (coverage .600). Also populism in left-wing manifestos is not explained by any solution formula since no conditions are necessary for the outcome (or its absence) and the coverage of the four, all very complex, final solution formulas is always lower than the conventional .75 threshold.

From this first step of analysis, one can conclude that the short-term conditions typically linked to the presence of high levels of populism have indeed some resonance with the *overall social acceptability of populism*. However, when trying to disentangle the different types of populism, this model seems to fail explaining the social acceptability of both left-wing and right-wing populism. This might reflect the choice of the conditions which aimed at explaining, indeed, the overall social acceptability of populism.

The aim of the next chapter consists in combining the four conditions already tested, with a long-term, cultural element: the levels of stigma attached to the fascist past. The model is tested a second time with the addition of the stigma levels, in order to find a configuration of conditions which can better explain (inclusion) a broader range of cases (coverage) for the social acceptability of populism as well as for its right-wing and left-wing manifestations.

Chapter 8 – The Stigma of the Fascist Past: a Game-Changer

This chapter repeats the analysis of the conditions for the social acceptability of populism, this time introducing into the model a fifth variable: *the levels of stigma attached to the fascist past*. The three outcomes and all the other conditions remain the same, as well as their calibration. Also the cases remain the same: eight countries taken in three time points, with the exclusion of Italy in 2001, for a total of 23 cases.

The chapter follows a structure identical to the one used for the previous step of analysis. The results of the fsQCA are presented first for the overall social acceptability of populism, and then for the two sub-categories. In addition, it is discussed whether the new solutions are able to explain some of the cases that in the previous step of analysis deviated for coverage or inclusion. In case the coefficients of inclusion and coverage improve after introducing the new condition, this is not automatically a sign that the causal mechanism works as hypothesized. In fact, it is necessary to examine which deviant cases can be explained with the new model compared to the previous one without levels of stigma as a condition.

The relevant row lines of the truth tables are presented, and the plots illustrating where the cases fall when considering the relationship between the most parsimonious solution and the outcome. The inclusion cut for the process of minimization is maintained exactly the same as the one used in Chapter 7 in order to grant a perfect comparability of the

results. Appendix 8 (Figure 33) shows the distribution of cases in the newly introduced condition.[153]

Explaining the social acceptability of populism

This section examines the presence of necessary and sufficient conditions for the social acceptability of populism. The conditions tested are low levels of accountability and responsiveness (D), poor economic performance (E), high levels of corruption (C) and of ideological convergence (CNVG). Moreover, low levels of stigma are included in the model (S). Appendix 8 shows the plot between each of the three outcomes with stigma alone (Figure 34: Total Populism and Stigma to Figure 36).

The analysis for necessity does not produce any result. Low levels of stigma are not, in isolation, a necessary condition for the presence of high levels of social acceptability of populism. This is a first, important, result. In isolation, the levels of stigma cannot explain the social acceptability of populism. If they do so, this can only be the case when there is an interaction with other conditions.

This time, since the conditions included in the model are 5, the possible configurations are 32. Hence, only the rows above the inclusion cut (0.88) are displayed (Table 13).[154]

[153] In Appendix 12 all the solution formulas for the alternative operationalization are reported (Table 42 to Table 44).
[154] The inclusion cut is maintained identical to the one used in Chapter 7 for maximum comparability.

Configurations which are considered as not sufficient for the outcome (below the inclusion cut) as well as logical reminders (which will be considerably more since the

Table 13 – Truth Table: Total Populism with Stigma

Conditions					Outcome			
C	D	E	CNVG	S	Populism	n	Inclusion	cases
1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0.9975	FR_02
1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0.9851	AT_94
1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0.9657	UK_10
1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0.9608	FR_12
0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0.9573	NL_12
0	0	1	1	1	1	2	0.9569	CH_95,CH_11
0	1	1	0	0	1	2	0.9561	DE_13,UK_95
0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.9525	AT_13
1	1	1	1	1	1	3	0.9384	FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0.9349	DE_94
0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0.9216	CH_03
0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0.9050	UK_03
1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0.8911	DE_02
0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0.8883	AT_02
0	0	0	1	1	1	2	0.8815	NL_94,NL_02

number of cases is stable while the number of possible configurations doubled) will not be displayed for reasons of space. The logical reminders are now 15, and assumptions made about them for the parsimonious solution are reported in Appendix 7 (Table 31) together with the most conservative solution. Concerning the assessment of sufficiency, by including the levels of stigma, the most parsimonious solution is now more elegant, interpretable, and composed of two terms:

Figure 22: Plot with Solution for Total Populism (With Stigma)

S + D => POP

The inclusion coverage has a coefficient of .782, which is slightly lower than before (.791), but a coverage coefficient of .859, which is considerably higher than before (.767).[155] Now, testing the model with the inclusion of stigma, *a low level of accountability and responsiveness (D) or a low stigmatization of the fascist past (S) are both relevant paths*

[155] This is not surprising, since the coefficients for inclusion and coverage are a trade-off between the two measures (Schneider and Wagemann 2012).

for the presence of the outcome (plotted in Figure 22). Interestingly, the presence of S alone has a coefficient for inclusion of .800, one for raw coverage of .683 (indicating which share of the outcome is explained by S) and one for unique coverage of .180 (indicating which share of the outcome is exclusively explained by a certain term).[156]

At this stage of the analysis, there is an additional element which should be considered: the variation of the deviant cases between the first model without the levels of stigma, and the deviant cases in the model after the introduction of the levels of stigma (Bennett and Elman 2006; Schneider and Rohlfing 2016). In other words, it is crucial to observe *which cases that were not explained by testing the four conditions extrapolated from the literature can now be explained by taking into consideration the levels of stigma*, in order to assess whether the new condition improves the explanatory power of the model. There are two categories of deviant cases: consistency (or inclusion) and coverage. The former constitutes a puzzle because it points to cases that should be members of the outcome but, in fact, they are not. The latter is a puzzle because it includes cases that, conversely, are members of the outcome for reasons not disclosed by the QCA solution.

The previous model produced three deviant cases coverage: the Netherlands in 2002, the United Kingdom and Switzerland in 2003. They displayed high levels of populism's social acceptability for reasons not explained by the solution C + E + D*cnvg => POP. However, with the new solution formula D + S => POP, they are not deviant cases coverage anymore. Low levels of accountability and responsiveness combined or a low

[156] See Ragin (2006).

stigma, can now explain why these three cases show high (the Netherlands 2002 and United Kingdom 2003) or very high (Switzerland 2003) levels of social acceptability of populism. By looking at the truth table, it is clear that in the cases of CH_03 and NL_02 the change is due to the low levels of stigma, since their levels of accountability and responsiveness were not problematic. In the case of UK_03, however, the presence of the outcome could be explained by the low quality of the democratic process.[157]

Finally, the model with four conditions did show several deviant case consistency (or inclusion). Five cases which were members of the solution were not members of the outcome. The model with the levels of stigma of the fascist past produces very similar results, with the only exception of the Netherlands in 1994 becoming a deviant case consistency while Sweden in 1994 is no longer one.

Explaining the social acceptability of right-wing populism

This section examines the presence of necessary and sufficient conditions for the social acceptability of *right-wing* populism. The conditions tested are low levels of accountability and responsiveness (D), poor economic performance (E), high levels of corruption (C) and of ideological convergence (CNVG). Moreover, the also low levels of stigma of the fascist past are included in the model (S).

[157] Going even further into the details, the United Kingdom shows alarmingly low levels of government capability (pertaining to responsiveness) and competition (pertaining to accountability), and this is true not only for the 2003 elections but also for the other two decades.

Table 14 – Truth Table: Right-wing Populism with Stigma

Conditions					Outcome			
C	D	E	CNVG	S	Right-Wing Populism	n	Inclusion	cases
1	1	1	1	1	1	3	0.989457	FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0.98745	AT_94
1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0.985736	FR_02
1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0.9742	FR_12
0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0.953105	NL_12
0	0	1	1	1	1	2	0.94606	CH_95,CH_11
0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.940492	AT_13
0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0.934618	CH_03
0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0.919191	AT_02
0	0	0	1	1	1	2	0.881093	NL_94,NL_02
1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0.87253	UK_10

The analysis for necessity does not produce any result. Low levels of stigma are not, in isolation, a necessary condition for the presence of the outcome. This is a first, important, result. In isolation, the levels of stigma cannot explain the social acceptability of populism. If they do so, this can only be the case when there is an interaction with other conditions.

Once again, since the conditions included in the model are five, the possible configurations are 32. Hence, only the rows above the inclusion cut (0.83) will be displayed (Table 14). Configurations which are considered as not sufficient for the

outcome (below the inclusion cut), as well as logical reminders, are not be displayed for reasons of space.

The logical reminders (configurations with no observed cases) are now 15, and assumptions made about them for the parsimonious solution are reported in Appendix 7 (Table 32) together with the most conservative solution. The cases assigned to the 11 sufficient configurations are now 15. Concerning the assessment of sufficiency, by including the levels of stigma, the two most parsimonious solutions are:

S1: S + (C*E) => POP_R

S2: S + (E*CNVG) => POP_R

The two solutions have respectively an inclusion coefficient of .856 and .846, and a coverage coefficient of .804 and .819. *Both solutions constitute a remarkable improvement compared to the solution obtained without stigma levels*, which had a coverage coefficient lower than .750.[158] The first term of the two solutions indicates that a low level of stigma (S) is sufficient for the social acceptability of right-wing populism (POP_R), while a combination a bad economic performance with either high levels of corruption (C*E) or with a high ideological convergence (E*CNVG) constitute the second term of the two solutions. *Even more importantly, it is possible to argue that a low level of stigma is per se a sufficient condition for the presence of the outcome*, since

[158] Before it was C*cnvg + E*CNVG => POP_R, with a coefficient for inclusion of .896 and a coefficient for coverage of .600.

Figure 23: Plot with Solution for Right-wing Populism (With Stigma)

it has an inclusion coefficient of .885 and a raw coverage of .773 (with a unique coverage of .241, meaning that *stigma alone can explain almost a quarter of the cases*).

Concerning the variation of the deviant cases, in this particular case, it makes no difference which of the two parsimonious solutions is selected. Figure 23 represents the second solution, which has a slightly higher coverage. It is crucial to observe which cases that were not explained by testing the four conditions extrapolated from the literature can now be explained by taking into consideration the idea of stigma, in order to assess

whether and possibly how the new condition improves the explanatory power of the model. The model with four conditions produced six deviant cases coverage: Switzerland in 2003, the Netherlands in 2002 and 2012, Austria and France in 2002, the United Kingdom in 2003. Tellingly, with the new solution formulas only the United Kingdom in 2003 is still a deviant case coverage, while all the other five cases can now be explained.

While before these cases were in the upper-left quadrant, leaving the presence of the outcome unexplained by the solution, now only one case remains. At this stage, none of the conditions analysed explains the high social acceptability of right-wing populism in the United Kingdom in 2003. However, the case is also rather close to the crossover point, therefore a different operationalization or cutting point might have produced different results. On the other hand, given the fact that also the United Kingdom in the 2010s shows rather high levels of right-wing populism's social acceptability, *one might consider the possibility that the type of collective memory assigned to the country, heroization, actually does not produce the high level of stigmatization of the fascist past that was expected*. Moreover, as mentioned above, the levels of accountability and responsiveness in the country are particularly low.

Apart from the United Kingdom in 2003, however, *high levels of right-wing populism's social acceptability are now explained much better*, and this is clearly linked to the inclusion of stigma of the fascist past of the model. Austria, France, Switzerland and the Netherlands have low or very low levels of stigma of the fascist past because of their collective memories based either on cancellation or victimization, and this makes it

possible to explain why they right-wing populism is socially acceptable although the other conditions were not supposed to trigger populism. After the inclusion of stigma in the model, these cases moved from the upper-left quadrant and now the outcome is explained.

Finally, the previous model with only four conditions did not show any deviant case consistency (or inclusion). All the cases which were not members of the outcome were also not members of the solution. The new model, in contrast, produces a deviant case coverage: the Netherlands in 1994 (bottom-right quadrant). Although it is a member of the solution, it is not member of the outcome. This time it is not a borderline case, because the case clearly belongs to the solution but displays a very low social acceptability of right-wing populism. One might argue that the measurement was biased by the fact that the party D66 has been coded as left-wing according to the degree of radicalism of its party manifesto and not as centre or right-wing as it is often described by experts. In case it was coded as right-wing, however, the social acceptability of right-wing populism would have still been lower compared to the expectations (the level would have been around 230, with the crossover point still very distant at 418).

Explaining the social acceptability of left-wing populism

This section examines the presence of necessary and sufficient conditions for the social acceptability of *left-wing* populism. The conditions tested are low levels of accountability and responsiveness (D), poor economic performance (E), high levels of corruption (C)

and of ideological convergence (CNVG). Moreover, also low levels of stigma (S) are included in the model.

The analysis for necessity does not produce any result. Low levels of stigma are not, in isolation, a necessary condition for the social acceptability of populism. Once again, since the conditions included in the model are 5, the possible configurations are 32. Hence, only the rows above the inclusion cut (0.84) are displayed (Table 15). Configurations which are considered as not sufficient for the outcome (below the inclusion cut) as well as logical reminders will not be displayed for reasons of space. The logical reminders (configurations with no observed cases) are now 15. The conservative and intermediate solutions are reported in Appendix 7 (Table 33). The cases assigned to the 10 sufficient configurations are now 12. Concerning the assessment of sufficiency, by including the levels of stigma, the most parsimonious solution path is now:

C*e + D*s + c*E*S => POP_L.

The solution (plotted in Figure 24) has an inclusion coefficient of .761 and a coverage coefficient of .733. Therefore it is not a solution that can be accepted as sufficient for the presence of the outcome. Three solution terms appear in the most parsimonious solution: high corruption and good economy (C*e), bad accountability and responsiveness but high stigma (D*s), low corruption with a bad economic performance and low stigma (c*E*S).

Table 15 – Truth Table: Left-wing Populism with Stigma

Conditions					Outcome			
C	D	E	CNVG	S	Left-Wing Populism	n	Inclusion	cases
1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0.9443	UK_10
0	1	1	0	0	1	2	0.9253	DE_13,UK_95
0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.9053	AT_13
1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0.8813	DE_02
1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0.8782	AT_94
0	0	1	1	1	1	2	0.8779	CH_95,CH_11
0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0.8772	UK_03
0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0.8769	DE_94
0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0.8689	NL_12
1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0.8430	FR_02

The solution (plotted in Figure 24) has an inclusion coefficient of .761 and a coverage coefficient of .733. Therefore it is not a solution that can be accepted as sufficient for the presence of the outcome. Three solution terms appear in the most parsimonious solution: high corruption and good economy (C*e), bad accountability and responsiveness but high stigma (D*s), low corruption with a bad economic performance and low stigma (c*E*S).

Figure 24: Plot with solution for left-wing populism with stigma

Compared to the solutions obtained before the introduction of stigma the coefficient for coverage is higher, but still not high enough. Interestingly, moreover, the role of stigma seems to be conflicting: both high and low levels of stigma are present in the solution.

Taking into consideration deviant cases, it appears clearly that a higher coefficient for coverage is not the only parameter to observe. In fact, while the previous model produced four deviant cases coverage, they are now five. Moreover, while before there was only one deviant case consistency (or inclusion), now there are five cases which were supposed to display high levels of social acceptability of left-wing populism but do not:

France (2002 and 2012), Germany (2002), and Italy (1994 and 2013). In general, it the new model does not seem to work better.

Conclusions

The second step of analysis tested the same conditions and outcomes, but also introduced a fifth condition: the levels of stigmatization of the fascist past. The results can be considered as more or less satisfactory according to the three different outcomes that are included in the model. *Results are satisfactory to explain the overall social acceptability of populism, very satisfactory for right-wing populism, and unsatisfactory for left-wing populism*. Moreover, none of the models produced any necessary condition for any of the outcomes, which might signal the importance of considering new conditions in future research, and on the other hand testifies the extreme variance when dealing with empirical manifestations of populism and its social acceptability across countries.

Concerning the overall social acceptability of populism, by introducing the levels of stigma the old and rather complex solution (C + E + D*cnvg => POP) is replaced by a new, more elegant one: S + D => POP. The levels of stigma now help explaining 14 cases, thus making the new solution more precise but also able to explain more cases: the Netherlands in 2002, the United Kingdom and Switzerland in 2003 can now be explained thanks to the introduction of the levels of stigma.

Concerning the social acceptability of left-wing populism, after introducing the levels of stigma the solution still fails to reach an acceptable coefficient for coverage, thus making the solution itself not strong enough to denote sufficiency. This aspect will be further investigated in the conclusions, but it seems safe to assume that left-wing populism answers to different logics and thrives under different conditions compared to right-wing populism, and future research should try to understand which are the specific conditions triggering left-wing populism.

The most outstanding results, however, concern the social acceptability of right-wing populism. After introducing the levels of stigma the old solution (C*cnvg + E*CNVG => POP_R) is replaced by the alternative new, better ones:

1) S + (C*E) => POP_R;

2) S + (E*CNVG) => POP_R.

Low levels of stigma are in both cases sufficient in isolation to explain the social acceptability of right-wing populism (raw coverage is .773). Both solutions, moreover, can explain five deviant cases coverage: Switzerland in 2003, the Netherlands in 2002 and 2012, Austria and France in 2002. The United Kingdom in 2003, however, remains unexplained, and it should be used for a case-study in future research.

From this second step of the analysis, one can conclude that when considering the levels of stigma of the fascist past, the social acceptability of populism can be better explained. More in detail, while the previous model produced a particularly unsatisfactory coefficient for the coverage of the solution which was supposed to explain the social acceptability of

right-wing populism, it is precisely this aspect that the new model contributes to grasp. It seems that the stigma of the fascist past is mainly linked to the acceptability of right-wing populism. The fact that the overall model seems to improve after the introduction of stigma levels should be lined mainly to the fact that of right-wing populism is better explained, while the acceptability of left-wing populism is poorly explained before as well as after the introduction of stigma.

Looking at the typology of collective memory previously elaborated, some remarks can be made at this stage. Countries characterized by a narrative based on *victimization* display a high social acceptability of populism and more in particular of right-wing populism. This is true also when other conditions seem not to constitute the perfect thriving ground for populism. In Austria and France the social acceptability of right-wing populism can be explained only after the introduction of the levels of stigma in the model, and indeed they are both characterized by collective memories based on victimization. Italy seems to follow the same trend, but the social acceptability of right-wing populism is lower than expected. This can be linked to two possible explanations: either to the presence of additional conditions which were not considered or to the fact that Italian political parties are more populist in the daily communication rather than in their manifestos.

Countries characterized by a narrative based on *cancellation* also display a high social acceptability of populism. This remains true also when other conditions seem not to constitute the perfect thriving ground for populism. In Switzerland and the Netherlands,

the social acceptability of right-wing populism can be explained only after the introduction of the levels of stigma in the model, and indeed they are both characterized by collective memories based on cancellation. Italy seems to follow the same trend, but the social acceptability of populism is lower than expected. This can be linked to two possible explanations: either to the presence of additional conditions which were not considered or to the fact that Italian political parties are more populist in the daily communication rather than in their manifestos.

Conclusions

American historian Robert Kagan wrote: "This is how fascism comes to America, not with jackboots and salutes […] but with a television huckster, a phony billionaire, a textbook egomaniac tapping into popular resentments and insecurities."[159] Kagan is describing Donald Trump, but the portrait fits many European populist actors. Ten years after witnessing a populist *Zeitgeist*, in 2017 it is possible to speak of a *fascist Zeitgeist*. Fascism can eventually gather large crowds in *Piazza Venezia* or the *Nuremberg Stadium*, but it usually starts by tapping into popular resentments and insecurities. Last time it was the aftermath of World War I and the *Great Depression*, this time it might be the exploitation of the so-called 'refugee crises' combined with yet another economic crisis. Right-wing populist movements all over the world are doing precisely this: they mobilize resentment by offering redemption from the 'old politics'. They promise to deal with problems more effectively, faster, and of course in line with the *volonté générale*.

In Hungary a well as Poland, in the United States and the Philippines, many are concerned with the illiberal turn of the democratic process. Indeed, refusing the 'old politics' usually means to refuse and to contest liberal democracy: its pluralism, minority protection, and division of powers. At stake, there is the very idea of democracy that Europe developed after 1945 as a reaction to fascism, Nazism and World War II. It is important to celebrate the *vox populi* and to denounce the intrigues and corruption of the

[159] Washington Post May 18, 2016: "This is how fascism comes to America." Available online (consulted in October 2017): https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/this-is-how-fascism-comes-to-america/2016/05/17/c4e32c58-1c47-11e6-8c7b-6931e66333e7_story.html?utm_term=.a86427aa3905

elites. This is actually an essential part of democracy itself. Doubtfully, however, the return in contemporary Germany of the Nazi slogan *Lügenpresse* ('lying press') should be welcomed as a sign of a healthy liberal democracy.

Compared to previous waves of populism that characterized Russia, Europe, and the Americas in the 19th century, socio-economic turbulence and political disenchantment are not the only elements that should be considered when trying to make sense of the presence of populist discourses. After World War II, *right-wing* populist discourses have become socially unacceptable in certain countries but not in others. While Germany and Sweden have restricted illiberal political ideas to a *no-go area of the public debate*, other countries such as Italy, Austria, and France did not stigmatize the fascist past and therefore right-wing populism maintained its *Salonfähigkeit*.

The most important lesson that one should learn from this study, is that *memory matters*. The process of memory-building is here analyzed as a sort of 'black-box', without investigating in detail *how* the collective memory of the fascist past was formed, but rather the outcome of that conflict. The way in which a country collectively remembers its past defines its new identity and national political culture by tracing *a red line between acceptable and taboo ideas of power*. School manuals, movies, TV shows, debates, civic education, parliamentary debates, laws, holydays, street names, official celebrations, debates among historians, and in general all the cluster of ideas conveyed by popular culture: *all of this matters*, and it can generate the collective antibodies to resist against

the fascist idea of power, or it can leave a country ready to fall again down the same, tragic mistakes that led to World War II.

This topic is more relevant than ever because the volatile, short-term socio-economic conditions for the success of populism are all lined up. The *Great Recession* made inequalities grow while feeding citizens with insecurities based on feelings such as *relative deprivation* and loss of *social status*. The constant flow of migrants has been labelled as an '*invasion*' or as a '*crisis*' and many political entrepreneurs took advantage of the fears thus generated. After *Brexit*, the process of European integration seems to be less a political project and more an economic marriage that can be broken as soon as it is seen as disadvantageous, thus rewarding Eurosceptic actors. The recent political developments seem to confirm that populist actors are increasingly successful. Without a political culture that strongly stigmatizes illiberal elements typical of populism, *fascism is not only a ghost from the past but a threat for the future*.

Indeed, this study clearly shows how the boundaries of 'what can be said' in the public debate heavily vary across countries. Different national political cultures ultimately define these boundaries. Many other factors can be studied in order to grasp the contingent, short-term opportunity structures for populism to thrive, but cultural opportunity structures operate on the long-term and generate a decisive impact on the social acceptability of populist discourses. Therefore, it is essential to link in a more systematic way the literature on populism and the studies on political culture, social stigma, and collective memory.

Figure 25: Mainstream and Non-Mainstream Populism Over Time

Figure 25 shows that populism in recent years is even more present than in the 1970s, when it was mainly a left-wing phenomenon. In particular, it is because of new or niche parties (dotted line) that the presence of populist discourses increased in Western Europe, while mainstream parties (dashed line) do not seem to have followed a process of *populistization*. After almost a century since fascism took power in Italy, most of the people living in Europe today can only have a second-hand experience of what that past meant for millions of people. However it is crucial that each country's role is critically examined, and that responsibilities are not avoided.

The collective re-elaboration of the fascist past can provide a valuable tool to defuse dangerous political discourses when the memory of those events is based on a process of *Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit*. On the other hand, if a country prefers to cancel those memories through *selective amnesia or even self-victimization*, right-wing populism finds no obstacles and becomes socially acceptable. In other words, different political cultures shape the bounds of the legitimate discursive space. For this reason, ideas previously associated with the fascist past now seem *acceptable* in certain countries but not in others.

Importantly, the memory and therefore the stigma associated to the fascist past are effective in explaining the social acceptability of right-wing populism, but not of *left-wing* populism. The social acceptability of left-wing populism follows a different path and cannot be explained by the stigma associated with the fascist past. In Germany, for example, left-wing populism is highly acceptable while right-wing populism has remained completely taboo until the 2017 elections (and is now present mainly in the East, which did not go through a process of culpabilizaiton).

This could be linked to the fact that the fascist past resonates strongly with the present right-wing populist discourses, and therefore the stigma attached to the illiberal elements of fascism does not affect left-wing populist discourses. Nativism and its definition of the people based on exclusionary criteria, for example, is not a characteristic of left-wing populism. This means that the other illiberal elements present in left-wing populist

discourses are not socially penalized because they are not declined in a nativist and nationalist way.

Therefore the social stigma applies to nativist forms of populism, but not to left-wing populism. Liberal democratic regimes are more or less well equipped (according to their own political culture) to reject right-wing populism as a dangerous ideology. It is possible to argue that by building a collective memory in which the whole country takes responsibility and condemns the fascist past, right-wing populism becomes less acceptable. However, there seems to be no answer concerning the acceptability of left-wing populism. Although this might not appear as a problem in contemporary Europe, also left-wing populism proposes an essentially illiberal vision of democracy.

Another issue, only partially explored in this study and that might constitute a fertile ground for future research, is represented by the memory based on *heroization*. A collective memory of heroization has been attributed here to the United Kingdom, and it is also supposed to be present in Eastern Europe. This type of memory, however, should be further investigated because it seems to entail rather low levels of stigma of the fascist past. The United Kingdom displays high levels of social acceptability of both left-wing and right-wing populism, and this has become even clearer after the public debate about Brexit. In absence of a clear stigmatization of the fascist past due to an objective lack of responsibilities and guilt, *pre-existent elements of the national political culture might play a crucial role in determining the degree of stigmatization of populism*. Indeed, it might be

precisely for this reason that *East European countries* display high levels of social acceptability for right-wing populism.

The most obvious application of the theory developed in this work is precisely Eastern Europe. Does the *legacy of Communism* block the social acceptability of left-wing populist discourses? And is there a link with the acceptability of right-wing populism? As already mentioned concerning Eastern Germany, the collective memory developed in the East is based on heroization because *the Soviet Union represented the opposition to fascism* and thus claimed to have no responsibility for the crimes of the regime it replaced. This could explain why, given the absence of a strong stigma of the fascist past, countries like *Hungary, Poland, and Czech Republic* show alarming authoritarian and nativist tendencies in the context of an institutionalized form of populist democracy. Moreover, it might be the case that the memory of Communism made left-wing populist discourses socially *unacceptable*.

The link between the legacies of authoritarian regimes and populist discourses can be investigated also in relation to other countries and regions. Fascism in Europe is only one example of the many authoritarian regimes that characterized the 20th century. The *Communist* past and the collective memories about it, for example, can be investigated not only in Europe but also in Asia. In Latin America, on the other hand, it is possible to study the presence of right-wing and left-wing populism in relationship to different authoritarian regimes such as *Chavismo* in Venezuela and *Peronismo* in Argentina or to the *Pinochet* regime in Chile, just to mention a few examples.

Also Southern Europe offers interesting possibilities to study the impact of collective memories on the social acceptability of populism. For example, it would be extremely interesting to include in future research cases such see Spain, Portugal and Greece which experienced extremely long-lasting authoritarian regimes. As the other cases examined confirm, soon it will be possible to observe what kind of collective memory has developed in those countries. While for other West European countries the time for critical debates was mature between the 1970s and the 1990s, now that more than thirty years passed since the end of those regimes it will be possible to assign a type of mainstream narrative and potential secondary narratives to these three countries.

By studying the legacies of different authoritarian pasts in other regions of the world, it might be necessary to expand or reformulate the typology of collective memory proposed in this study. Moreover, it is possible to imagine that the social acceptability of different ideas of power is linked not only to the legacies of authoritarian regimes, but also to other critical junctures such as colonialism, revolutions, civil wars, and regime changes.

Another element that could be relevant for future research consists in determining the social acceptability of populist discourses by analysing not only party manifestos but also additional elements of the public debate. Political discourses, indeed, circulate on a variety of channels such as TV shows, radio programs, newspapers, websites, and social media. Indeed, political actors still communicate their ideas and programs to the voters through their party manifestos, but the role of other channels is increasingly important.

Moreover, it would be possible to test whether different *media cultures* (and not only political cultures) are linked to different levels of populism's social acceptability.

Democracy is a theoretical utopia, and each achievement on the path towards a more inclusive, just, and representative form of democracy should be defended rather than given for granted. Moreover, even in Western Europe democratic quality can still spread and better incorporate minorities and women into politics, guarantee better income equality, and strengthen the chain of accountability and responsiveness that link the people to their representatives.

The tension between populism and liberal democracy is a crucial element that might determine the types and shapes of future political systems. It is important to observe whether European and non-European countries will choose to stigmatize the illiberal elements of populism or whether, on the other hand, the same illiberal features will become increasingly acceptable also in countries like Germany where they have remained for decades at the periphery of the public debate. Ringing the bell of the *End of History* has never appeared as premature as now, and the future of democracy depends also on how we decide to remember the past.

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Appendices

Appendix 1 – Populism in Manifestos

Table 16 – Descriptive Data about Manifestos

	Number Manifestos	Number Statements	Number Populist Statements	Percentage Populism	Average Populism by Manifesto
1970s	27	1304	84	6.44	4.87
1980s	30	3061	112	3.65	4.27
1990s	39	2718	139	5.11	4.82
2000s	35	3297	148	0.85	4.48
2010s	42	3684	229	6.21	6.51
Total	173	14064	712	1.06	1.21

Table 17 – Average Percentage of Populism in Manifestos (unweighted)

	Total Populism	Right-Wing Populism	Left-Wing Populism
1970s	4.303147	2.088074	6.518221
1980s	4.276575	3.079667	5.473483
1990s	5.099442	4.549077	5.649806
2000s	3.804168	3.980221	3.628116
2010s	6.620512	5.675102	7.565923

Table 18 – Table Average Populism in Manifestos (weighted)

	Right-Wing Populism	Left-Wing Populism	Total Populism
1970s	72.68861	517.7319	295.2103
1980s	172.377	439.0941	305.7355
1990s	263.7608	318.9435	291.3522
2000s	268.4654	123.1031	195.7843
2010s	281.166	307.7309	294.4484

Table 19 – Average Populism per Country (unweighted)

	Right-Wing Populism	Left-Wing Populism	Total Populism
1970s	2.610092	13.52986	16.46131
1980s	5.774376	10.26278	16.03716
1990s	13.64723	9.887161	23.53439
2000s	10.23485	8.811138	19.04599
2010s	17.0253	17.96907	34.00753

Table 20 – Table Average Populism per Country (weighted)

	Right-Wing Populism	Left-Wing Populism	Total Populism
1970s	99.94684	630.3958	730.3426
1980s	323.2068	823.7027	1145.469
1990s	791.2825	595.7903	1387.073
2000s	690.3396	316.5509	1006.89
2010s	843.4979	673.2416	1516.74

Appendix 2 – Populism in Manifestos: Statistical Significance

Table 21 – Statistical Significance Unweighted Populism

Dependent Variable: Percentage of populist statements in manifestos

	All Parties		Mainstream Parties	
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**
Intercept	8.35***	11.35***	9.41***	9.36***
	(2.33)	(2.32)	(2.09)	(2.09)
1970s	-0.08	-3.07	-0.65	-0.60
	(1.90)	(1.86)	(1.87)	(1.87)
1980s	-1.13	-4.12*	-1.03	-0.99
	(1.78)	(1.74)	(1.81)	(1.81)
1990s		-2.99		0.05
		(1.60)		(1.73)
2000s	0.79	-2.20	0.13	0.18
	(1.72)	(1.67)	(1.82)	(1.81)
2010s	2.99		-0.05	
	(1.60)		(1.73)	
Length (cent)	0.56	0.56	-0.18	-0.18
	(1.40)	(1.40)	(1.49)	(1.49)
AIC	1168.50	1168.50	746.16	746.16
BIC	1215.89	1215.89	787.72	787.72
Log Likelihood	-569.25	-569.25	-358.08	-358.08
Num. Obs.	174	174	118	118
Num. Groups: Parties	65	65	41	41
Var: Parties (Intercept)	1.83	1.83	0.80	0.80
Var: Residual	52.17	52.17	37.75	37.75

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Results of two-level regression models with party manifestos nested in parties. All models contain country-dummies (not shown). The observations are 174 because the 5 Star Movement's manifesto is coded both as left-wing and right-wing.

Table 22 – Statistical Significance Weighted Populism

Dependent Variable: Percentage of populist statements in manifestos (weighted)

	All Parties		Mainstream Parties	
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**
Intercept	742.43***	753.96***	822.59***	741.12***
	(175.09)	(174.07)	(181.34)	(182.34)
1970s	-63.12	-74.65	-148.52	-67.05
	(139.67)	(136.70)	(133.17)	(134.69)
1980s	-5.77	-17.30	-37.35	44.12
	-63.12	-74.65	-148.52	-67.05
1990s		-11.53		81.47
		(117.99)		(123.83)
2000s	59.94	48.41	-92.72	-11.25
	(126.43)	(122.94)	(127.41)	(128.34)
2010s	11.53		-81.47	
	(117.99)		(123.83)	
Length_cent	-25.19	-25.19	-110.49	-110.49
	(103.08)	(103.08)	(108.21)	(108.21)
AIC	2553.89	2553.89	1650.13	1650.13
BIC	2601.28	2601.28	1691.69	1691.69
Log Likelihood	-1261.95	-1261.95	-810.07	-810.07
Num. Obs.	174	174	118	118
Num. Groups: Parties	65	65	41	41
Var: Parties (Intercept)	14444.77	14444.77	43751.16	43751.16
Var: Residual	281201.45	281201.45	182489.18	182489.18

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Results of two-level regression models with party manifestos nested in parties. All models contain country-dummies (not shown).

Appendix 3 – Measurement of Populism in Manifestos

Table 23 – Measurement of Populism in Manifestos

Country	Decade	Party-Decade	Statements	Populist Statements	Vote Share	Ideology	Radicalism	Populism (%)	Populism (weighted)
AT	1970	SPÖ_70	37	2	50.4	L	2.9	5.405405	790.0541
AT	1970	ÖVP_70	27	1	42.9	R	1.3	3.703704	206.5556
AT	1970	FPÖ_70	15	0	5.4	L	2.2	0	0
AT	1980	SPÖ_80	97	15	47.6	L	3.1	15.46392	2281.856
AT	1980	ÖVP_80	35	2	43.2	R	1.1	5.714286	271.5429
AT	1980	FPÖ_80	46	3	5	R	2.5	6.521739	81.52174
AT	1990	SPÖ_90	98	7	34.9	L	2.1	7.142857	523.5
AT	1990	ÖVP_90	110	10	27.7	R	3.5	9.090909	881.3636
AT	1990	FPÖ_90	104	11	22.5	R	5.8	10.57692	1380.288
AT	1990	GrÙne_90	31	2	7.3	R	1.7	6.451613	80.06452
AT	1990	LIF_90	22	0	6	R	4.4	0	0
AT	2000	SPÖ_00	105	1	42.3	L	2.2	0.952381	88.62857
AT	2000	ÖVP_00	170	6	36.5	R	3	3.529412	386.4706
AT	2000	FPÖ_00	139	1	10	R	4.6	0.719424	33.09353
AT	2000	GrÙne_00	52	2	9.5	L	3.2	3.846154	116.9231
AT	2010	SPÖ_10	60	2	26.8	L	2.1	3.333333	187.6
AT	2010	ÖVP_10	92	11	24	R	2.1	11.95652	602.6087
AT	2010	FPÖ_10	19	4	20.5	R	4.7	21.05263	2028.421
AT	2010	GrÙne_10	241	17	12.42	L	3	7.053942	262.8299
AT	2010	NEOS_10	79	4	4.96	R	2	5.063291	50.22785
AT	2010	TS_10	144	20	5.73	R	3.6	13.88889	286.5
CH	1970	CVP_70	106	0	20.1	R	1.4	0	0
CH	1970	FDP_70	19	0	22.1	R	2.4	0	0
CH	1970	SVP_70	14	0	9.9	R	4.3	0	0
CH	1970	SP_70	18	1	24.7	L	3.9	5.555556	535.1667
CH	1970	LdU_70	16	1	6	L	1.5	6.25	56.25
CH	1980	CVP_80	25	0	20.2	R	1.2	0	0
CH	1980	FDP_80	30	0	6.9	R	5.6	0	0

Country	Decade	Party-Decade	Statements	Populist Statements	Vote Share	Ideology	Radicalism	Populism (%)	Populism (weighted)
CH	1980	SVP_80	42	0	11.1	R	1.3	0	0
CH	1980	SP_80	17	0	22.8	L	4.4	0	0
CH	1990	CVP_90	33	4	16.8	R	1.3	12.12121	264.7273
CH	1990	FDP_90	26	2	20.2	R	4.3	7.692308	668.1538
CH	1990	GPS_90	53	2	5	L	2.1	3.773585	39.62264
CH	1990	SVP_90	73	5	14.9	R	3.3	6.849315	336.7808
CH	1990	SP_90	43	5	21.8	L	3	11.62791	760.4651
CH	2000	CVP_00	23	0	14.3	R	4.9	0	0
CH	2000	FDP_00	47	6	17.3	R	2.6	12.76596	574.2128
CH	2000	GPS_00	32	1	7.4	L	2.9	3.125	67.0625
CH	2000	SVP_00	169	14	26.7	R	5.2	8.284024	1150.154
CH	2000	SP_00	121	4	23.3	L	4.8	3.305785	369.719
CH	2010	BDP_10	3	0	5.4	R	2.3	0	0
CH	2010	CVP_10	42	0	12.3	R	1.3	0	0
CH	2010	FDP_10	49	2	15.1	R	3.2	4.081633	197.2245
CH	2010	GPS_10	91	2	8.4	L	3.1	2.197802	57.23077
CH	2010	GLP_10	14	0	5.4	L	3.1	0	0
CH	2010	SVP_10	48	9	26.6	R	1.1	18.75	548.625
CH	2010	SP_10	31	3	18.7	L	6	9.677419	1085.806
DE	1970	CDU/CSU_70	31	0	35.2	R	1.5	0	0
DE	1970	FDP_70	2	0	8.4	R	3.7	0	0
DE	1970	SPD_70	56	1	45.8	L	2.4	1.785714	196.2857
DE	1980	CDU/CSU_80	36	3	38.1	R	4	8.333333	1270
DE	1980	FDP_80	45	2	6.9	R	1.4	4.444444	42.93333
DE	1980	GrÙnen_80	25	2	5.6	L	3.4	8	152.32
DE	1980	SPD_80	65	19	38.2	L	1.7	29.23077	1898.246
DE	1990	CDU/CSU_90	42	1	34.2	R	3.7	2.380952	301.2857
DE	1990	FDP_90	191	7	6.9	R	1.2	3.664921	30.34555
DE	1990	GrÙnen_90	149	9	7.3	L	3	6.040268	132.2819
DE	1990	SPD_90	54	6	36.4	L	2.8	11.11111	1132.444
DE	2000	CDU/CSU_00	91	2	29.5	R	1.9	2.197802	123.1868

Country	Decade	Party-Decade	Statements	Populist Statements	Vote Share	Ideology	Radicalism	Populism (%)	Populism (weighted)
DE	2000	FDP_00	115	4	7.4	R	2.1	3.478261	54.05217
DE	2000	GrÙnen_00	129	2	8.6	L	2.6	1.550388	34.66667
DE	2000	SPD_00	112	4	38.5	L	2	3.571429	275
DE	2010	CDU/CSU_10	37	0	34.1	R	1.9	0	0
DE	2010	GrÙnen_10	54	16	8.4	L	2.4	29.62963	597.3333
DE	2010	Linke_10	120	25	8.6	L	4.8	20.83333	860
DE	2010	SPD_10	135	26	25.7	L	2.2	19.25926	1088.919
FR	1970	PS_70	228	35	43.2	L	4.1	15.35088	2718.947
FR	1970	UDR_70	95	12	15.1	R	2	12.63158	381.4737
FR	1980	PCF_80	69	4	15.3	L	4.2	5.797101	372.5217
FR	1980	PS_80	43	1	25.8	L	3.8	2.325581	228
FR	1980	RPR_80	74	9	18	R	2.1	12.16216	459.7297
FR	1990	LO_90	28	2	5.3	L	5	7.142857	189.2857
FR	1990	PCF_90	71	3	8.6	L	4.3	4.225352	156.2535
FR	1990	PS_90	72	10	23.3	L	2.3	13.88889	744.3056
FR	1990	RPR_90	130	8	20.9	R	1.3	6.153846	167.2
FR	1990	FN_90	17	1	15	R	6	5.882353	529.4118
FR	1990	UDF_90	23	1	18.6	R	1.3	4.347826	105.1304
FR	2000	LO_00	33	0	5.3	L	5	0	0
FR	2000	PS_00	76	6	16.2	L	2.1	7.894737	268.5789
FR	2000	EELV_00	60	1	5.2	L	3.2	1.666667	27.73333
FR	2000	UMP_00	35	1	19.9	R	3	2.857143	170.5714
FR	2000	FN_00	164	17	16.9	R	5.9	10.36585	1033.579
FR	2000	UDF_00	117	14	6.8	R	1.9	11.96581	154.5983
FR	2010	PS_10	94	2	28.6	L	3.2	2.12766	194.7234
FR	2010	FdG_10	149	11	5.25	L	2.6	7.38255	100.7718
FR	2010	Modem_10	78	3	9.1	R	1.1	3.846154	38.5
FR	2010	UMP_10	40	1	27.1	R	3.2	2.5	216.8
FR	2010	FN_10	116	2	17.9	R	5.9	1.724138	182.0862
ITA	1970	PCI_70	20	1	27.1	L	2.9	5	392.95
ITA	1970	PSI_70	5	2	9.6	L	5	40	1920

Country	Decade	Party-Decade	Statements	Populist Statements	Vote Share	Ideology	Radicalism	Populism (%)	Populism (weighted)
ITA	1980	PCI_80	515	9	29.9	L	1.7	1.747573	88.82913
ITA	1980	PRI_80	486	3	5.1	R	1	0.617284	3.148148
ITA	1980	PSI_80	274	3	11.4	L	1.7	1.094891	21.21898
ITA	1980	DC_80	102	4	32.9	L	1.3	3.921569	167.7255
ITA	1980	MSI_80	364	9	6.8	R	1.1	2.472527	18.49451
ITA	1990	LN_90	112	6	8.4	R	1.9	5.357143	85.5
ITA	1990	RC_90	85	1	6.1	L	3.4	1.176471	24.4
ITA	1990	FI_90	118	2	21	R	4.8	1.694915	170.8475
ITA	1990	AN_90	121	9	13.4	R	1.7	7.438017	169.438
ITA	1990	PDS_90	53	4	20.4	R	1.7	7.54717	261.7358
ITA	1990	PPI_90	26	2	11.1	R	5.7	7.692308	486.6923
ITA	2010	PD_10	45	3	25.4	L	2.4	6.666667	406.4
ITA	2010	PdL_10	68	4	21.6	R	2.7	5.882353	343.0588
ITA	2010	M5S_10	38	3	25.6	R	0.7	7.894737	141.4737
ITA	2010	M5S_10	38	3	25.6	L	0.7	7.894737	141.4737
ITA	2010	SC_10	38	5	8.3	R	1.4	13.15789	152.8947
NL	1970	VVD_70	98	0	14.4	R	3.1	0	0
NL	1970	PvdA_70	61	1	27.3	L	5.5	1.639344	246.1475
NL	1970	ARP_70	104	11	8.84	L	2.4	10.57692	224.4
NL	1970	KVP_70	40	0	17.65	L	2.4	0	0
NL	1980	VVD_80	63	0	23.1	R	3.1	0	0
NL	1980	PvdA_80	87	8	30.4	L	3.1	9.195402	866.5747
NL	1980	CDA_80	8	0	29.4	L	2.2	0	0
NL	1990	VVD_90	83	2	20	R	2.5	2.409639	120.4819
NL	1990	PvdA_90	7	0	24	R	1.4	0	0
NL	1990	D66_90	128	5	15.5	L	1.8	3.90625	108.9844
NL	1990	CDA_90	9	0	22.2	L	1.3	0	0
NL	2000	VVD_00	84	1	15.4	R	3.4	1.190476	62.33333
NL	2000	PvdA_00	110	7	15.1	L	2	6.363636	192.1818
NL	2000	D66_00	137	7	5.1	L	1.4	5.109489	36.48175
NL	2000	SP_00	91	4	5.9	L	4.4	4.395604	114.1099

Country	Decade	Party-Decade	Statements	Populist Statements	Vote Share	Ideology	Radicalism	Populism (%)	Populism (weighted)
NL	2000	CDA_00	87	3	27.8	R	2.1	3.448276	201.3103
NL	2000	GL_00	156	11	6.9	L	3.5	7.051282	170.2885
NL	2000	LPF_00	25	1	17	R	4.4	4	299.2
NL	2010	VVD_10	162	4	26.6	R	3.9	2.469136	256.1481
NL	2010	PvdA_10	308	8	24.8	L	2.3	2.597403	148.1558
NL	2010	D66_10	222	2	8	R	1.6	0.900901	11.53153
NL	2010	PVV_10	116	6	10.1	R	5.3	5.172414	276.8793
NL	2010	SP_10	134	1	9.6	L	5	0.746269	35.8209
NL	2010	CDA_10	109	4	8.5	R	2.8	3.669725	87.33945
SE	1970	C_70	33	1	25.1	L	3.4	3.030303	258.6061
SE	1970	FP_70	32	0	9.4	L	2.2	0	0
SE	1970	M_70	5	0	14.3	R	3	0	0
SE	1970	S_70	5	0	43.6	L	1.8	0	0
SE	1970	V_70	12	0	5.3	L	5.3	0	0
SE	1980	C_80	53	0	15.5	L	2.4	0	0
SE	1980	FP_80	15	0	5.9	R	1.5	0	0
SE	1980	M_80	17	0	23.6	R	3.5	0	0
SE	1980	S_80	16	0	45.6	L	2.9	0	0
SE	1980	V_80	33	0	5.6	L	5	0	0
SE	1990	C_90	23	0	7.6	R	5.2	0	0
SE	1990	FP_90	38	0	7.2	R	4.9	0	0
SE	1990	MP_90	32	0	5	L	3.4	0	0
SE	1990	M_90	32	0	22.4	R	6	0	0
SE	1990	S_90	34	0	45.2	R	4.2	0	0
SE	1990	V_90	28	0	6.2	L	5.7	0	0
SE	2000	C_00	25	0	6.2	R	1.6	0	0
SE	2000	FP_00	37	0	13.4	R	2.3	0	0
SE	2000	KD_00	82	2	9.1	R	3.3	2.439024	73.2439
SE	2000	M_00	61	0	15.3	R	3.8	0	0
SE	2000	S_00	37	0	39.8	L	2.5	0	0
SE	2000	V_00	75	0	8.4	L	4.3	0	0

Country	Decade	Party-Decade	Statements	Populist Statements	Vote Share	Ideology	Radicalism	Populism (%)	Populism (weighted)
SE	2010	C_10	7	0	6.1	R	3.2	0	0
SE	2010	FP_10	11	0	5.4	R	3	0	0
SE	2010	MP_10	9	1	6.9	L	2.7	11.11111	207
SE	2010	S_10	58	0	12.9	L	2.2	0	0
SE	2010	V_10	76	0	5.7	L	4.3	0	0
SE	2010	SD_10	52	2	12.9	R	3.8	3.846154	188.5385
SE	2010	M_10	175	1	23.3	R	3.4	0.571429	45.26857
UK	1970	LIB_70	58	5	18.3	L	2.1	8.62069	331.2931
UK	1970	LAB_70	79	6	39.2	L	3.8	7.594937	1131.342
UK	1970	CON_70	88	4	35.8	R	1.3	4.545455	211.5455
UK	1980	LAB_80	169	9	27.6	L	4.9	5.325444	720.213
UK	1980	CON_80	83	1	42.4	R	3.9	1.204819	199.2289
UK	1980	SDP_80	127	6	25.3	R	2	4.724409	239.0551
UK	1990	LD_90	147	5	17.8	L	3.2	3.401361	193.7415
UK	1990	LAB_90	53	3	34.4	L	4	5.660377	778.8679
UK	1990	CON_90	219	4	41.9	R	3.8	1.826484	290.8128
UK	2000	LD_00	255	12	18.3	L	2.2	4.705882	189.4588
UK	2000	LAB_00	86	7	40.7	L	0.8	8.139535	265.0233
UK	2000	CON_00	159	7	31.7	R	3.7	4.402516	516.3711
UK	2010	LD_10	83	7	23	L	1	8.433735	193.9759
UK	2010	LAB_10	104	5	29	L	2	4.807692	278.8462
UK	2010	CON_10	133	13	36.1	R	3.1	9.774436	1093.857

Notes.
1) Six manifestos are missing. The missing cases are the following: in the 1970s Républicains Indépendant (France), PSDI, DC, MSI (Italy); for the1980s UDF (France); for the 2000s MDC (France).
2) When possible, in order to determine the levels of radicalism, the Chapel Hill survey is used (Bakker et al. 2015). However, the survey does not cover the 1990s, for which the Party Manifesto Project is used (Lehmann et al. 2016). The values from the two datasets are then normalized and standardized.
The data concerning the electoral results are obtained via Caramani (2000; 2015)

Appendix 4 – Conditions: Raw and Fuzzy Values

Table 24 – Values for Conditions (Raw and Fuzzy)

Country	Decade	Corruption		Economy		Convergence		Account-Resp.	
		Raw	Fuzzy	Raw	Fuzzy	Raw	Fuzzy	Raw	Fuzzy
AT	1990s	67.03	0.51	8.25	0.26	0.55	0.20	61.80	0.64
AT	2000s	71.81	0.39	6.62	0.12	0.60	0.12	63.40	0.57
AT	2010s	71.71	0.39	11.16	0.64	0.39	0.67	63.50	0.56
CH	1990s	91.16	0.06	12.30	0.76	0.44	0.53	65.50	0.46
CH	2000s	72.69	0.36	8.33	0.27	0.67	0.05	68.40	0.27
CH	2010s	72.70	0.36	10.25	0.53	0.38	0.71	75.20	0.05
DE	1990s	86.73	0.09	8.35	0.27	0.63	0.08	56.50	0.81
DE	2000s	55.74	0.66	9.08	0.37	0.26	0.91	59.60	0.72
DE	2010s	73.56	0.34	10.30	0.54	0.47	0.44	63.50	0.56
FR	1990s	53.60	0.68	12.22	0.75	0.44	0.52	59.40	0.73
FR	2000s	36.11	0.84	9.30	0.40	0.39	0.67	59.30	0.73
FR	2010s	59.89	0.61	12.54	0.78	0.58	0.16	54.60	0.86
ITA	1990s	12.50	0.95	12.55	0.78	0.41	0.64	60.70	0.68
ITA	2010s	12.79	0.95	16.20	0.95	0.38	0.71	50.50	0.92
NL	1990s	90.66	0.06	8.46	0.29	0.22	0.95	65.10	0.49
NL	2000s	80.37	0.18	5.33	0.06	0.34	0.81	68.00	0.29
NL	2010s	79.61	0.19	10.26	0.53	0.46	0.46	68.00	0.29
SE	1990s	91.94	0.05	10.72	0.59	0.66	0.06	68.60	0.26
SE	2000s	88.76	0.07	5.23	0.06	0.40	0.67	70.40	0.17
SE	2010s	82.50	0.14	8.95	0.35	0.35	0.79	73.70	0.07
UK	1990s	77.30	0.24	13.41	0.84	0.61	0.11	48.60	0.94
UK	2000s	71.98	0.38	9.56	0.44	0.34	0.80	56.60	0.81
UK	2010s	59.13	0.61	14.56	0.90	0.36	0.75	57.60	0.78

Table 25 – Values for Outcomes (Raw and Fuzzy)

Country	Decade	Right-Wing Populism		Left-Wing Populism		Total Populism	
		Raw	Fuzzy	Raw	Fuzzy	Raw	Fuzzy
AT	1990s	2341.72	1	523.50	0.67	2865.22	1.00
AT	2000s	419.56	0.5	205.55	0.17	625.12	0.33
AT	2010s	2967.76	1	450.43	0.53	3418.19	1.00
CH	1990s	1269.66	1	800.09	0.95	2069.75	0.97
CH	2000s	1724.37	1	436.78	0.50	2161.15	0.98
CH	2010s	745.85	0.93	1143.04	1.00	1888.89	0.95
DE	1990s	331.63	0.35	1264.73	1.00	1596.36	0.89
DE	2000s	177.24	0.15	309.67	0.30	486.91	0.23
DE	2010s	0.00	0.05	2546.25	1.00	2546.25	0.99
FR	1990s	801.74	0.95	1089.85	0.99	1891.59	0.95
FR	2000s	1358.75	1	296.31	0.28	1655.06	0.91
FR	2010s	437.39	0.54	295.50	0.28	732.88	0.43
IT	1990s	1174.21	1	6.57	0.05	1180.78	0.73
IT	2010s	637.43	0.84	86.92	0.09	724.35	0.42
NL	1990s	120.48	0.11	108.98	0.1	229.47	0.11
NL	2000s	562.84	0.75	513.06	0.65	1075.91	0.67
NL	2010s	631.90	0.84	183.98	0.15	815.88	0.5
SE	1990s	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.05
SE	2000s	73.24	0.08	0.00	0.05	73.24	0.06
SE	2010s	233.81	0.21	207.00	0.18	440.81	0.21
UK	1990s	290.81	0.29	972.61	0.99	1263.42	0.77
UK	2000s	516.37	0.68	454.48	0.54	970.85	0.6
UK	2010s	1093.86	0.99	472.82	0.58	1566.68	0.89

Table 26 – Calculation of Accountability and Responsiveness

		Responsiveness		Accountability		
Country	Decade	GOVCAP	REPRES	TR_PTPP	COMPET	Total
AT	1990s	71.1	58.2	58.1	59.7	61.8
AT	2000s	66.8	64.4	59.7	62.7	63.4
AT	2010s	66.5	70.5	50.7	66.3	63.5
CH	1990s	75.7	65.6	45.7	75.0	65.5
CH	2000s	76.4	68.7	55.9	72.4	68.4
CH	2010s	78.5	73.0	80.1	69.1	75.2
DE	1990s	66.0	53.3	44.7	62.1	56.5
DE	2000s	67.9	61.6	44.8	64.0	59.6
DE	2010s	65.7	60.9	62.1	65.2	63.5
FR	1990s	67.8	50.5	60.2	59.0	59.4
FR	2000s	62.0	57.2	60.2	57.8	59.3
FR	2010s	51.0	60.2	55.4	51.7	54.6
IT	1990s	64.7	50.4	55.1	72.6	60.7
IT	2010s	50.0	48.6	39.7	63.8	50.5
NL	1990s	77.2	50.5	64.2	68.4	65.1
NL	2000s	70.8	56.0	70.7	74.7	68.0
NL	2010s	64.8	59.2	69.4	78.5	68.0
SE	1990s	74.1	63.7	71.9	64.9	68.6
SE	2000s	69.6	70.1	75.2	66.8	70.4
SE	2010s	73.0	68.5	81.5	71.9	73.7
UK	1990s	45.7	76.4	34.3	37.9	48.6
UK	2000s	45.3	77.1	53.6	50.2	56.6
UK	2010s	51.8	74.8	56.8	47.0	57.6

Table 27 – Calculation of Economic Performance

Country	Decade	Unemployment	Gini	GDP	Total
AT	1990s	3.3	28.1	6.6	8.249625
AT	2000s	4.2	26.6	10.9	6.62109
AT	2010s	4.9	29.3	0.7	11.16151
CH	1990s	3.2	29.82	-3.9	12.29558
CH	2000s	2.2	27.52	4.7	8.33472
CH	2010s	3.4	30.09	2.7	10.24692
DE	1990s	6.5	26.79	8.2	8.353365
DE	2000s	8.5	27.00	8.2	9.080347
DE	2010s	6.5	28.95	4.5	10.30213
FR	1990s	11.1	28.54	3.0	12.2167
FR	2000s	10.4	27.91	10.4	9.297281
FR	2010s	8.7	28.13	-0.8	12.54253
IT	1990s	9.0	31.91	3.2	12.55493
IT	2010s	8.8	32.71	-7.1	16.20321
NL	1990s	6.0	25.99	6.6	8.463507
NL	2000s	4.0	24.03	12.1	5.327244
NL	2010s	4.5	25.91	-0.4	10.26139
SE	1990s	4.9	21.10	-6.2	10.72242
SE	2000s	6.6	23.58	14.5	5.229819
SE	2010s	8.1	25.17	6.4	8.951768
UK	1990s	6.1	33.01	-1.1	13.41191
UK	2000s	6.1	34.32	11.7	9.563203
UK	2010s	6.6	33.85	-3.3	14.56104

Appendix 5 – Distribution Cases in Outcomes

Figure 26: Distribution Acceptability of Total Populism

Figure 27: Distribution Acceptability Left-wing Populism

Figure 28: Distribution Acceptability Right-wing Populism

Figure 29: Distribution Cases in Conditions

Figure 30: Plots Total Populism and Conditions

Figure 31: Plots Right-wing Populism and Conditions

Figure 32: Plots Left-wing Populism and Conditions

Appendix 6 – All Solutions Without Stigma

Table 28 – Solutions Total Populism (Without Stigma)

```
Conservative Solution for Total Populism

M1: D*E + C*D*cnvg + c*E*CNVG => POP

             incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases

1  D*E       0.847  0.770  0.550  0.135  DE_13,UK_95; AT_13; FR_12; FR_95,I
T_94,IT_13,UK_10
2  C*D*cnvg  0.956  0.907  0.357  0.040  AT_94; FR_12
3  c*E*CNVG  0.924  0.867  0.370  0.062  CH_95,CH_11; AT_13
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------
   M1        0.852  0.775  0.652


Intermediate Solution for Total Populism

M1:    E + C*D + D*cnvg => POP

           incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases

1  E       0.821  0.741  0.644  0.128  NL_12,SE_94; CH_95,CH_11; DE_13,UK_9
5; AT_13; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
2  C*D     0.858  0.759  0.482  0.023  AT_94; DE_02,FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,IT_
94,IT_13,UK_10
3  D*cnvg  0.872  0.800  0.502  0.047  AT_02,DE_94; DE_13,UK_95; AT_94; FR_
12
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
   M1      0.798  0.719  0.754


Most Parsimonious Solution for Total Populism

M1: C + E + D*cnvg => POP

           incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases

1  C       0.845  0.751  0.526  0.036  AT_94; DE_02,FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,IT_
94,IT_13,UK_10
2  E       0.821  0.741  0.644  0.097  NL_12,SE_94; CH_95,CH_11; DE_13,UK_9
5; AT_13; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
3  D*cnvg  0.872  0.800  0.502  0.047  AT_02,DE_94; DE_13,UK_95; AT_94; FR_
12
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
   M1      0.791  0.712  0.767
```

Table 29 – Solutions Right-Wing Populism (Without Stigma)

```
Conservative Solution for Right-Wing Populism

M1: C*D*cnvg + c*E*CNVG + (C*D*E) => POP_CAL5
M2: C*D*cnvg + c*E*CNVG + (D*E*CNVG) => POP_CAL5

             incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  (M1)   (M2)   cases

1  C*D*cnvg  0.935  0.886  0.357  0.045  0.045  0.101  AT_94; FR_12
2  c*E*CNVG  0.845  0.775  0.346  0.064  0.119  0.064  CH_95,CH_11; AT_13
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------
3  C*D*E     0.907  0.865  0.440  0.023  0.096         FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,I
T_13,UK_10
4  D*E*CNVG  0.885  0.845  0.426  0.010         0.083  AT_13; FR_95,IT_94,I
T_13,UK_10
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------
   M1        0.889  0.845  0.605
   M2        0.895  0.851  0.591

Intermediate Solution for Right-Wing Populism

M1:    E*CNVG + C*D*cnvg => POP_CAL5

             incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases

1  E*CNVG    0.883  0.846  0.492  0.236  CH_95,CH_11; AT_13; FR_95,IT_94,IT
_13,UK_10
2  C*D*cnvg  0.935  0.886  0.357  0.101  AT_94; FR_12
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------
   M1        0.895  0.851  0.593

Parsimonious Solution for Right-Wing Populism

M1: C*cnvg + E*CNVG => POP_CAL5

           incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases

1  C*cnvg  0.940  0.896  0.386  0.108  AT_94; FR_12
2  E*CNVG  0.883  0.846  0.492  0.214  CH_95,CH_11; AT_13; FR_95,IT_94,IT_1
3,UK_10
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------
   M1      0.896  0.853  0.600
```

Table 30 – Solutions Left-Wing Populism (Without Stigma)

Conservative and Intermediate Solution for Left-Wing Populism

M1: c*D + c*E*CNVG + D*e*cnvg => POP_CAL5

	incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u	cases
1 c*D	0.819	0.677	0.622	0.095	AT_02,DE_94; UK_03; DE_13,UK_95; AT_13
2 c*E*CNVG	0.861	0.711	0.455	0.059	CH_95,CH_11; AT_13
3 D*e*cnvg	0.819	0.664	0.436	0.025	AT_02,DE_94; AT_94
M1	0.786	0.646	0.706		

Parsimonious Solutions for Left-Wing Populism

M1: c*D + (c*E*CNVG + C*e*cnvg) => POP_CAL5
M2: c*D + (c*E*CNVG + D*e*cnvg) => POP_CAL5
M3: c*D + (C*e*cnvg + d*E*CNVG) => POP_CAL5
M4: c*D + (d*E*CNVG + D*e*cnvg) => POP_CAL5

					----------				
	incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u	(M1)	(M2)	(M3)	(M4)	cases
1 c*D	0.819	0.677	0.622	0.095	0.155	0.095	0.206	0.146	AT_02, DE_94; UK_03; DE_13,UK_95; AT_13
2 c*E*CNVG	0.861	0.711	0.455	0.000	0.031	0.059			CH_95, CH_11; AT_13
3 C*e*cnvg	0.895	0.726	0.375	0.008	0.022		0.011		AT_94
4 d*E*CNVG	0.825	0.657	0.408	0.002			0.033	0.061	CH_95, CH_11
5 D*e*cnvg	0.819	0.664	0.436	0.011		0.025		0.014	AT_02, DE_94; AT_94
M1	0.785	0.639	0.703						
M2	0.786	0.646	0.706						
M3	0.782	0.633	0.705						
M4	0.783	0.640	0.708						

Appendix 7 – All Solutions With Stigma

Table 31 – Solution Total Populism (With Stigma)

```
Conservative Solutions for Total Populism (With Stigma)

M01: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*CNVG + c*D*cnvg*s + (c*D*e*cnvg + c*D*e*s + c*E*CN
VG*S) => POP_CAL5
M02: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*CNVG + c*D*cnvg*s + (c*D*e*cnvg + c*D*e*s + D*E*CN
VG*S) => POP_CAL5
M03: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*CNVG + c*D*cnvg*s + (c*D*e*cnvg + c*E*CNVG*S + D*e
*CNVG*s) => POP_CAL5
M04: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*CNVG + c*D*cnvg*s + (c*D*e*cnvg + D*e*CNVG*s + D*E
*CNVG*S) => POP_CAL5
M05: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*CNVG + c*D*cnvg*s + (c*D*e*s + c*e*cnvg*S + c*E*CN
VG*S) => POP_CAL5
M06: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*CNVG + c*D*cnvg*s + (c*D*e*s + c*e*cnvg*S + D*E*CN
VG*S) => POP_CAL5
M07: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*CNVG + c*D*cnvg*s + (c*D*e*s + c*E*CNVG*S + D*e*cn
vg*S) => POP_CAL5
M08: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*CNVG + c*D*cnvg*s + (c*D*e*s + D*e*cnvg*S + D*E*CN
VG*S) => POP_CAL5
M09: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*CNVG + c*D*cnvg*s + (c*e*cnvg*S + c*E*CNVG*S + D*e
*CNVG*s) => POP_CAL5
M10: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*CNVG + c*D*cnvg*s + (c*e*cnvg*S + D*e*CNVG*s + D*E
*CNVG*S) => POP_CAL5
M11: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*CNVG + c*D*cnvg*s + (c*E*CNVG*S + D*e*cnvg*S + D*e
*CNVG*s) => POP_CAL5
M12: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*CNVG + c*D*cnvg*s + (D*e*cnvg*S + D*e*CNVG*s + D*E
*CNVG*S) => POP_CAL5


                incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  (M1)   (M2)   (M3)   (M4)   (M5
)   (M6)   (M7)   (M8)   (M9)   (M10)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------
 1  C*D*CNVG    0.886  0.799  0.386  0.021  0.021  0.021  0.021  0.021  0.0
21  0.021  0.021  0.021  0.021  0.021
 2  c*d*S       0.855  0.767  0.409  0.036  0.062  0.120  0.062  0.120  0.0
36  0.057  0.062  0.120  0.036  0.057
 3  C*D*S       0.897  0.813  0.430  0.031  0.033  0.033  0.033  0.033  0.0
33  0.033  0.031  0.031  0.033  0.033
 4  c*D*cnvg*s  0.946  0.909  0.370  0.044  0.044  0.044  0.044  0.044  0.0
44  0.044  0.044  0.044  0.088  0.088
 5  c*D*e*cnvg  0.899  0.827  0.333  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
 6  c*D*e*s     0.894  0.799  0.353  0.000  0.013  0.013                  0.0
13  0.013  0.013  0.013
 7  c*e*cnvg*S  0.895  0.798  0.329  0.000                               0.0
00  0.000                 0.000  0.000
 8  c*E*CNVG*S  0.961  0.927  0.322  0.003  0.012         0.012         0.0
12         0.012         0.012
 9  D*e*cnvg*S  0.899  0.799  0.299  0.008
0.008  0.008
10  D*e*CNVG*s  0.852  0.694  0.278  0.000                0.013  0.013
0.013  0.013
11  D*E*CNVG*S  0.915  0.845  0.356  0.000         0.009         0.009
0.009         0.009         0.009
```

```
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------
    M1          0.831  0.760  0.771
    M2          0.831  0.759  0.768
    M3          0.831  0.760  0.771
    M4          0.831  0.759  0.768
    M5          0.828  0.756  0.771
    M6          0.828  0.755  0.768
    M7          0.833  0.763  0.779
    M8          0.832  0.762  0.776
    M9          0.828  0.756  0.771
    M10         0.828  0.755  0.768
    M11         0.833  0.763  0.779
    M12         0.832  0.762  0.776

----------------------------
                (M11)  (M12)  cases
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1  C*D*CNVG    0.021  0.021  DE_02; FR_02; UK_10; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
 2  c*d*S       0.062  0.120  CH_03; NL_94,NL_02; NL_12; CH_95,CH_11
 3  C*D*S       0.031  0.031  AT_94; FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
 4  c*D*cnvg*s  0.088  0.088  DE_94; DE_13,UK_95
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5  c*D*e*cnvg                DE_94; AT_02
 6  c*D*e*s                   DE_94; UK_03
 7  c*e*cnvg*S                CH_03; AT_02
 8  c*E*CNVG*S  0.012         CH_95,CH_11; AT_13
 9  D*e*cnvg*S  0.008  0.008  AT_02; AT_94
10  D*e*CNVG*s  0.013  0.013  UK_03; DE_02
11  D*E*CNVG*S         0.009  AT_13; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

Intermediate Solution for Total Populism (With Stigma)

```
M1:    D + S => POP_CAL5

       incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u
---------------------------------
1  D   0.784  0.697  0.679  0.176
2  S   0.800  0.713  0.683  0.180
---------------------------------
   M1  0.782  0.709  0.859

       cases
------------
1  D   DE_94; UK_03; AT_02; DE_13,UK_95; AT_13; DE_02; AT_94; FR_02; UK_10;
FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
2  S   CH_03; NL_94,NL_02; AT_02; NL_12; CH_95,CH_11; AT_13; AT_94; FR_02;
FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
------------
```

Parsimonious Solution for Total Populism (With Stigma)

```
M1: D + S => POP_CAL5

       incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u
---------------------------------
```

```
1  D   0.784  0.697  0.679  0.176
2  S   0.800  0.713  0.683  0.180
--------------------------------
   M1  0.782  0.709  0.859

       cases
------------
1  D   DE_94; AT_02; UK_03; DE_13,UK_95; AT_13; AT_94; DE_02; FR_02; FR_12;
UK_10; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
2  S   CH_03; NL_94,NL_02; NL_12; CH_95,CH_11; AT_02; AT_13; AT_94; FR_02;
FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
------------
```

Table 32 – Solutions Right-Wing Populism (With Stigma)

Conservative Solution for Right-Wing Populism (With Stigma)

Number of multiple-covered cases: 6

M1: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*E*CNVG + (c*e*S*cnvg + c*E*S*CNVG) => POP_CAL5
M2: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*E*CNVG + (c*e*S*cnvg + D*E*S*CNVG) => POP_CAL5
M3: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*E*CNVG + (c*E*S*CNVG + D*e*S*cnvg) => POP_CAL5
M4: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*E*CNVG + (D*e*S*cnvg + D*E*S*CNVG) => POP_CAL5

					----------				
	incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u	(M1)	(M2)	(M3)	(M4)	cases
1	c*d*S	0.898	0.853	0.438	0.060	0.060	0.082	0.086	0.146	CH_03; NL_94,NL_02; NL_12; CH_95,CH_11
2	C*D*S	0.975	0.961	0.477	0.074	0.076	0.076	0.074	0.074	AT_94; FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
3	C*D*E*CNVG	0.912	0.874	0.361	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.031	UK_10; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
4	c*e*S*cnvg	0.920	0.863	0.345	0.000	0.005	0.005			CH_03; AT_02
5	c*E*S*CNVG	0.951	0.925	0.326	0.003	0.012		0.012		CH_95,CH_11; AT_13
6	D*e*S*cnvg	0.927	0.874	0.315	0.009			0.014	0.014	AT_02; AT_94
7	D*E*S*CNVG	0.958	0.940	0.381	0.000		0.009		0.009	AT_13; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
	M1	0.880	0.839	0.719						
	M2	0.880	0.838	0.716						
	M3	0.885	0.846	0.727						
	M4	0.884	0.845	0.724						

Intermediate Solution for Right-Wing Populism (With Stigma)

M1: S + C*D*E*CNVG => POP_CAL5

	incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u	cases
1	S	0.885	0.850	0.773	0.443	CH_03; NL_94,NL_02; NL_12; CH_95,CH_11; AT_02; AT_13; AT_94; FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
2	C*D*E*CNVG	0.912	0.874	0.361	0.031	UK_10; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
	M1	0.859	0.818	0.804		

Parsimonious Solutions for Right-Wing Populism (With Stigma)

M1: S + (C*E) => POP_CAL5
M2: S + (E*CNVG) => POP_CAL5

```
                                 ------------------
           incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  (M1)   (M2)   cases
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
1  S       0.885  0.850  0.773  0.241  0.330  0.327  CH_03; NL_94,NL_02; NL
_12; CH_95,CH_11; AT_02; AT_13; AT_94; FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
2  C*E     0.910  0.871  0.474  0.000  0.031         UK_10; FR_12; FR_95,IT
_94,IT_13
3  E*CNVG  0.883  0.846  0.492  0.015         0.046  CH_95,CH_11; AT_13; UK
_10; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
   M1      0.856  0.815  0.804
   M2      0.846  0.803  0.819
```

Table 33 – Solutions Left-Wing Populism (With Stigma)

Conservative Solutions

```
M1: c*d*E*S + C*D*e*S + c*D*cnvg*s + C*D*CNVG*s + c*E*CNVG*S + (c*D*e*s) =>
POP_CAL5
M2: c*d*E*S + C*D*e*S + c*D*cnvg*s + C*D*CNVG*s + c*E*CNVG*S + (D*e*CNVG*s)
=> POP_CAL5
```

					cov.u			
		incl	PRI	cov.r		(M1)	(M2)	cases
1	c*D*cnvg*s	0.897	0.812	0.464	0.065	0.065	0.123	DE_94; DE_13,UK_95
2	C*D*CNVG*s	0.880	0.635	0.344	0.028	0.028	0.028	DE_02; UK_10
3	c*d*E*S	0.848	0.671	0.377	0.001	0.001	0.001	NL_12; CH_95,CH_11
4	C*D*e*S	0.828	0.515	0.332	0.029	0.029	0.029	AT_94; FR_02
5	c*E*CNVG*S	0.873	0.727	0.386	0.012	0.012	0.012	CH_95,CH_11; AT_13
6	c*D*e*s	0.851	0.681	0.443	0.000	0.024		DE_94; UK_03
7	D*e*CNVG*s	0.817	0.563	0.352	0.000		0.024	UK_03; DE_02
	M1	0.784	0.641	0.705				
	M2	0.784	0.641	0.705				

Intermediate Solution

```
M1:    D*s + C*D*e + c*E*S => POP_CAL5
```

		incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u	cases
1	D*s	0.801	0.640	0.565	0.173	DE_94; UK_03; DE_13,UK_95; DE_02; UK_10
2	C*D*e	0.792	0.489	0.378	0.026	AT_94; DE_02; FR_02
3	c*E*S	0.842	0.683	0.457	0.116	NL_12; CH_95,CH_11; AT_13

Parsimonious Solution

```
M1: C*e + D*s + c*E*S => POP_CAL5
```

		incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u	cases
1	C*e	0.810	0.553	0.421	0.034	AT_94; DE_02; FR_02
2	D*s	0.801	0.640	0.565	0.173	DE_94; UK_03; DE_13,UK_95; DE_02; UK_10
3	c*E*S	0.842	0.683	0.457	0.081	NL_12; CH_95,CH_11; AT_13
	M1	0.761	0.612	0.733		

Appendix 8 – Outcomes and Stigma

Figure 33: Distribution of Cases in Stigma

Figure 34: Total Populism and Stigma

Figure 35: Right-Wing Populism and Stigma

Figure 36: Left-Wing Populism and Stigma

Appendix 9 – Robustness Test without Convergence

Table 34 – Robustness Test without Convergence (With Stigma)

Parsimonious Solution for Total Populism

M1: S + C*E => POP_CAL5

	incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u	cases
1 S	0.885	0.850	0.773	0.330	CH_03,NL_94,NL_02; CH_95,CH_11,NL_12; AT_02; AT_13; AT_94,FR_02; FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,IT_13
2 C*E	0.910	0.871	0.474	0.031	UK_10; FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,IT_13
M1	0.856	0.815	0.804		

Parsimonious Solution for Right-Wing Populism

M1: S + C*E => POP_CAL5

	incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u	cases
1 S	0.885	0.850	0.773	0.330	CH_03,NL_94,NL_02; CH_95,CH_11,NL_12; AT_02; AT_13; AT_94,FR_02; FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,IT_13
2 C*E	0.910	0.871	0.474	0.031	UK_10; FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,IT_13
M1	0.856	0.815	0.804		

Parsimonious Solution for Left-Wing Populism

M1: D*s + c*E*S => POP_CAL5

	incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u	cases
1 D*s	0.803	0.643	0.536	0.231	DE_94,UK_03; DE_13,UK_95; DE_02; UK_10
2 c*E*S	0.842	0.683	0.432	0.127	CH_95,CH_11,NL_12; AT_13
M1	0.795	0.657	0.663		

Table 35 – Robustness Test without Convergence (Without Stigma)

Parsimonious Solution for Total Populism

M1: C => POP_CAL5

```
       incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------
1  C   0.895  0.851  0.569    -    AT_94,DE_02,FR_02; FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,I
T_13,UK_10
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------
   M1  0.895  0.851  0.569
```

Parsimonious Solution for Right-Wing Populism

M1: C => POP_CAL5

```
       incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------
1  C   0.895  0.851  0.569    -    AT_94,DE_02,FR_02; FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,I
T_13,UK_10
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------
   M1  0.895  0.851  0.569
```

Parsimonious Solution for Left-Wing Populism

M1: c*D*E => POP_CAL5

```
          incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases
-----------------------------------------------------
1  c*D*E  0.886  0.764  0.488    -    AT_13,DE_13,UK_95
-----------------------------------------------------
   M1     0.886  0.764  0.488
```

Appendix 10 – Alternative Operationalization (A.O.)

Table 36 – Variables used for the Alternative Operationalization (A.O.)

Dimensions of Populism	Aspects	Questions in the Codebook
People-centrism	Closeness to the people	Does the speaker claim to belong / be close to / know / speak for / care for / agree with / perform everyday actions like / represent / embody the people?
	Stating a monolithic people	Does the speaker describe the people as homogeneous, sharing common feelings, desires, or opinions?
	Stressing the virtues of the people	Does the speaker describe the people in a positive way (moral, credible, competent, no lack of understanding, etc.)?
	Praising the people's achievements	Does the speaker stress positive actions and positive past and future impacts of the people (responsible for a positive development / situation, not being responsible for a mistake, etc.)?
	Claiming power for the people	Does the speaker argue that the people should have / gain / not lose power? Does the speaker give the people the competence to act or decide on a specific political issue? Does the speaker demand institutional reforms for more participation of the people in politics?
Anti-elitism	Exclusion of the elites from the people	Does the speaker describe the elites as not belonging to / not being close to / not knowing the needs of / not caring about / not speaking on behalf of / not empowering / deceiving the people?
	Blaming the elites	Does the speaker argue that the elites are a burden/threat? Does the speaker argue that the elites are accountable for negative developments/situations?
	Denouncing the elites	Does the speaker argue that the elites are responsible for wrong/stupid actions or immoral/criminal/ behaviour? Does the speaker argue that the elites are planning/scheming/striving something?
	Denying power to the elites	Does the speaker argue that the elites should have not / lose / not have more power? Does the speaker deny to the elites the competence to act or decide on a specific political issue?

Note: three additional aspects have been included in the measurement compared to the other operationalization. Notably, the three variables: 'blaming the elites', 'denouncing the elites', 'claiming less power to the elites'. Since this operationalization is based on the co-occurrence of the pillars, there were no reasons to exclude them from the measurement of populism.

Table 37 – Measurement Populism in Manifestos (A.O.)

Country	Decade	Party-Year	Total Statements	Populist Statements	Percentage	Weighted Populism
AT	1970	SPÖ_1975	37	2	0	0
AT	1970	ÖVP_1975	27	1	0	0
AT	1970	FPÖ_1975	15	0	0	0
AT	1980	ÖVP_1983	35	4	11.42857	543.0857
AT	1980	SPÖ_1983	97	15	0	0
AT	1980	FPÖ_1983	46	3	0	0
AT	1990	FPÖ_1994	104	17	16.34615	2133.173
AT	1990	GRÜNE_1994	31	4	12.90323	160.129
AT	1990	SPÖ_1994	98	7	0	0
AT	1990	ÖVP_1994	110	10	0	0
AT	1990	LIF_1994	22	1	0	0
AT	2000	SPÖ_2002	105	13	12.38095	1152.171
AT	2000	GRÜNE_2002	52	4	7.692308	233.8462
AT	2000	FPÖ_2002	139	7	5.035971	231.6547
AT	2000	ÖVP_2002	170	6	0	0
AT	2010	TS_2013	144	39	27.08333	558.675
AT	2010	GRÜNE_2013	241	27	11.20332	417.4357
AT	2010	NEOS_2013	79	6	7.594937	75.34177
AT	2010	SPÖ_2013	60	2	0	0
AT	2010	ÖVP_2013	92	11	0	0
AT	2010	FPÖ_2013	19	4	0	0
CH	1970	LdU_1975	16	3	18.75	168.75
CH	1970	CVP_1975	106	0	0	0
CH	1970	FDP_1975	19	0	0	0

Country	Decade	Party-Year	Total Statements	Populist Statements	Percentage	Weighted Populism
CH	1970	SVP_1975	14	0	0	0
CH	1970	SP_1975	18	1	0	0
CH	1980	CVP_1983	25	0	0	0
CH	1980	FDP_1983	30	0	0	0
CH	1980	SVP_1983	42	0	0	0
CH	1980	SP_1983	17	0	0	0
CH	1990	FDP_1995	26	3	11.53846	1002.231
CH	1990	GPS_1995	53	4	7.54717	79.24528
CH	1990	CVP_1995	33	4	0	0
CH	1990	SVP_1995	73	5	0	0
CH	1990	SP_1995	43	5	0	0
CH	2000	SVP_2003	169	47	27.81065	3861.231
CH	2000	FDP_2003	47	9	19.14894	861.3191
CH	2000	SP_2003	121	5	4.132231	462.1488
CH	2000	CVP_2003	23	0	0	0
CH	2000	GPS_2003	32	2	0	0
CH	2010	SVP_2011	48	15	31.25	914.375
CH	2010	SP_2011	31	5	16.12903	1809.677
CH	2010	GPS_2011	91	5	5.494505	143.0769
CH	2010	BDP_2011	3	0	0	0
CH	2010	CVP_2011	42	2	0	0
CH	2010	FDP_2011	49	2	0	0
CH	2010	GLP_2011	14	0	0	0
DE	1970	CDU_1972	31	3	0	0
DE	1970	FDP_1972	2	0	0	0

Country	Decade	Party-Year	Total Statements	Populist Statements	Percentage	Weighted Populism
DE	1970	SPD_1972	56	3	0	0
DE	1980	SPD_1983	65	20	30.76923	1998.154
DE	1980	CDU_1983	36	3	0	0
DE	1980	FDP_1983	45	2	0	0
DE	1980	Grüne_1983	25	2	0	0
DE	1990	Grüne_1994	149	26	17.44966	382.1477
DE	1990	CDU_1994	42	1	0	0
DE	1990	FDP_1994	191	7	0	0
DE	1990	SPD_1994	54	6	0	0
DE	2000	SPD_2002	112	6	5.357143	412.5
DE	2000	FDP_2002	115	5	4.347826	67.56522
DE	2000	CDU_2002	91	3	3.296703	184.7802
DE	2000	Grüne_2002	129	2	0	0
DE	2010	Grüne_2013	54	22	40.74074	821.3333
DE	2010	Linke_2013	120	34	28.33333	1169.6
DE	2010	SPD_2013	135	33	24.44444	1382.089
DE	2010	CDU_2013	37	0	0	0
FR	1970	PS_1973	228	35	15.35088	2718.948
FR	1970	UMP_1973	95	15	15.78947	476.8421
FR	1980	PCF_1981	69	13	18.84058	1210.696
FR	1980	UMP_1981	74	11	14.86486	561.8919
FR	1980	PS_1981	43	1	0	0
FR	1990	PCF_1997	71	5	7.042254	261.6338
FR	1990	LO_1995	28	0	0	0
FR	1990	PS_1997	72	10	0	0

Country	Decade	Party-Year	Total Statements	Populist Statements	Percentage	Weighted Populism
FR	1990	UMP_1993	130	8	0	0
FR	1990	FN_1997	17	0	0	0
FR	1990	UDF_1997	23	1	0	0
FR	2000	UDF_2002	117	17	14.52991	187.7265
FR	2000	FN_2002	164	22	13.41463	1337.573
FR	2000	LO_2002	33	0	0	0
FR	2000	PS_2002	76	6	0	0
FR	2000	EELV_2002	60	1	0	0
FR	2000	UMP_2002	35	1	0	0
FR	2010	EELV_2012	149	20	13.42282	183.2215
FR	2010	MoDem_2012	78	8	10.25641	102.6667
FR	2010	FN_2012	116	3	2.586207	273.1293
FR	2010	PS_2012	94	2	0	0
FR	2010	UMP_2012	40	1	0	0
ITA	1970	PCI_1972	20	3	15	1178.85
ITA	1970	PSI_1972	5	2	0	0
ITA	1970	MSI-DN_1983	364	51	14.01099	104.8022
ITA	1980	PCI_1983	515	24	4.660194	236.8777
ITA	1980	PSI_1983	274	7	2.554745	49.51095
ITA	1980	PRI_1983	486	11	2.263374	11.54321
ITA	1980	DC_1983	102	4	0	0
ITA	1980	MSI-DN_1994	121	18	14.87603	340.6463
ITA	1990	MSI-DN_1994	53	7	13.20755	458.0377
ITA	1990	FI_1994	118	13	11.01695	1110.508
ITA	1990	LN_1994	112	10	8.928571	142.5

Country	Decade	Party-Year	Total Statements	Populist Statements	Percentage	Weighted Populism
ITA	1990	PRC_1994	85	3	3.529412	72.6
ITA	1990	PPI_1994	26	2	0	0
ITA	1990	M5S_2013	38	7	18.42105	330.1053
ITA	2010	M5S_2013	38	7	18.42105	330.1053
ITA	2010	PD_2013	45	5	11.11111	677.3333
ITA	2010	PDL_2013	68	5	7.352941	428.8235
ITA	2010	SC_2013	38	5	0	0
NL	1970	ARP_1971	104	15	14.42308	306
NL	1970	PvdA_1971	61	2	3.278689	492.2951
NL	1970	VVD_1971	98	0	0	0
NL	1970	KVP_1971	40	0	0	0
NL	1980	PvdA_1982	87	11	12.64368	1191.54
NL	1980	VVD_1982	63	2	0	0
NL	1980	CDA_1982	8	0	0	0
NL	1990	VVD_1994	83	12	14.45783	722.8916
NL	1990	D66_1994	128	17	13.28125	370.5469
NL	1990	PvdA_1994	7	0	0	0
NL	1990	CDA_1994	9	0	0	0
NL	2000	GL_2002	156	44	28.20513	681.1538
NL	2000	LPF_2002	25	5	20	1496
NL	2000	CDA_2002	87	9	10.34483	603.931
NL	2000	SP_2002	91	9	9.89011	256.7473
NL	2000	D66_2002	137	11	8.029197	57.32847
NL	2000	PvdA_2002	110	8	7.272727	219.6364
NL	2000	VVD_2002	84	3	3.571429	187

Country	Decade	Party-Year	Total Statements	Populist Statements	Percentage	Weighted Populism
NL	2010	PVV_2012	116	20	17.24138	922.931
NL	2010	PvdA_2012	308	23	7.467532	425.9481
NL	2010	SP_2012	134	9	6.716418	322.3881
NL	2010	CDA_2012	109	5	4.587156	109.1743
NL	2010	VVD_2012	162	7	4.320988	448.2593
NL	2010	D66_2012	222	5	2.252252	28.82883
SE	1970	C_1973	33	1	0	0
SE	1970	FP_1973	32	0	0	0
SE	1970	M_1973	5	0	0	0
SE	1970	S_1973	5	0	0	0
SE	1970	V_1973	12	1	0	0
SE	1980	C_1982	53	0	0	0
SE	1980	FP_1982	15	0	0	0
SE	1980	M_1982	17	0	0	0
SE	1980	S_1982	16	0	0	0
SE	1980	V_1982	33	1	0	0
SE	1990	C_1994	23	0	0	0
SE	1990	FP_1994	38	0	0	0
SE	1990	MP_1994	32	2	0	0
SE	1990	M_1994	32	2	0	0
SE	1990	S_1994	34	0	0	0
SE	1990	V_1994	28	2	0	0
SE	2000	C_2002	25	0	0	0
SE	2000	FP_2002	37	0	0	0
SE	2000	KD_2002	82	2	0	0

Country	Decade	Party-Year	Total Statements	Populist Statements	Percentage	Weighted Populism
SE	2000	M_2002	61	1	0	0
SE	2000	S_2002	37	0	0	0
SE	2000	V_2002	75	2	0	0
SE	2010	SD_2014	52	3	5.769231	282.8077
SE	2010	C_2014	7	0	0	0
SE	2010	FP_2014	11	0	0	0
SE	2010	MP_2014	9	1	0	0
SE	2010	S_2014	58	3	0	0
SE	2010	V_2014	76	5	0	0
SE	2010	_2014	175	1	0	0
UK	1970	Liberal Democrats_1974	58	6	10.34483	397.5517
UK	1970	Con_1974	88	9	10.22727	475.9773
UK	1970	Labour_1974	79	7	8.860759	1319.899
UK	1980	SDP/Alliance_1983	127	12	9.448819	478.1102
UK	1980	Labour_1983	169	15	8.87574	1200.355
UK	1980	Con_1983	83	4	4.819277	796.9157
UK	1990	Labour_1992	53	4	7.54717	1038.491
UK	1990	Liberal Democrats_1992	147	10	6.802721	387.483
UK	1990	Con_1992	219	7	3.196347	508.9224
UK	2000	Con_2001	159	23	14.46541	1696.648
UK	2000	Liberal Democrats_2001	255	23	9.019608	363.1294
UK	2000	Labour_2001	86	7	0	0
UK	2010	Liberal Democrats_2010	83	12	14.45783	332.5301
UK	2010	Con_2010	133	19	14.28571	1598.714
UK	2010	Labour_2010	104	5	0	0

Table 38 – Populism by Country-Decade Raw and Weighted (A.O.)

		Right-Wing Populism		Left-Wing Populism		Total Populism	
Country	Decade	Raw	Fuzzy	Raw	Fuzzy	Raw	Fuzzy
AT	1990s	2293.302	1.0	0	0.1	2293.302	0.9
AT	2000s	231.6547	0.2	1386.018	1.0	1617.672	0.8
AT	2010s	634.0168	0.6	417.4357	0.7	1051.452	0.7
CH	1990s	1002.231	0.8	79.24528	0.1	1081.476	0.7
CH	2000s	4722.55	1.0	462.1488	0.8	5184.699	1.0
CH	2010s	914.375	0.7	1952.754	1.0	2867.129	1.0
DE	1990s	0	0.1	382.1477	0.7	382.1477	0.2
DE	2000s	252.3454	0.2	412.5	0.7	664.8454	0.5
DE	2010s	0	0.1	3373.022	1.0	3373.022	1.0
FR	1990s	0	0.1	261.6338	0.5	261.6338	0.1
FR	2000s	1525.3	0.9	0	0.1	1525.3	0.8
FR	2010s	375.796	0.3	183.2215	0.3	559.0175	0.4
IT	1990s	2051.692	1.0	72.6	0.1	2124.292	0.9
IT	2010s	758.9288	0.7	NA	1.0	1766.367	0.9
NL	1990s	722.8916	0.6	1007.439	0.7	1093.438	0.7
NL	2000s	2286.931	1.0	370.5469	1.0	3501.797	1.0
NL	2010s	1509.193	0.9	1214.866	0.9	2257.53	0.9
SE	1990s	0	0.1	748.3361	0.1	0	0.1
SE	2000s	0	0.1	0	0.1	0	0.1
SE	2010s	282.8077	0.2	0	0.1	282.8077	0.2
UK	1990s	508.9224	0.5	0	1.0	1934.896	0.9
UK	2000s	1696.648	0.9	1425.974	0.6	2059.777	0.9
UK	2010s	1598.714	0.9	363.1294	0.6	1931.244	0.9

Figure 37: Populism in Manifestos (A.O.)



Figure 38: Populism in Manifestos Weighted (A.O.)



Figure 39: Populism in Countries (A.O.)



Figure 40: Populism in Countries Weighted (A.O.)



Appendix 11 – All Solutions without Stigma (A.O.)

Table 39 – Solutions Total Populism without Stigma (A.O.)[160]

```
Conservative Solutions for Total Populism

M1: C*D + c*E + D*CNVG + c*d*cnvg => POP_CAL5

             incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------
1  C*D       0.881  0.824  0.463  0.026  AT_94; DE_02,FR_02; FR_12; FR_95
,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
2  c*E       0.871  0.792  0.453  0.073  NL_12,SE_94; CH_95,CH_11; DE_13,
UK_95; AT_13
3  D*CNVG    0.914  0.869  0.493  0.052  UK_03; AT_13; DE_02,FR_02; FR_95
,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
4  c*d*cnvg  0.820  0.720  0.337  0.027  CH_03; NL_12,SE_94
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------
   M1        0.831  0.775  0.727

Intermediate Solution for Total Populism

M1:    E + C*D + d*cnvg + D*CNVG => POP_CAL5

           incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------
1  E       0.831  0.766  0.610  0.097  NL_12,SE_94; CH_95,CH_11; DE_13,UK
_95; AT_13; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
2  C*D     0.881  0.824  0.463  0.013  AT_94; DE_02,FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,I
T_94,IT_13,UK_10
3  d*cnvg  0.833  0.747  0.369  0.033  CH_03; NL_12,SE_94
4  D*CNVG  0.914  0.869  0.493  0.043  UK_03; AT_13; DE_02,FR_02; FR_95,I
T_94,IT_13,UK_10
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------
   M1      0.820  0.765  0.756

Parsimonious Solution for Total Populism

M1: C + E + d*cnvg + D*CNVG => POP_CAL5

           incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------
1  C       0.886  0.838  0.516  0.029  AT_94; DE_02,FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,I
T_94,IT_13,UK_10
2  E       0.831  0.766  0.610  0.086  NL_12,SE_94; CH_95,CH_11; DE_13,UK
_95; AT_13; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
3  d*cnvg  0.833  0.747  0.369  0.027  CH_03; NL_12,SE_94
4  D*CNVG  0.914  0.869  0.493  0.043  UK_03; AT_13; DE_02,FR_02; FR_95,I
T_94,IT_13,UK_10
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------
   M1      0.822  0.769  0.773
```

[160] Thresholds to determine the membership of the cases in the outcome (full non-membership, crossover point and full membership): 0 – 665 – 2294. To determine the configurations of the truth table considered as sufficient for the outcome the inclusion cut is .85. The same holds true for both analyses, without and with stigma.

Table 40 – Solutions Right-Wing Populism without Stigma (A.O) [161]

Conservative Solution for Right-Wing Populism

M1: C*D + D*CNVG + c*E*CNVG => POP_CAL5

	incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u	cases
1 C*D	0.728	0.614	0.472	0.076	AT_94; DE_02,FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
2 D*CNVG	0.808	0.721	0.538	0.065	UK_03; AT_13; DE_02,FR_02; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
3 c*E*CNVG	0.822	0.680	0.380	0.069	CH_95,CH_11; AT_13
M1	0.763	0.665	0.682		

Intermediate Solution for Right-Wing Populism

M1: C*D + D*CNVG + E*CNVG => POP_CAL5

	incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u	cases
1 C*D	0.728	0.614	0.472	0.076	AT_94; DE_02,FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
2 D*CNVG	0.808	0.721	0.538	0.054	UK_03; AT_13; DE_02,FR_02; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
3 E*CNVG	0.829	0.732	0.521	0.069	CH_95,CH_11; AT_13; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
M1	0.762	0.663	0.682		

Parsimonious Solution for Right-Wing Populism

M1: C + D*CNVG + E*CNVG => POP_CAL5

	incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u	cases
1 C	0.752	0.646	0.540	0.113	AT_94; DE_02,FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
2 D*CNVG	0.808	0.721	0.538	0.054	UK_03; AT_13; DE_02,FR_02; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
3 E*CNVG	0.829	0.732	0.521	0.039	CH_95,CH_11; AT_13; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
M1	0.770	0.680	0.720		

[161] Thresholds to determine the membership of the cases in the outcome (full non-membership, crossover point and full membership): 0 – 509 – 1697. To determine the configurations of the truth table that are considered as sufficient for the outcome the inclusion cut is .77. The same holds true for both analyses, without and with stigma.

Table 41 – Solutions Left-Wing Populism without Stigma (A.O.) [162]

```
Conservative Solution for Left-Wing Populism

M1: c*D + D*CNVG + c*E*CNVG => POP_CAL5

             incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------
1  c*D       0.824  0.711  0.535  0.167  AT_02,DE_94; UK_03; DE_13,UK_95;
AT_13
2  D*CNVG    0.746  0.608  0.485  0.116  UK_03; AT_13; DE_02,FR_02; FR_95
,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
3  c*E*CNVG  0.830  0.687  0.375  0.054  CH_95,CH_11; AT_13
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------
   M1        0.740  0.636  0.706

Intermediate Solution for Left-Wing Populism

M1:    c*D + D*CNVG + E*CNVG => POP_CAL5

           incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------
1  c*D     0.824  0.711  0.535  0.167  AT_02,DE_94; UK_03; DE_13,UK_95; A
T_13
2  D*CNVG  0.746  0.608  0.485  0.029  UK_03; AT_13; DE_02,FR_02; FR_95,I
T_94,IT_13,UK_10
3  E*CNVG  0.757  0.616  0.465  0.056  CH_95,CH_11; AT_13; FR_95,IT_94,IT
_13,UK_10
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------
   M1      0.741  0.637  0.708

Parsimonious Solutions for Left-Wing Populism

M1: c*D + E*CNVG + (C*CNVG) => POP_CAL5
M2: c*D + E*CNVG + (D*CNVG) => POP_CAL5

                              -------------------
           incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  (M1)   (M2)   cases
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------
1  c*D     0.824  0.711  0.535  0.167  0.205  0.167  AT_02,DE_94; UK_03;
DE_13,UK_95; AT_13
2  E*CNVG  0.757  0.616  0.465  0.032  0.032  0.056  CH_95,CH_11; AT_13;
FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------
3  C*CNVG  0.784  0.645  0.408  0.000  0.022         DE_02,FR_02; FR_95,I
T_94,IT_13,UK_10
4  D*CNVG  0.746  0.608  0.485  0.007         0.029  UK_03; AT_13; DE_02,
FR_02; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
```

[162] Thresholds to determine the membership of the cases in the outcome (full non-membership, crossover point and full membership): 0 – 262 – 749. To determine the configurations of the truth table that are considered as sufficient for the outcome the inclusion cut is .8. The same holds true for both analyses, without and with stigma.

```
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------
   M1       0.749  0.646  0.701
   M2       0.741  0.637  0.708
```

Appendix 12 – All Solutions with Stigma (A.O.)

Table 42 – Solutions Total Populism with Stigma (A.O.)

Conservative Solutions for Total Populism

```
M1: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*CNVG + c*E*cnvg*s + D*e*CNVG*s + (c*e*cnvg*S + c*
E*CNVG*S) => POP_CAL5
M2: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*CNVG + c*E*cnvg*s + D*e*CNVG*s + (c*e*cnvg*S + D*
E*CNVG*S) => POP_CAL5
M3: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*CNVG + c*E*cnvg*s + D*e*CNVG*s + (c*E*CNVG*S + D*
e*cnvg*S) => POP_CAL5
M4: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*CNVG + c*E*cnvg*s + D*e*CNVG*s + (D*e*cnvg*S + D*
E*CNVG*S) => POP_CAL5
```

		incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u	(M1)	(M2)	(M3)	(M4)	cases
1	C*D*CNVG	0.912	0.860	0.372	0.020	0.020	0.020	0.020	0.020	DE_02; FR_02; UK_10; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
2	c*d*S	0.932	0.895	0.417	0.062	0.062	0.081	0.086	0.122	CH_03; NL_94,NL_02; NL_12; CH_95,CH_11
3	C*D*S	0.886	0.832	0.397	0.027	0.029	0.029	0.027	0.027	AT_94; FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
4	c*E*cnvg*s	0.868	0.766	0.297	0.043	0.043	0.043	0.043	0.043	SE_94; DE_13,UK_95
5	D*e*CNVG*s	0.933	0.847	0.285	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.012	UK_03; DE_02
6	c*e*cnvg*S	0.916	0.856	0.315	0.003	0.012	0.012			CH_03; AT_02
7	c*E*CNVG*S	0.952	0.903	0.299	0.003	0.011		0.011		CH_95,CH_11; AT_13
8	D*e*cnvg*S	0.922	0.860	0.287	0.008			0.017	0.017	AT_02; AT_94
9	D*E*CNVG*S	0.930	0.877	0.339	0.000		0.008		0.008	AT_13; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
	M1	0.871	0.828	0.747						
	M2	0.871	0.827	0.744						
	M3	0.872	0.829	0.752						
	M4	0.871	0.828	0.749						

Intermediate Solution for Total Populism

```
M1:    E + S + D*CNVG => POP_CAL5
```

		incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u	cases
1	E	0.831	0.766	0.610	0.058	SE_94; NL_12; CH_95,CH_11; DE_13,UK_95; AT_13; UK_10; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
2	S	0.880	0.844	0.703	0.183	CH_03; NL_94,NL_02; AT_02; NL_12; CH_95,CH_11; AT_13; AT_94; FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
3	D*CNVG	0.914	0.869	0.493	0.032	UK_03; AT_13; DE_02; FR_02; UK_10; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13

```
------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------
   M1      0.849  0.808  0.870
```

Parsimonious Solution for Total Populism

```
M1: E + S + D*CNVG => POP_CAL5

           incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases
------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------
1  E       0.831  0.766  0.610  0.058  SE_94; NL_12; CH_95,CH_11; DE_13,U
K_95; AT_13; FR_12; UK_10; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
2  S       0.880  0.844  0.703  0.183  CH_03; NL_94,NL_02; NL_12; CH_95,C
H_11; AT_02; AT_13; AT_94; FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
3  D*CNVG  0.914  0.869  0.493  0.032  UK_03; AT_13; DE_02; FR_02; UK_10;
FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------
   M1      0.849  0.808  0.870
```

Table 43 – Solutions Right-wing Populism with Stigma (A.O.)

Conservative Solutions for Right-Wing Populism

```
M1: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*E*CNVG + c*D*e*s*CNVG + (c*e*S*cnvg + c*E*S*CNVG)
=> POP_CAL5
M2: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*E*CNVG + c*D*e*s*CNVG + (c*e*S*cnvg + D*E*S*CNVG)
=> POP_CAL5
M3: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*E*CNVG + c*D*e*s*CNVG + (c*E*S*CNVG + D*e*S*cnvg)
=> POP_CAL5
M4: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*E*CNVG + c*D*e*s*CNVG + (D*e*S*cnvg + D*E*S*CNVG)
=> POP_CAL5
```

		incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u	(M1)	(M2)	(M3)	(M4)	cases
1	c*d*S	0.873	0.799	0.482	0.076	0.076	0.100	0.105	0.173	CH_03; NL_94,NL_02; NL_12; CH_95,CH_11
2	C*D*S	0.786	0.677	0.434	0.043	0.045	0.045	0.043	0.043	AT_94; FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
3	C*D*E*CNVG	0.816	0.708	0.365	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025	UK_10; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
4	c*D*e*s*CNVG	0.804	0.620	0.279	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.014	UK_03
5	c*e*S*cnvg	0.805	0.657	0.341	0.000	0.000	0.000			CH_03; AT_02
6	c*E*S*CNVG	0.918	0.832	0.355	0.001	0.011		0.011		CH_95,CH_11; AT_13
7	D*e*S*cnvg	0.800	0.665	0.307	0.010			0.010	0.010	AT_02; AT_94
8	D*E*S*CNVG	0.889	0.804	0.399	0.000		0.010		0.010	AT_13; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
	M1	0.785	0.703	0.742						
	M2	0.787	0.705	0.741						
	M3	0.790	0.711	0.752						
	M4	0.792	0.713	0.751						

Intermediate Solution for Right-Wing Populism

```
M1:    S + c*D*CNVG + D*E*CNVG => POP_CAL5
```

	incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u	cases
1 S	0.786	0.709	0.775	0.341	CH_03; NL_94,NL_02; NL_12; CH_95,CH_11; AT_02; AT_13; AT_94; FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
2 c*D*CNVG	0.823	0.695	0.360	0.014	UK_03; AT_13
3 D*E*CNVG	0.832	0.733	0.452	0.029	AT_13; UK_10; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
M1	0.769	0.695	0.842		

Parsimonious Solutions for Right-Wing Populism

```
M1: S + c*D*CNVG + (C*E) => POP_CAL5
```

```
M2: S + c*D*CNVG + (E*CNVG) => POP_CAL5

                                        ------------------
             incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  (M1)   (M2)   cases
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
1  S         0.786  0.709  0.775  0.216  0.254  0.273  CH_03; NL_94,NL_02
; NL_12; CH_95,CH_11; AT_02; AT_13; AT_94; FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_1
3
2  c*D*CNVG  0.823  0.695  0.360  0.014  0.019  0.014  UK_03; AT_13
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
3  C*E       0.768  0.637  0.452  0.000  0.018         UK_10; FR_12; FR_9
5,IT_94,IT_13
4  E*CNVG    0.829  0.732  0.521  0.012         0.030  CH_95,CH_11; AT_13
; UK_10; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
   M1        0.764  0.688  0.831
   M2        0.762  0.686  0.843
```

Table 44 – Solutions Left-Wing Populism with Stigma (A.O.)

Conservative Solutions for Left-Wing Populism

```
M1: c*d*CNVG*S + c*D*cnvg*s + C*D*CNVG*s + c*E*CNVG*S + (c*D*e*s) => POP_
CAL5
M2: c*d*CNVG*S + c*D*cnvg*s + C*D*CNVG*s + c*E*CNVG*S + (D*e*CNVG*s) => P
OP_CAL5

                                          ------------------
               incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  (M1)   (M2)   cases
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------
1  c*d*CNVG*S  0.822  0.707  0.350  0.056  0.056  0.056  NL_94,NL_02; CH_
95,CH_11
2  c*D*cnvg*s  0.820  0.703  0.362  0.049  0.049  0.128  DE_94; DE_13,UK_
95
3  C*D*CNVG*s  0.918  0.822  0.307  0.029  0.055  0.029  DE_02; UK_10
4  c*E*CNVG*S  0.828  0.668  0.313  0.017  0.017  0.017  CH_95,CH_11; AT_
13
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------
5  c*D*e*s     0.846  0.709  0.377  0.000  0.014         DE_94; UK_03
6  D*e*CNVG*s  0.878  0.761  0.323  0.000         0.014  UK_03; DE_02
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------
   M1          0.849  0.773  0.636
   M2          0.849  0.773  0.636
```

Intermediate Solution for Left-Wing Populism

```
M1:    D*s + c*CNVG*S => POP_CAL5

             incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------
1  D*s       0.843  0.742  0.508  0.260  DE_94; UK_03; DE_13,UK_95; DE_02
; UK_10
2  c*CNVG*S  0.834  0.729  0.399  0.151  NL_94,NL_02; CH_95,CH_11; AT_13
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------
   M1        0.838  0.763  0.660
```

Parsimonious Solution for Left-Wing Populism

```
M1: D*s + c*CNVG*S => POP_CAL5

             incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------
1  D*s       0.843  0.742  0.508  0.260  DE_94; UK_03; DE_13,UK_95; DE_02
; UK_10
2  c*CNVG*S  0.834  0.729  0.399  0.151  NL_94,NL_02; CH_95,CH_11; AT_13
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------
   M1        0.838  0.763  0.660
```

Appendix 13 – Robustness test without "Convergence" (A.O.)

Table 45 – Robustness Test without "Convergence" (A.O.) With Stigma

Parsimonious Solutions for Total Populism

M1: S + C*E => POP_CAL5

	incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u	cases
1 S	0.881	0.843	0.758	0.350	CH_03,NL_94,NL_02; CH_95,CH_11,NL_12; AT_02; AT_13; AT_94,FR_02; FR_95,FR_12,IT_94
2 C*E	0.913	0.871	0.441	0.033	UK_10; FR_95,FR_12,IT_94
M1	0.854	0.810	0.792		

Parsimonious Solutions for Right-Wing Populism

M1: S + C*E => POP_CAL5

	incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u	cases
1 S	0.885	0.850	0.773	0.330	CH_03,NL_94,NL_02; CH_95,CH_11,NL_12; AT_02; AT_13; AT_94,FR_02; FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,IT_13
2 C*E	0.910	0.871	0.474	0.031	UK_10; FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,IT_13
M1	0.856	0.815	0.804		

Parsimonious Solutions for Left-Wing Populism

M1: c*S + D*S + C*D*E => POP_CAL5

	incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u	cases
1 c*S	0.879	0.822	0.555	0.163	CH_03,NL_94,NL_02; CH_95,CH_11,NL_12; AT_02; AT_13
2 D*S	0.877	0.819	0.533	0.039	AT_02; AT_13; AT_94,FR_02; FR_95,FR_12,IT_94
3 C*D*E	0.906	0.859	0.405	0.033	UK_10; FR_95,FR_12,IT_94
M1	0.849	0.800	0.729		

Table 46 – Robustness Test without "Convergence" (A.O.) Without Stigma

Parsimonious Solutions for Total Populism

M1: C => POP_CAL5

	incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u	cases
1 C	0.895	0.849	0.542	-	AT_94,DE_02,FR_02; FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,UK_10
M1	0.895	0.849	0.542		

Parsimonious Solutions for Right-Wing Populism

M1: C => POP_CAL5

	incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u	cases
1 C	0.895	0.851	0.569	-	AT_94,DE_02,FR_02; FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
M1	0.895	0.851	0.569		

Parsimonious Solutions for Left-Wing Populism

M1: C*D => POP_CAL5

	incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u	cases
1 C*D	0.883	0.825	0.478	-	AT_94,DE_02,FR_02; FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,UK_10
M1	0.883	0.825	0.478		

Appendix 14 – Statistical significance (A.O.)

Table 47 – Statistical Significance Unweighted Populism (A.O.)

Dependent Variable: Percentage of populist statements in manifestos

	All Parties		Mainstream Parties	
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**
Intercept	6.28*	9.84***	6.84***	8.26***
	(2.57)	(2.56)	(2.07)	(2.08)
1970s	0.15	-3.41	0.13	-1.29
	(1.91)	(1.87)	(1.75)	(1.76)
1980s	0.46	-3.10	1.52	0.10
	(1.78)	(1.76)	(1.70)	(1.70)
1990s		-3.56*		-1.42
		(1.62)		(1.62)
2000s	2.08	-1.48	2.15	0.74
	(1.72)	(1.68)	(1.69)	(1.69)
2010s	3.56*		1.42	
	(1.62)		(1.62)	
Length (cent)	2.35	2.35	1.04	1.04
	(1.42)	(1.42)	(1.40)	(1.40)
AIC	1175.98	1175.98	734.37	734.37
BIC	1223.36	1223.36	775.93	775.93
Log Likelihood	-572.99	-572.99	-352.19	-352.19
Num. Obs.	174	174	118	118
Num. Groups: Parties	65	65	41	41
Var: Parties (Intercept)	6.01	6.01	2.53	2.53
Var: Residual	51.59	51.59	32.44	32.44

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Results of two-level regression models with party manifestos nested in parties. All models contain country-dummies (not shown). The observations are 174 because the 5 Star Movement's manifesto is coded both as left-wing and right-wing.

Table 48 – Statistical Significance Weighted Populism (A.O.)

Dependent Variable: Percentage of populist statements in manifestos (weighted)

	All Parties		Mainstream Parties	
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**
Intercept	627.56***	709.90***	684.51***	754.66***
	(155.77)	(154.49)	(147.45)	(147.92)
1970s	-48.84	-131.17	-89.52	-159.66
	(131.76)	(128.56)	(122.85)	(123.39)
1980s	42.76	-39.57	56.13	-14.01
	(123.50)	(120.78)	(119.11)	(119.17)
1990s		-82.33		-70.14
		(111.17)		(113.83)
2000s	169.58	87.25	80.53	10.39
	(119.66)	(116.13)	(118.57)	(118.70)
2010s	82.33		70.14	
	(111.17)		(113.83)	
Length_cent	91.46	91.46	-41.70	-41.70
	(96.57)	(96.57)	(98.63)	(98.63)
AIC	2531.65	2531.65	1627.78	1627.78
BIC	2579.04	2579.04	1669.34	1669.34
Log Likelihood	-1250.83	-1250.83	-798.89	-798.89
Num. Obs.	174	174	118	118
Num. Groups: Parties	65	65	41	41
Var: Parties (Intercept)	1851.03	1851.02	14320.56	14320.56
Var: Residual	253744.57	253744.58	159640.72	159640.72

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Results of two-level regression models with party manifestos nested in parties. All models contain country-dummies (not shown).